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Preface
This thesis is the result of research that started with two observations and
three general aims. In the first place, it was observed that most non-
monotonic formalisms in the literature depict non-monotonic reasoning as a
complicated mechanism, while on the other hand, human non-monotonic
reasoning seems a trivial procedure. In the second place, it was realized that
(human) non-monotonic reasoning is not necessarily less rational than, say,
mathematical reasoning. These seemingly unconnected observations gave
rise to the somewhat unusual approach to non-monotonic logic of this thesis.
While non-monotonic reasoning is typically considered and studied as a
subdiscipline of artificial reasoning, we aimed at an approach that depicts
non-monotony as a respectable subject of (mathematical) logic. A first
important task, for example, is to extend classical propositional logic with
"defeasible" implication in a convincing way. Defeasible implication should
be taken seriously as a sensible alternative for "ordinary" implication.
A second general aim was to depict non-monotonic reasoning as a natural
phenomenon and to keep our formalisms as simple as possible. The third
major aim was to use non-monotonic reasoning for reflections on
.foundatiorral issues. For example, it seems that human reasoning is "too
non-monotonic" to be mathematically formalizable. Is it possible to prove or
to understand this "non-formalizability"?
More concretely, we presume that there exists a"calculus of nales-with-
possible-exceptions," aoverned by general principles that are themselves
rules-with-possible-exceptions. We will be interested in non-monotonic
formalisms in which at leasC some of the rules of inference are defeasible.
Do such formalisms exist'? How to construct them? How do they behave in
comparison to other non-monotonic formalisms?
Before we can address such issues, however, a lot of work has to be done.
We will use elementary topology to define a semantics of defeasible
implication. The definition will generalize situations like "if E is a line and P
is a point in the Euclidean plane, then typically P is not on E; but if P is
known to be on ~, this conclusion is no longer sanctioned." Starting from
these topological notions, we will construct simple formalisms in which, for
example, the rule of monotony is valid-up-to-possible-exceptions. This will
have interesting foundational consequences.
We will not aim at constructing exact descriptions of practical reasoning, nor
at prescriptions for systems of artificial reasoning. Nevertheless, it is hoped
that this thesis will contribute to the understanding of non-monotony as it
occurs in practical reasoning and as it should occur in artificial reasoning.
Tilburg I's-Hertogenbosch ~ Ravenstein, Summer 1997
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Some standard notations, as used in this thesis
{... I... } the set of all ... such that ...
... E... ... is an element of the set ...
... 3... the set ... contains the element ...
... c... ... is a subset of ...
... - ... ... equals ...
... ~ ... ... is distinct from ...
P~ empty set; (unique) set without elements
~(X) power set of the set X; the set of all subsets of X
A x B the set of all pairs (a, b) such that a E A and b E B
A n B the intersection of A with B; the set of all elements that A has
in common with B
A U B the union of A and B; the set of all elements that are in A, or in
B, or in both
UA the union of all sets A such that ... ;
{ x I x E A for some set A satisfying ... }
X~ A the set of all elements of X that are not in A
A~ (relative) complement of A; X` A for some set X
...n... ...and...
~ ... not ...
~ implies
~ (only) if; if and only if
b'...[...] for all ... : ...
IN the set of all natural numbers; { 0, 1, 2, ... }
7Z the set of all integers; {..., -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, ... }
Q~ the set of all rational numbers ( fractions, including negative
numbers)
IR the set of all real numbers ( the set of points on a line)
t~ the set of all complex numbers (the set of points in a plane)
~ see 5.7 and p. 43
l~ see p. 54
4~ ~ see 7.3
~] end of proof
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Although the core of this thesis consists of mathematical defini-
tions that could very well speak for themselves, this chapter will
provide a number of possible motivations for them. The presen-
tation will be rather informal, and many terms, such as
"reasoning," "logically correct" or "classical logic," will be used
without further specification.
~1 Roots
The subject of this dissertation is non-monotonic logic. This term refers to
the investigation of formal systems of logic that fail to satisfy the principle of
monotony: "if some collection of premisses supports some conclusion, then
any larger collection of premisses will support that conclusion as well."
The interest in such systems originally arose from research in artificial intel-
ligence, in particular in connection with what is usually called the frame
problem ( to be explained below). Besides that, logicians have long been
aware of the existence of non-deductive reasoning. But formalizing such
types of reasoning leads to severe difficulties unless a non-monotonic
formalism is accepted as a sensible option. Let us consider some examples.
- The,frame problem is about finding an efficient representation of know-
ledge about changing domains and of the typical inertia principle that people
seem to apply so easily in reasoning about them (for example, when reading
a novel or hearing a fairytale). Intuitively, this inertia principle could be
stated as "things keep on going as usual, unless we are told otherwise." For
instance: on the table there is a green block, a blue block and a red block.
The blue block is removed. What blocks are left on the table? The obviously
intended answer is "(only) the green block and the red block." But, for
example, the assumptions
At(table, blockl, t0), green(blockl),
At(table, block2, t0), blue(block2),
At(table, block3, t0), red(block3),
Removed(block2, t1)
(where t 0 and t 1 denote time-points)
do not imply, e.g.,
At(table, block3, t2)
nor ~At ( table, block4 , t2 ) .
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And indeed, the "obviously intended answer" is not logically implied by the
premisses, unless it is assumed that no other blocks were on the table than
the ones mentioned and that no other blocks were removed than the one
mentioned. Finding out, for example, that there was a purple block on the
table before we started and that the red block was also removed will force
us to withdraw the formerly correct answer. The problem is to automatize
the process of finding the intended answer, thus formalizing, in some way,
the inertia principle involved. As this is a process in which some knowledge
leads to some conclusions, we may refer to this process as (a non-standard
type ot) reasoning. The idea is to view the answer as implied by the
premisses, where implication has some non-standard interpretation. Some
have suggested that the word entailment should be used rather than
implication.
Formalizing this type of reasoning (i.e., completely describing the entailment
relation) in its full generality is a delicate matter, as is apparent from the fol-
lowing example: Fred is in the kitchen, sitting at a white table, admiring his
green wallpaper. One week later, we visit him again. We typically expect
that the white table will still be there and that the wallpaper will still be
green (as a matter of fact, we silently assume that the kitchen will still be
there). But do we expect that Fred will still be in the kitchen? A sentence
like In ( kitchen, table ) should, once true, typically remain true,
while In ( kitchen, Fred) should not. But In ( cof f in, Fred) , in
its turn, should. A convincing formal treatment of a useful and sensible
entailment relation is still pending.
Some other sources of non-monotonic reasoning :
- An interesting task for artificial intelligence in general is the design of an
intelligent (artificial) secretary with the ability to understand ordinary text
and conversation. Such a system should, among other things, be able to
handle trivial-but-withdrawable conclusions. For example, if we order a cup
of tea with sugar, the system should understand that we will not be happy
with a cup of tea with both sugar and diesel oil in it But this trivial
conclusion should not be drawn if a cup of tea with both sugar and diesel oil
is explicitly ordered.
- Formalizing inductive reasonirig may also lead to non-monotony: after
seeing 1273 swans, each one of them white, we draw the conclusion "all
swans are white." Observing a black swan forces us to withdraw that
conclusion. Inductive reasoning is related to the type of reasoning involved
in tasks like: "complete the following row: 1, 3, 2, 4, 3, 5, ... ". The
~
obviously intended answer ("4, 6, 5, 7, ...") is withdrawn after hearing that
the next number is not 4.
- Abductive (diagnostic) reasoriirig : both diseases D and D' cause symptom
P. D causes symptom Q as well. A patient showing P but not Q is concluded
to have dísease D'. Hearing about another disease, D", causing P but not Q,
would force us to withdraw that conclusion.
- Dialecticnl reasoning (reasoning by arguments and counterarguments) is a
very common type of reasoning, used, e.g., in court, in political debate, and
in meetings. In court, only available information can be taken into account,
and a decision has to be made within a limited amount of time. The court's
conclusions will be considered correct provided certain rules have not been
violated (if it was a fair trial). Nevertheless, it is possible that new
information will shed new light on a case, or that the availability of more in-
formation would lead to a different result.
The examples mentioned so far depict non-monotonic logic as investigating
formalizations of non-standard types of reasoning; reasoning that is, in
principle, incorrect. Indeed, in the literature on non-monotonic logic, non-
monotonic formalisms are usually thought of as models of certain types of
human reasoning that deviate rather drastically from correct reasoning, but
that are remarkably efficient and useful for certain practical purposes. Non-
monotonic formalisms, then, are acknowledged to be models of incorrect
reasoning. Sometimes it is even argued (e.g., in [Flach 95]) that logic,
investigating human reasoning, should not, in the first place, be concerned
with distinguishing correct from incorrect reasoning, but rather with
modelling or describing all kinds of human reasoning. (We do not agree with
this position; see ~3 for more remarks on the purpose of logic.) In both
cases, it is held that we should be interested in logics differing from classical
logic because humans happen to reason incorrectly most of the time.
One of the primary motivations for this dissertation is to take non-monotony
more seriously. This can be done in several ways. One possibility is to point
out some blind spots of classical logic, formalize the neglected phenomena,
and find out that the resulting formalism is non-monotonic. After all,
classical logic (say, first order predicate logic) does in fact neglect some
phenomena typical for human reasoning that could hardly be called irrational
or incorrect and some of these phenomena would lead to non-monotonic
formalisms.
For example, humans usually know how to take their own fallibility into
account. In reasoning, they might take into account possible failure of as-
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sumptions, of arguments, or of necessary silent presumptions. Reasoning
that cannot deal with its own failure might be considered irrational.
However, classical logic traditionally avoids this issue altogether. Below, we
will see how this phenomenon may lead to non-monotony. Another
phenomenon neglected by classical logic that may lead to non-monotony is
the multitude of possible interpretations that implication might have, each
one distinct from the conception of implication as used in predicate logic (as
well as in mathematical reasoning in general). That another definition of
implication may lead to non-monotony can be seen, e.g., in conditional logic
(see [Lewis 73]), or in the rest of this dissertation. Both phenomena will play
a role in the things to follow.
Another possibility, not necessarily incompatible with the former, is to rea-
lize that a formal system, such as predicate logic, is best seen as a mathe-
matical model (of something that we have called a type of reasoning). But a
model is like a caricature, emphasizing certain aspects, neglecting others.
And it is not uncommon for an object to have two different models. This
leads us to the first main point of departure of this dissertation: we want to
view both classical logic and non-monotonic logic as caricatures of the
same type of reasoning. Consequently, we will restrict our attention to those
forms of non-monotony that are compatible with this point of view. This
excludes most examples in the beginning of this section.
The type of non-monotony that we want to study is best illustrated by the
following example. John is always home at 6 o'clock, it's 6 o'clock now,
and John is not hnme (now).
What conclusions can be drawn from this combination of assumptions?
Let us rephrase "John is always home at 6 o'clock" as "if it is 6 o'clock, then
John is home." Then the assumptions may be written as p~ q, p, ~q, where
p denotes "it is 6 o'clock now" and q denotes "John is home now."
If we interpret implication ("~") as implication-without-possible-
exceptions, as is usual in mathematics, this set of assumptions is
contradictory, and we may conclude anything from it, including "I am the
emperor of China," as well as "John is home now." However, in everyday
life, we would usually take into account the possible failure of "John is
always home at 6 o'clock" in exceptional cases. Hence, we would not
consider "John is home now" to be a sensible conclusion to those three
assumptions. In particular, the combination of assumptions is not
inconsistent.
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On the other hand, knowing how to handle possible exceptions to an
implicational statement does not necessarily mean that we do not take the
statement seriously (as a statement expressing implication). For example, the
combination of just the two assumptions "John is always home at 6 o'clock"
and "it is 6 o'clock now" should allow "John is home now" as a sensible
conclusion.





However, with a less pedantic interpretation of implication as well as infer-
ence, we could accept p~ q' p as valid, but not p~ q' p' ~q
q q
(which shows that the resulting inference relation would be non-monotonic),
nor p~ q1P' ~q (since "-~" amounts to implication-with-possible-
exceptions).
In Chapters 2 and 3, we will present mathematical definitions of implication-
with-possible-exceptions and of an inference relation that behave as indica-
ted.
If we say that implication as used in everyday reasoning rarely amounts to
implication-without-possible-exceptions, it is important to understand that
this is not a linguistic issue. Although it is also true that conditional sen-
tences as used in natural language may allow exceptions, we consider
implication to be an instrument used by humans to organize or represent
knowledge in their mind, without the help of natural language. It just hap-
pens not to be an essential aspect of implication that it cannot have excep-
tions. On the contrary, implication signifies the existence of a rule. But rules
may have exceptions and nevertheless be valid. Hence, in this dissertation,
we will take the position that it is natural to interpret implication as
implication-as-a-rule-with-possible-exceptions. We will defend this
viewpoint, not by argumentation leading to a conclusion, but by
investigating its mathematical consequences and possibilities.
We want to study non-monotonic logic as a subdiscipline of logic, using
mathematical methods. There is reason to doubt, however, whether the
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mathematical methods typically used in logic will suffice. The activity, at
present, in the field of non-monotonic reasoning can roughly be divided into
two sectors. The first sector consists of proposals for concrete prescriptions,
usually stemming from an attempt to simulate human reasoning processes.
Most of them either use probabilistic considerations (e.g., [Adams 75],
[Bacchus 90]; see also [Geffner 92]), try to model reasoninQ-by-lack-of-
information (e.g., default logic and auto-epistemic logic, see [Brewka 91 ]),
or involve some minimalization of possible models, minimizing, for
example, the collection of unexplained exceptions to rules or unexpected
changes in a changing domain (e.g., circumscription, see [Brewka 91]).
Since most of these "concrete" approaches were designed with a number of
concrete examples in mind, they typically lack generality. The general
tendency in this sector is towards more and more complicated machinery
(for example, [Nait Abdallah 95], 715 pages).
The second sector consists of more axiomatic approaches, in which it is
asked what properties some reasonable system should or may have (e.g.,
[KLM 90], [Flach 95], but we can also consider [AGM 85] to be in this
sector). These approaches mimic classical logic in that completeness results
are used to establish connections between semantical constructions and
axiom systems. Since we aim at a logical, non-adhoc approach, it will be
clear that it is this sector that will be of interest to us. But the approaches in
this sector have problems analogous to those in the first sector. Most
proposed axiom systems seem either too weak or too strong. Which brings
us to another main issue with which we began our inquiry: why is it so
di~cult to find a convincing formal treatment of these types of reasoning,
while, at the same time, humans seem to handle them so easily?
Of course, there is a variety of essentially different types of non-monotonic
reasoning and it is to be expected that, say, abductive reasoning will need an
other formalization than, say, inductive reasoning. Moreover, a typical
"common sense" argument may involve a combination of several different
types of inference. There is no doubt that this drastically complicates the
task of formalization. However, looking at the attempts so far, this does not
seem to be the main difficulty, since most of the approaches restrict their
attention to a single type of reasoning, proposing some axiom system and
then finding some counterintuitive examples of the very type of reasoning
they were intended to axiomatize. One possible answer to this question will
be informally sketched in ~2 below. At this stage, two comments should be
made. In the fïrst place, answering the question of why it is so difficult
should not be confused with solving the difficulty itself. In the second place,
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since we will present no more than an informal sketch, it is not and cannot
be claimed that ~2 provides the only answer. Our answer will essentially be
to indicate a lack of expressive power of the mathematical modelling
methods used in most approaches, in particular, the way in which rules of
inference are interpreted.
It is in this context that one may ask, what would happen if K.e interpret
rules of inference, bein~ implicational .rtatements, as rcrle.c-with-possible-
exceptions? This dissertation is, by and large, an attempt to provide
mathematical methods by which this (latter) question may be investigated.
~2 On the Nature of Models
This section will informally present motivations for the contents of this
dissertation, resulting from reflection on the mathematical methods that are
(to be) used in logic. In particular, from ref7ection on the notion of a model.
The word "model" is usually associated with resemblance, a model being
either the original or an image of something else. In mathematics, however,
any mathematical structure is called a model, and the term is not associated
with resemblance. Some models are acknowledged to have been inspired by
some product of human imagination, but, once a useful model has been
completely specified, the original source of inspiration is typically ignored,
nomenclature excepted. In this section (only), we will use the term "model"
to denote any image (of something else), usually, but not necessarily, an
abstract, schematic presentation. A mathematical model, then, is a
mathematical structure intended to bear some resernblarzce to something
else. A single object may have more than one decent model, analogous to
the possibility of having several different pictures of a single object. In
addition, a model is like a caricature, exaggerating certain properties,
ignoring others. It typically resembles the original only in some respects.
Finally, a model is like an approximation: susceptible to improvement or
precization. Let us give an example.
Fred,ftts into his p}jamas. His pyjamas fit into his suitcase. Fred does nnt
fit into h~is suitcase.
A possible model of the contents of these sentences is:
Fred - Fred's pyjamas - Fred's suitcase
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In this model, the relation "...fits into..." is represented by an intransitive
relation (that is, a relation ...R... such that aRb, bRc does not imply aRc).
This does not necessarily imply, however, that the relation we originally had
in mind really is intransitive, as is apparent from the following precization of
this model :
Fred's pyjamas (when he has them on)
' ~
Fred Fred's suitcase
Fred's pyjamas (folded together)
The former model can still be considered to be a decent and accurate model,
however.
From this example, several things can be learned.
The first is that, under certain circumstances, a transitive relation may be
adequately represented by an intransitive relation. Equivalently, claiming
that some intransitive relation is an accurate representation of a certain
relation does not amount to claiming that the relation at issue is really
intransitive. To return to the subject of non-monotony, let us rephrase the
example.
If somezhing is a penguin., it is n bird. If sometfTing is a bird it (has the
properry that it) can~ fly. If it is aperaguin, it cannot fly.








In this way, a formal system of logic in which the relation of implication is
intransitive could be an accurate mathematical model of a type of reasoning
in which implication is a transitive relation. Likewise, it should be possible
to design a non-monotonic formal logic that can be seen as a decent and
accurate model of an ordinary, monotonic type of reasoning. In this thesis,
however, we will not proceed in this direction.
Another point is that something like Fred's pyjamas, which seems to be
representable as a single object without any danger of confusion, suddenly
seems an ambiguous concept in the more precise model. This phenomenon
is typical for the kind of notions that arise in practical argumentation. Such
notions typically are abstractions, enabling us to classify different objects or
perceptions as equivalent-in-some-respect. The ability to form and handle
abstract notions of this kind is a fundamental and indispensable instrument
for humans to organize real-world knowledge. Even the perception of a
single object as a single object is essentially due to an identification of
various perceptions.
However, as the example shows, two notions equivalent in some respects
may fail to be equivalent in some other respects. Hence, any mathematical
structure, being a fixed set of elements with a fixed equivalence relation
(namely "equality"), when intended to model a number of notions stemming
from practical argumentation, will typically be susceptible to precization,
like the model in our example. But this precization, in its turn, will also be
susceptible to precization, and so on.
A related issue is the following. It is common knowledge among
mathematicians that natural language does not lend itself to precise
definitions or descriptions of any kind. Any natural language description is
susceptible to misunderstanding. Attempts to clarify a particular description
by providing an additional explanation in natural language leaves just one
more description, susceptible of (other) misunderstanding. Mathematicians
use artificial notations and notions, a"language" felt to be superior to natural
languages, in that respect. However, for the delineation of notions that arise
in practical argumentation, there is no reason to suppose that this
mathematical language is any better. But it would be downright strange if
notions (seemingly) unfit for mathematical treatment were to be discarded as
unsensible on these grounds rather than blaming a deficiency in the
(mathematical) language used. Consider the following metaphor:
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Someone is looking at a piece of paper and claims he has a precisely
determined point in mind. A sceptical opponent demands that he
draws it. The person draws some spot with a pencil, whereupon his
opponent gets a magnifying glass and denies the claim. Using the
same magnifying glass and more accurate drawing material, a more
precise spot is located. The opponent gets a stronger magnifying
glass and, again, denies the claim. After some attempts, the person
refuses further discussion, blames his drawing material but maintains
his original claim. The opponent's denial remains ...
Mathematicians consider a spot drawn with a pencil to be no more than an
approximation of a real point, while a real po;nt is "infinitely precise,"
hence, essentially undrawable. In view of the above metaphor, it is good to
know that there is another treatment of the same aeometrical intuitions,
namely Johannes Hjelmslev's approach called "natural geometry" (see
[Hjelmslev 23]), which takes "rough spots" seriously, and ignores the
infinitely precise points as unnecessary idealizations. We could compare
notions as arising from practical reasoning to precise points, and we already
depicted their representations in mathematical models as approximations.
Thus, it is to be expected that Hjelmslev's approach is of some value for the
study of mathematical representation of notions arising from practical
reasoning. Unfortunately, the mathematical elaborations of Hjelmslev's
geometry, as developed so far, although geometrically very convincing, can
not directly be used for our purposes. In this thesis, instead of adapting
Hjelmslev's geometry for our purposes, we will use elementary topological
notions, which is intended to have the same effect. However, from a
mathematícal viewpoint, the connection between the upcoming definitions
and Hjelmslev's geometrical ideas will not be apparent.
The next point to be learned from the example about Fred's pyjamas is that,
apparently, many situations that are inconsistent according to classical logic,
do have a plausíble interpretation if we take the above-mentioned
phenomenon into account. For example, "R is a transitive relation," "aRb,"
"bRc," "not: aRc" is, classically, an inconsistent combination of
assumptions, but it is not entirely unthinkable. It is not too difficult to define
a class of generalized models and a corresponding definition of truth that
captures this phenomenon. However, such a class of models, when properly
defined, will contain plausible representations of many more situations that
are inconsistent according to classical logic. It is to be expected, then, that
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within such a class of models, only very few "laws of logic" will be valid.
Hence, practical reasoning is probably not susceptible to precise description
using, for example, certain axiom system. To gain insight, nevertheless, into
practical argumentation, other tools are needed.
For example, perhaps rules exist that are valid-(only)-up-to-possible-
exceptions and that capture essential features of practical reasoning. The
elaboration of this idea requires some (mathematical) detïnition of what it
means for a rule to be valid-up-to-possible-exceptions. This is exactly what
we aim at. The following might serve to elucidate our intentions.
In general, the study of complex systems of any kind requires adequate
instruments. A well-known example is the Euclidean axiom system. Before
the emergence of these axioms, geometry was already a well developed field
of knowledge, with numerous theorems. Euclid managed to organize this
large amount of knowledge in a useful way, and to distinguish between
(geometrically) relevant and irrelevant issues (such as, "what exactly is a
point or a straight line?"), solving many controversies by establishing
efficient conventions and habits. One of these was the habit of interpreting
implicational statements as implication-without-exceptions. Thus, the notion
of implication-without-exceptions proved to be an adequate instniment for
organizing that particular amount of knowledge. (Whether it is indispensable
remains to be seen, however.) As the very enterprise of logic was
historically instigated by the success of the Euclidean axiom system, the
notion of implication as developed and investigated in that discipline
traditionally amounts to implication-without-exceptions. Implication-as-a-
rule, that is, with possible exceptions, as defined and investigated in this
thesis, is mainly proposed as a suitable alternative to gain insight into the
nature of practical reasoning.
~3 Practical Argumentation
Other motivations for the study of non-monotonic logic in general, and for
the contents of this thesis in particular, have to do with the purpose of logic.
Logic investigates human reasoning, by analyzing and classifying arguments.
The only purpose of such an investigation is that it should help us to
distinguish good (correct) reasoning from bad (incorrect) reasoning. For
mathematical reasoning, a formalism like predicate logic is quite suitable.
However, reasoning in everyday life is typically non-mathematical (which is
definitely not synonymous with "incorrect"), and the study of logic should, if
possible, be an aid in such practical argumentation as well. As such, the
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investigation of non-monotonic formalisms might be of greater help than the
study of monotonic formalisms, such as predicate logic. 1fie principle of
monotony, as suitable as it may be for mathematical reasoning, is a
misleading principle in practical reasoning, as will be shown by some
examples, below.
Objections to the principle of monotony are often related to analogous
objections to the principle of transitivity: if a implies b, and b implies c, then
a implies c. Or, equivalently, to the assumption that any chain of acceptable
arguments is automatically acceptable as a whole. A very old example of
practical argumentation conflicting with the principle of transitivity is the
famous Sorites paradox, or paradox of the sandheap: any sandheap remains
a sandheap after removing one grain of sand. The remaining sandheap shares
this property. Hence every sandheap remains a sandheap after removing 2
arains of sand. Continuing this chain of arguments leads to the conclusion
that it does not take sand at all to have a sandheap. The paradox is caused,
of course, by the fact that the notion of a sandheap, as intended here, is
vague. But, since (practical) argumentation may involve such vague notions,
the sandheap shows that the principle of transitivity is not generally
applicable. It does not show, however, that the principle of monotony is not
generally applicable.
Another example where the transitivity rule fails is the example about birds
and penguins in ~2. In general, the transítivity rule, "a ~ b, b~ c implies a
-~ c," can fail if "b" denotes an ambiguous sentence or a sentence involving
abstract notions (see ~2). That is, if "b" means something different in "a ~
b" than in "b ~ c." This latter explanation might also account for the
following example: "if there is both sugar and diesel oil in my tea, then there
is sugar in it" and "if there is sugar in my tea, then I like it" do not imply
"if there is both sugar and diesel oil in my tea, then I like it." In contrast with
the Sorites paradox, these examples (and the ones to follow) are directly
connected to failure of the principle of monotony, since they show that, for
some sentences a, b, c, "b ~ c" does not imply "(a 8z b) ~ c."
The principle of transitivity can also fail if "~" denotes something different
in "a ---~ b" than in "b ~ c." For example, "if the grass is wet, then the
sprinkler has been on" and "if it has rained, then the grass is wet" do not
imply "if it has rained, then the sprinkler has been on," nor "if it has rained
and the grass is wet, then the sprinkler has been on." This example does not
involve two different meanings of "the grass is wet." It involves a distinction
between evidential implication and causal implication (the grass being wet is
evidence for, but not the cause of the sprinkler having been on, while the
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rain caused the grass to be wet). In this case, however, one could also say
that, although the assumptions were phrased as "a -~ b, b-~ c," their
content actually amounts to "a ~ b, b~ c," which does not imply "a -~ c,"
nor "(a 8z b) ~ c," nor "(a 8i b) ~ c."
Examples involving po.csibility or pern2issiori form a category of their own,
involving subtleties concerning the meanin~ of implication. For example,
there is a difference between "if x is a natural number, then it is possible that
x- 0" and "for every natural number x, it is possible that x- 0." In a
somewhat more disguised form, imagine a patient who reasons as follows.
"My brother had disease X, and was cured by medicine M. Hence, it is
possible to cure X with medicine M. I have got disease X. Hence, it is at
least possible to cure me by medicine M. That is, if my doctor claims he is
sure that I cannot possibly be cured by medicine M, he is ignorant, or just
stubborn." The doctor, on the other hand, knows of two varieties of disease
X, X ~ and X2. X ~ is curable with medicine M, X~ is not, and the patient has
X2. In simplistic terms, this example shows that "X is curable" and "my
disease is X" does not imply "my disease is curable," because of the special
nature of a notion like "curable." The example about Fred's pyjamas in ~2
also involves such a notion, since the relation "... fits into ..." amounts to "...
somehow fits into ...", or "...po.s.ribly fits into ...". An other example involves
"permission" instead of "possibility": "You may only kill people that are
guilty of adultery" implies "In principle, you may, in some circumstances,
kill other people." This latter sentence, taken in isolation, could be used to
say "You may kill someone who stole fl 25,- from you," although this
conclusion is by no means authorized by the original rule.
Most mental errors in practical reasoning (and in intellectual writing) seem
to have a common source that is hard to define. It can be described as
(unjustified) reasoning from conclusions previously drawn, ignoring the
origin of those conclusions. Or, alternatively, as drawing conclusions by
looking at words only, without considering their original intention. The
examples above point, in particular, to the principle of transitivity as
misleading our judgment in practical reasoning. Sometimes we are not
misled, because we are too familiar with the subject (as in the rain and
sprinkler example). But sometimes the principle seduces us even on subjects
we are quite familiar with (such as the last example). Note that, in these
examples it is applying the principle of monotony (or transitivity) that would
constitute a logicnl error, in contrast with the examples from the beginning
of ~ 1, where non-monotony arose from the acceptance of logically unsound
behaviour as the intended behaviour. As said, we are interested in such types
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of "correct" non-monotonic reasoning, since we want to emphasize that it is
possible to think of the rule of monotony as an unsound principle of
reasoning.
But this is not the only motivation for non-monotonic logic resulting from
reflection on the purpose of logic. An investigation of reasoning, if it is to be
of any help in understanding practical reasoning, will require some analysis
of the notion of ijnplication. In practical reasoning, there is a variety of
possible interpretations of implication, the "classical" interpretation being
only one of them. For example, sentences like "if the water boils, then tum
out the gas" or "if you turn out the gas, then the water will stop boiling"
denote some connection between actions and statements. That even the
latter statement is not covered by the usual interpretation of implication is
seen by the fact that it involves a notion of implication that does not satisfy
the principle of monotony: "if you turn out the gas, and shortly afterwards
you turn it back on again, then the water will not stop boiling." Although it
certainly is possible to interpret such statements using ordinary implication,
they usually have another intention. Likewise, a sentence like "if the price
increases, sales will decrease" does not amount to "in every possible world
in which the price is higher than in the actual world, sales are lower than in
the actual world." Capturing the content of such sentences requires other
constructions.
Several researchers have elaborated alternative interpretations of implication
as used in everyday life. In conditional logic, for example, (see [Lewis 73])
an attempt is made to find semantic, mathematical constructions that capture
the notion of implication involved in sentences like "if Caesar had been in
charge in Yugoslavia, he would have used the atomic bomb" or "if Caesar
had been in charge in Yugoslavia, he would have used catapults." Although
conditional logic is usually said to investigate "counterfactual" conditional
statements, the essential point seems to be to provide an acceptable
~nathematical treatment of ceteris-paribus-implication: "if a (and all "other"
things r-em-ain unchanged), then b" (see [Nieuwint 90]). Adams (see [Adams
7S]) used ideas from probability theory to interpret and investigate
"plausible implication": "if a, then it is highly likely that b." In discussing the
alternative treatments of implication, we should also mention Grice's
discussion of "conversationa] implicature" (see [Grice 89]), a linguistic, non-
mathematical approach. These investigations, thouah rather diverse, have
one thing in common: each of the approaches leads to some form of non-
monotony.
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There is more to be learned from these efforts, however. A closer look at the
constructions arouses the following suspicion: implication as used in
practical reasoning might have the same character as the abstract notions in
~2: any mathematical construction capturing the intention of a particular
implicational statement might need precization if that statement is used for
other purposes. It is quite possible, then, that there is no mathematical
formalism that manages to capture all the subtle differences in meaning (of
implication) that occur in practical reasoning. And even if we could develop
such a system, it would be too complícated to use, since it would force us to
be unreasonably specific about our intentions, whenever we formulate an
implicational statement.
The approach followed in this thesis is an attempt to overcome this
difticulty. Superiicially, however, it could also be described as the
investigation of just another non-standard interpretation of implication,
named "implication-up-to-possible-exceptions," emphasizing the following
aspect of implication. In reasoning in general, the purpose of implicational
statements is not to guarantee the truth of its conclusion whenever certain
conditions are fulfilled, as is the purpose of theorems in mathematics.
Implication serves as an instrument by which humans organize (some of)
their real-world knowledge. Implication-without-exceptions is a powerful
instniment in mathematical reasoning, but it is hardly applicable anywhere
else. Implication which is to be taken seriously unless we have a good
reason not to, should be much better in this respect. However, claiming that
it is not the purpose of arguments to acquire absolute certainty is something
different than claiming that it is not the purpose of logic to distinguish
between correct and incorrect reasoning.
~4 Plan
To recapitulate, there is a variety of motivations to develop and investigate
non-monotonic formalisms, and different motivations will typically lead to
essentially different formalisms. In this thesis, we are interested in non-
monotony as an important aspect of practical reasoning. In particular, we are
interested in implication as used in practical reasoning, and we restrict our
attention to only one aspect of it, namely the fact that a valid implicational
statement may have exceptions (but nevertheless be valid). It is to be
understood that this subject is related to, but nevertheless different from
investigating conditional-sentences-as-used-in-natural-language. In fact, we
will completely avoid linguistic issues.
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Practical reasoning seems to be not susceptible to precise formalization, at
least not in the same way as mathematical reasoning. Hence, the formalisms
we will provide are claimed to be no more than caricatures of practical
reasoning, in about the same way as classical logic can be seen as a
caricature of practical reasoning. It is not our aim to come up with some
formalism to be directly applied in intelligent computer software; the results
should be seen as attempts to gain insight into the nature of practical
argumentation.
In Chapter 2, we will present a topological interpretation of implication-
with-possible-exceptions, inspired by geometrical intuitions. This semantic
construction is not intended to bear direct resemblance to any intuitive
interpretation of natural implication, it serves as basic material for the rest of
the thesís. The simplest way to use this deFinition in a caricature of practical
reasoning, however, turns out to be equivalent to the well-known
approaches of Shoham or Kraus et aL (see [Shoham 88] and [KLM 90]),
involving partially ordered sets of possible worlds.
In Chapter 3, the same topological notion will be used to interpret inference.
This allows us to talk about rules of inference (that is, laws of logic) as
rules-with-possible-exceptions. It is then established that, in at least one
natural extension of the simple system of Chapter 2, each of the laws of
classical logic is valid-as-a-rule, including the rule of monotony. The system,
however, is non-monotonic from a mathematical point of view (since the
rule of monotony has exceptions).
In Chapter 4, the topological notion of Chapter 2 will be used to interpret
universal quantification, which will be used in Chapter 5 to provide another
way to think of rules of inference as rules-with-possible-exceptions. The
advantage of this system over the one in Chapter 3 is, among other things,
that it satisfies "monotony of independent additions." For example, if a, b, c
a ~ b, a, c
are three distinct basic formulas, then b is valid, but
a ~ b, a, -,b
is not.
b
Finally, there are two appendices. Appendix A contains standard material of
propositional logic, Appendix B contains the necessary standard definitions




Inspired by geometrical ideas, we provide a mathematical no-
tion, and use it to define implication-up-to-possible-exceptions.
The resulting semantics of non-monotonic logic turns out to be
comparable to semantics using partial orderings.
~5 The Calculus of Degenerate Cases
Euclidean geometry is an old discipline of mathematics. Most probably the
oldest one that requires a notion of implication, in that it is organized as a
small number of assumptions, called axioms, and an unlimited number of
theorems, each being logically implied by the axioms. Moreover, a typical
theorem or axiom is in itself an implicational statement, stating about a num-
ber of objects that they will have certain properties whenever they satisfy
some conditions. The interesting feature, for us, is the phenomenon of theo-
rems having degenerate cases. It is a phenomenon commonly seen in Eu-
clidean geometry, although it is usually not considered important. Some
mathematicians iind it amusing, others annoying. Let us give an example.
5.1 Theorem Let E be a line in a plane, P a point in the same plane. Then, in
that plane, there is at most one line through P perpendicular to e.
If P is not on E, the proof could be something like the following.
Suppose that m and m' are lines through P, each one perpendicular to E.
Let 6 denote line-reflection in line C. Then 6(m) - m, 6(m') - m'. Since P
is not on e, 6(P) ~ P. But 6(P) is on m, as well as on m'. Hence m and m'
have two different points in common. Therefore, m- m', which proves the
conclusion.
Although the conclusion of Theorem 5.1 also holds if P is on E, the idea of
the proof above cannot possibly be used in that case. Now the case "P is on
e" is called a degenerate case.
Some people would think of this example as being just a matter of proof-by-
cases. But there is more to it. The first is, that there are also theorems having
degenerate cases for which the theorem fails. It is a good habit in mathe-
matics to take care of such cases in the wording of the theorem in question,
namely by adding some extra conditions. For example:
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5.2 Theorem Let E be a line (in Euclidean space), P a point (in the same
space), such that P is not on E. Then (in that space) there is at most one line
through P perpendicular to e.
(Proof: see above.)
But this habit veils an essential practical aspect, namely the fact that even
experienced mathematicians remember such theorems or proofs as valid up
to some exceptional cases, the latter being treated separately, for safety. For
this kind of geometrical theorems, the possible degenerate cases are easily
traceable; for example, by carefully following the details of a provisional
proof, like the one above. In other fields of human knowledge this typically
is not so easy, if it is possible at all.
Furthermore, even in the case of Theorem 5.1, where both cases do satisfy
the conclusion, the case "P is on E" is said to be degenerate, while the case
"P is not on E" is not. This peculiar asymmetry is explained, in this case, by
the intuitive idea that for "almost all" lines C and "almost all" points P, P is
not on E. In general, there is a number of other statements like this. For
example, "for almost all points P and Q: P is distinct from Q", "given a line,
almost all lines are not perpendicular to that line", "given a line, almost all
points are not on that line", etc., etc. One might ask whether the intuitive
content of such sentences can be captured by some mathematical definition.
In fact, there are several possibilities. Using elementary topological ideas,
there is one option with particularly nice properties, as we will see. The de-
finitions that we will use, here, are not claimed to capture the intuitive ideas
in every respect, but for the purposes at hand, they will suffice. Let us, first,
restrict our attention to statements of the simplest kind. Given some subset
of the plane, what does it mean to say "almost all" points (in the plane) are
in that subset?
5.3 Definition Let X be a topological space (see Appendix B), and let a be
a subset of X. We say that a isfull (in X) whenever every nonempty open O
contains a nonempty open O' (open in X) with O' c n.
(As said in Appendix B, we will use the variables O, O~, O' etc.,
exclusively, to denote open sets in some topological space. Consequently,
we will skip the word "open" as much as possible.)
5.4 Example If E denotes the Euclidean plane, and E a line in it, then E`C is
full in E("almost all elements of E are elements of E~ B.")
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The following picture might suffice to see this:
5.5 Proposition Let X be a topological space and a c X. Then the follo-
wing statements are equivalent:
i) a is full in X,
ii) the interior of a is dense in X,
iii) a contains a subset that is both open and dense in X,
iv) for every nonempty O, a is dense in O and a~ is not,
v) a~ is nowhere dense in X.
(Provable by elementary check.)
The intuitive content of the notion of a full subset is the following: a set is
full in X whenever its complement (in X) has got holes wherever we look (in
X) and the set itself does not have such holes (cf. 5.5 iv, above). Note that,
in the space IR of real numbers, Q~ is dense, but not full, and Q~~ is also
dense but not full (every nonempty open interval contains both rational and
irrational numbers). In every topological space, any full subset of X is dense
in X, but not vice versa. Any set which is both open and dense in X is full in
X, but not vice versa. The following properties are crucial:
5.6 Proposition
If X is a topological space, and a and b are subsets of X, then:
i) If a and b are full in X, then a n b is full in X,
ii) If a is full in X and a c a' c X, then a' is full in X,
iii) If a is full in X, then n~ is not full in X, unless X- fÓ.
Proof:
i) is a trivial consequence of 5.5 iii) and the fact that the intersection of any
pair of open and dense sets is open and dense.
ii) is a trivial consequence of Definition 5.3.




Since every subset of a topological space is canonically equipped with an
induced topology, it is straightforward to extend Definition 5.3.
5.7 Definition Given a topological space X and a, b c X, we say that b is
.full in a (written as "a ~ b") whenever a n b is a full subset of a-with-in-
duced-topology.
"a ~ b" is considered to be a possible interpretation of the phrase "almost
all elements of a are also in b".
5.8 Proposition If X is a topological space and a, b c X, then a~ b
(only) if every O(open in X) such that O n a~ QS contains an O' such that
O'na~SÓand O'nacb.
(Provable by elementary check.)
5.9 Example If E denotes the Euclidean plane, and E some line in it, then E~
is full in E, but not in E. After all, almost all elements of E are in E`E. But of
the elements of E, not even a single one is in E`E . And C~ P~ is not true, by
Proposition 5.6 iii).
The notion of a full subset can also be used to interpret more general sen-
tences, like "for almost all points P, Q: P is distinct from Q", by using the
product topology on E x E ( where E denotes the Euclidean plane). That
issue is postponed, however, until Chapter 4.
The notion defined in 5.7 could be seen as a topological notion capturing the
intuition of inclusion-up-to-possible-exceptions. It has very nice properties.
Example 5.9 shows that it is non-monotonic: E~ 2~ is true, but E n E-~ E~ is
not true; hence, a ~ b does, in general, not imply a n c ~ b. On the other
hand, we have :
5.10 Proposition For every topological space, and for all a, b, c c X:
i) a-~a
ii) a-~ b (only) if a~ a n b
iii) ifa-~b,a~cthena-~bnc
iv) ifa~bandbccthena~c
v) if a~ fÓ then a-~Ó
vi) ifa~candb~cthenaUb-~c
Proof: i) and ii) are trivial. iii), iv) and v) are direct consequences of
Proposition 5.6 i), ii) and iii), respectively.
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Hence, a u b-~ c.
~
More important are the following properties:
5.11 Proposition For every topological space, and for all a, b, c c X:
i) ifa~banda~cthenanb~c,
ii) ifa~bandanb~cthena~c.
Proof: i) Suppose that a ~ b and a-~ c.




Hence, a n b~ c.
ii) Suppose that a-~ b and a n b~ c.
For every O such that O n a~ P~, let O' c O be such that
O'na~P~andO'nacb.ThenO'n(anb)~~.
Let O" c O' be such that
O"n(anb)~QJand O"n(anb)cc.
ThenO"na~~ÓandO"nac0"n(anb)cc.
Hence, a ~ c.
5.12 Proposition Let X be a topological space and a, b, c c X. Then :
i) a c b implies a~ b, but, in general, a~ b does not imply a c b,
ii) if a H b (i.e., a~ b and b-~ a),
then a ~ c implies b ~ c, but c~ a does not imply c~ b,
iii) a~ b, b~ c does not imply a --~ c, but it does if a~ b~ c,
iv) a n b~ c implies a~ b~ v c, but not vice versa,
v) a~ b does not imply b~ ~ a~
vi) a C b C C, c-~ a implies b~ a.
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Proof: The positive statements are easy corollaries of Propositions 5.10 and
5.11. For example, to prove iv), note that, by 5.10 iv), a n b~ c implies
a n b-~ b~ ~ c and, together with a n b~ ~ b~ u c (5.10 i), this implies
a~ b~ v c, by 5.10 vi). vi) is proved as follows : a c b c c and c ~ a
implies c~ b, by 5.10 iv), which implies b- c n b~ a, by 5.11 i).
For the negative statements, let E denote the Euclidean plane, and let ~ be a
line in E. Then E ~ E~ and E~~d, hence 2~-i P~, hence E fi E~. Hence:




v) E ~ ~, E -fi ~.
~
5.13 Definition A topological space X is called monotonic whenever, for
all a, b, c c X, a~ b implies a n c~ b.
As seen before, the Euclidean plane is a non-monotonic space.
On the other hand, if X is equipped with the minimal topology (i.e., Q~ and X
itself are the only open subsets of X), then X is a monotonic space.
(Proof : Using Proposition 5.8, the definition of a~ b ("every O such that
Ona~~containsanO'suchthat O'na~Q~and O'nacb"j
amounts, in this case, to "if X n a~~, then X n a c b", which is
equivalent to "a c b".)
Likewise, if X is equipped with the discrete topology (i.e., all subsets of X
are open), then X is a monotonic space.
(Proof : In this case, the definition of a-~ b implies "for every x E X such
that { x} n a~ QS, { x} n a c b", which also is equivalent to "a C b".)
5.14 Proposition Let X be a topological space. Then the following state-
ments are equivalent :
i) X is monotonic
ii) for all a, b c X, a~ 6 implies a c b,
iii) for all a c X, X~ a implies X- a,
iv) every open set of X is closed in X.
Proof: i) ~ ii): If X is monotonic, then a~ b implies a n { x} ~ b, for all
x E X. Hence, it implies { x}-~ b, for all x E a.
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ii) ~ iv): Every open set is full in its closure (see Definition B.7). Hence, if
X satisfies ii), then every open set equals its own closure.
iv) ~ iii): If X~ a, then (according to 5.5 iii) there is an O, open in X such
that O c a and O is dense in X. By iv), O is closed, hence O- X- a.
iii)~ii):Ifa~banda~b,thenX- a~va~a~ub,andX~a~vb.
ii) ~ i) is trivial.
~
As a matter of fact, it is easy to see :
5.15 Proposition For every topological space, X, the following statements
are also equivalent :
i) X is monotonic,
ii) for all a, b, c c X, a~ b and b~ c implies a~ c,
iii) for all a, b c X, a-~ b irnplies b~ ~ a~
iv) for all a, b, c c X, a~ b~ v c implies a n b~ c.
Proof:
i) ~ ii), i) ~ iii) and i) ~ iv) are trivial consequences of 5.14 i) t~ ii).
To prove i) ~ ii), i) ~ iii) and i) ~ iv):
Let X be a non-monotonic space.
By 5.14 i) ~ iii), there is a d c X such that
X~ d is true, but X- d is not.
Then d~ -~ X, X~ d, d~ ~i d(hence, ii) is not true),
X-~ d, d~ ~ Q1 (hence, iii) is not true),
and X-~ d u~Ó, X n d~ ~i P~ (hence, iv) is not true).
5.16 Proposition ( "Loop-rule")
Let X be a topological space. Then, for all a, b, c c X,
if a~ b, b ~ c, and c -~ a, then a~ c, (hence) a H b, b H c, etc.
Proof: Suppose that a-~ b, b --~ c, and c ~ a.
For every O such that O n a ~ QJ, there is an O' c O such that
O'na~~and0'nacb.
Hence, O' n b~ Q) and there is an O" c O' such that
O"nb~Q3and0"nbcc.
Hence, there is an O"' c O" such that O"' n c~ Q~ and O"' n c c a.
Now,O"'ncc0"'nac0"'nbc0"'nc.
Hence,0"'c0,0"'na~~and0"'nacc.
Hence, a~ c. The rest is seen by symmetry.
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The following three lemmas will turn out to be particularly useful.
5.17 Lemma ("the open-lemma")
For all a, b, c c X, a~ b implies a n c~ b íf c is open ( either in X or
in a).
Proof: If a-~ b and c is open (either in X or in a), then for every O such
that (O n c) n a~ QS, there is an O' c(O n c) such that
O'na~QSandO'nacb.
Then O'n(anc)-0'na~~and0'n(anc)cb.
Hence, a n c~ b.
0
5.18 Lemma ("the dense-lemma")
For all a, b, c c X, a~ b implies a n c~ b if c is dense in a.
Proof: If a~ b and c is dense in a, then for every O such that
Oncna~QJ (hence,Ona~Q~),
there is an O' c O such that
O'na~PJandO'nacb.
Since c is dense in a, this implies O' n a n c~~. But O' n a n c c b.
Hence, a n c~ b.
~
5.19 Lemma ("the closed-lemma")
For all a, b, c c X, a-~ b implies a n c ~ b if b is closed (either in X
or in a).
Proof: If b is closed ( either in X or in a), and a~ b, then b is both closed in
a and dense in a. Hence, a c b. Hence, for all c, a n c~ b.
a
~6 Application
Definition 5.7 could be said to capture the notion of inclusion-up-to-
possible-exceptions. However, our original aim was the study of practical
reasoning by providing a non-standard interpretation of implication, namely
implication-with-possible-exceptions. The simplest way to use Definition 5.7
for that purpose is the following.
The usual way to represent, in mathematical terms, the meaning of an impli-
cational statement "a implies b" is to associate it with a collection of pos-
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sible worlds, in each of which a and b are either true or false. The statement
a is said to imply the statement b whenever all possible worlds that satisfy a
do also satisfy b. On this point, we will just adhere to usage. However, by
using the topological interpretation of inclusion-up-to-possible-exceptions,
as defined in 5.7, we can now interpret implication-up-to-possible-
exceptions in a similar way, if the collection of possible worlds is provided
with a topology.
6.1 Definition Let B be a finite Boolean algebra (see Appendix A).
A topological model (of B) is a pair (X, ~p), where
i) X is a topological space,
ii) cp: B~~(X) is a Boolean translation.
(The elements of X are nicknamed "possible worlds", and for all a E B,
cp(a) is the set of all possible worlds in which a is said to be true.)
For a, b E B, we will say "a ~ b is true in (X, cp)" whenever
cp(a) ~ cp(b) is true in the topological space X, that is: almost all possible
worlds in X that satisfy a do also satisfy b.
For example, let B be the free Boolean algebra generated by two (distinct)
basic formulas, a and b. Then there exist topological models of B in which
a~ b is true, but (a n~ b) ~ b is not.
(Proof: If E is the Euclidean plane and B a line in E, then there is one and
only one Boolean translation cp: B-~ 0'(E) such that
cp(a) - E and ~p(b) - E~ E.
In the topological model ( E, cp), a~ b is true (since E~ E~),
while (a n-~ b) ~ b is not : E n C~~ is not true, since E is not empty.)
The intuitive content of the possible worlds, as well as of the topology, may
remain unspecified, the only relevant aspect of a topological model being the
combinations of sentences " s ~ t" (for s, t E B) it makes true. Moreover,
the term "world" should not be taken too literally. For example, we could
think of the formulas a and b as signifying the sentences "x is a bird" and "x
can fly", respectively. Then the elements of X should rather be thought of as
possible instances that x could refer to. It is not claimed, of course, that the
set of all birds bears any resemblance with the Euclidean plane, but that the
relation between birds and birds that cannot fly could be thought to resemble
the relation between E and B.
Note that, for this reading of a and b, the topological model above shows
that the statement " if x is a bird, then it can fly" does not imply "if x is a bird
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and x cannot fly, then x can fly". According to classical logic, however (that
is, interpreting implication as implication-without-exceptions), this latter
statement is a necessary consequence of the former. In this way, certain
combinations of sentences considered inconsistent when using the more
usual interpretation of implication are nevertheless representable using topo-
logical models. We will call them "topologically representable" or even
"topologically consistent".
Let us give some more examples. In each example, B is assumed to be the
free Boolean algebra generated by the basic formulas occurring in it. E
denotes the Euclidean plane. E, rn etc. denote lines in E, while P, Q etc.
denote points in E.
6.2 Example (Exceptions to exceptions)
The combination of the assumptions "If x is a bird, then x can fly", "If x is a
penguin, then x cannot fly" and "If x is a yellow penguin, then x can fly"
does not imply "If x is a penguin, then x can fly", nor "If x is a yellow
penguin, then x cannot fly". That is:
b~f, bnp~~f, bnpny~f
donotimplypnb-~f,nor pnbny~~f.
Proof: Let P be a point on a line, E, and cp a Boolean translation B~~(E)
such that ~p(b) - E, ~p( f)- E~ u~ P}, cp(p) - B, ~p(y) - { P}. Then it is easy
to check that the topological model (E, ~p) falsifies the implication.
0
6.3 Example (More specific rules)
The assumptions "If x is a student, then x is unemployed", "If x is an adult,
then x is employed" do not imply "If x is an adult and x is a student, then x is
employed", nor "If x is an adult and x is a student, then x is unemployed".
However, together with the assumption "If x is a student, then x is an adult",
they imply the latter, but not the former. In symbols:
a~ c, b-~ ~c does not imply a n b~ c, nor a n b~~c,
while a~ c, b ~~c, a--~ b implies a n b~ c, but not a n b-~ ~c.
Proof: Let C be a line and cp a Boolean translation B~~(E) such that
~P(a) - E, ~P(b) - e , ~P(c) - e~.
Then a~ c and b-~ ~c are true in (E, cp), but a n b -~ c is not.
On the other hand, if cp(a) - B, cp(b) - E and cp(c) - e, then
a~ c and b-~ -~c are also true, but a n b-~ ~c is not.
Note that in this latter topological model, a~ b is also true.
Hence, a-~ c, b-~ ~c, a~ b does not imply a n b~~c.
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However, a--~ c, a~ b implies a n b-~ c, by Proposition 5.11 i).
~
6.4 Example ( Conflicting arguments)
a-~ c, b~ c does not imply a n b~ c.
Proof: A line, C, devides the plane in two halfplanes, say H ~ and HZ, each
containing E. Let cp be a Boolean translation B~~(E) such that ~p(a) - H~,
cp(b) - H2, cp(c) - C~. Then a-~ c and b~ c are true in (E, cp), but not
a n b-~ c. Note that a-~ ~b and b~-,a are also true in (E, cp).
~
For example, if a murder has been committed in Johannesburg, and John
was seen in London at the time of the murder, he has got a valid alibi.
Likewise, if John was seen in Paris. But combined, the two alibis would
arouse suspicion.
Example 6.4 reflects the phenomenon that, in practical reasoning, providing
two arguments (for a single conclusion) might be less convincing than pro-
viding only one, in particular when the two arguments contradict each other,
or contain conflicting information.
6.5 Example ( Irresolute situations)
a~ b does not imply "either a n c-~ b or a n c~~b".
Proof: Let P be a point on the line e and Q a point not on E. Let cp be a
Boolean translation B~~(E) such that cp(a) - E, cp(b) - B~, cp(c) -{ P,Q }.
Then a~ b is true in (E, cp), but a n c~ b is not (since { P} is open in
{ P,Q } and P~~), nor is a n c~~b ( since { Q} is open in { P,Q } and
Q~ e). Note that a--~ ~c is also true in (E, cp).
~
For example, if we iind the bones of an extinct species of bird, we cannot
conclude that that species could fly, solely because that is typically the case
for birds. Neither are we in a position to conclude that that species of bird
could not fly, however.
6.6 Example
a-~ b, a~i ~c does not imply a n c~ b.
Proof: By choosing coordinates in E, we may identify E with IRZ. Let ï' be
the disc {(x, y) I x2 t y2 ~ 1}, P-(2, 0), E-{(x, y) I y- 0}, a line through
P.
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Let cp be a Boolean translation B~~(E) such that cp(a) - E, cp(b) -~, and
cp(c) - I' v{ P}. Then a-~ b is true in ( E, cp), but a~-,c is not (since T'
is open in E), nor is a n c~ b(since { P} is open in I' ~{ P} and P~ e~).
0
We could think of { P} as ( representing the) penguins, E as birds, T' as spar-
rows, E as birds that cannot fly. cp(c) then represents the sparrows and pen-
guins together. Then, in our topological model, birds fly, penguins don't,
some exceptional sparrows do not fly. The sentence "if x is a bird then x is
not a sparrow" is not true, nor is the sentence "if x is a sparrow or a penguin,
then x can fly". ( Example taken from [Prakken 93].)
Note that 1, ~ E~ is also true in E(sparrows fly), as well as
h u{(1, 0) }~ E~ (if penguins were more like sparrows, then the sentence
"if x is either a sparrow or a penguin, then x can fly" would be true).
6.7 Example
a~ b does not imply "either a n c~ b or a n~c ~ b".
Proof: Let r ~ and I'Z be two discs and E a line like in the picture below.
Let cp be a Boolean translation B~~(E) such that cp(a) - r~ ~ r2 ,
cp(b) - e~, and cp(c) -(ï'~ n C) v(1,2 ~ E). Then a~ b is true in (E, ~p),
but a n c~ b is not ( since r~ n C~ E~ is not true), nor is a n~c ~ b
(for similar reasons).
We could think for example, of I'~ as "mammals", T'2 as "birds". Birds can
fly, mammals cannot fly. Penguins, exceptional birds, cannot fly. Bats, ex-
ceptional mammals, can fly. (Example taken from [Prakken 93].)
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~7 Preferential Consequence Relations
Now that we have seen some examples, it is time for a complete charac-
terization of all such topologically representable situations or, equívalently,
for a complete axiomatization of topological models. In [KLM 90], it was
established that all properties mentioned in Propositions 5.10, 5.11, 5.15,
and 5.16, as well as the positive results of 5.12, are consequences of only a
small number of them, namely: 5.10 i, iv, v and vi, and 5.11 (i and ii). The
following notion originates from their article:
7.1 Definition Let (B, ~) be a Boolean algebra (see Appendix A). A binary
relation, F-, on B is cálled a~referential conseguence relation (on B)
whenever
(P1) for all a E B, a h a,
(P2) for all a, b, c E B, if a 4~ b and b S c, then a I~ c,
(P3) for all a, b, c E B, if a w b and a n b w c, then a w c,
(P4) for all a, b, c E B, if a F~ b and a I~ c, then a n b~- c,
(PS) for all a, b, c E B, if a~- c and b 4~ c, then a v b~- c.
Definition 7.1 is not restricted to finite Boolean algebras. For example, for
every topological space X, the binary relation "~", as defined in 5.7, is a
preferential consequence relation on the Boolean algebra (~(X), c ). (This
was proved in Propositions 5.10 and 5.11.) However, the characterization
that we will provide will be restricted to preferential consequence relations
on finite Boolean algebras, since it is associated with examples from
practical reasoning like those in the preceding section, each of which
involving finitely many basic formulas. We are going to prove that P1-PS is
a complete set of axioms for problems of that simple kind.
This may seem a little bit strange, since
(P6) for all a E B, if a w 1, then a- L
is not a consequence of P1-PS but does nevertheless hold in every topologi-
cal space (Proposition 5.10 v). However, P6 is considered redundant, for the
following reason.
7.2 Proposition Let (B, 5) be a Boolean algebra, and I~ a preferential
consequence relation on B. Then there is a Boolean algebra, B', a Boolean
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translation cp: B-~ B', and a preferential consequence relation, w A, on B'
such that for all a, b E B,
a I~ b(only) if cp(a) ~-A cp(b)
and such that wA satisfies P6 (as well as P1-PS).
(The proof of this proposition is not difficult but somewhat tedious.
Therefore, it is skipped.)
To prove that P1-PSIP6 is a complete set of axioms for the relation "-~" in
topological models, we use another completeness theorem, originating from
[KLM 90]. We will give a number of preliminary definitions, first.
7.3 Definition Let (X, S) be a partial ordering and a, b c X.
An element x E a is minimal in a whenever there is no y E a such that y c x
except x itself. We will use a l~ ~ b to denote : every element of a that is
minimal in a is an element of b.
If we think of the elements of X as possible worlds, the partial ordering is
supposed to describe a"normality" ordering on the possible worlds, or a
preference of some possible worlds over others. For x~, x2 E X, x ~ ~ x2 is to
be read as "x ~ is a more normal world than xZ" or "x ~ is preferred over x2".
Then a 4~ ~ b amounts to: "of all the worlds in a, at least the most normal
(preferred) ones are in b".
It is easy to see, that for every finite partial ordering (X, 5), the relation 4--~
is a preferential consequence relation on the Boolean algebra (~(X), c) and,
moreover, that it satisfies P6.
7.4 Theorem (Kraus, Lehmann, Magidor 1990)
Let B be a finite Boolean algebra, and w a preferential consequence relation
on B. Then there is a finite partially ordered set (X, S) and a Boolean trans-
lation cp: B~~(X) such that
for all a, b E B, a F~ b(only) if cp(a) 4~ ~ cp(b).
For the proof, the reader is referred to [KLM 90].
We are now ready to prove a similar theorem concerning topological
models. The result will be an easy corollary (Corollary 7.6, below) of the
following theorem :
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7.5 Theorem For every partial ordering, 5, on a finite set X there is at least
one topology on X such that, for all a, b c X,
a-~ b (only) if a h~ b.
Proof: Let (X, 5) be a partial ordering.
Detïne ti:- { v c X I if p E v and q S p then q E v}. This is a topology on X.
For every p E X, let Op denote { q E X ~ q 5 p}.
Suppose that a~ b. If p is minimal in a, then Op n a-{ p}.
Since a~ b is true, there is an O' c OP such that
O'na~2s and O'nacb.
Hence, O' n a-{ p} and p E b.
Hence a ~ ~ b.
On the other hand, suppose that a L~ ~ b. Let O be such that O n a~ QJ. Say
p E a and p E O. Since X is finite, there is a q that is minimal in a
such that q S p.
For such q: Oq c OP c O and q E b (since a~ ~ b).
Hence,OqcO,Oqna- {q} ~P~,andOqnacb.
Hence a -~ b.
Hence, for all a, b c X, a~ b (only) if a~~ b.
0
7.6 Corollary I Completeness Theorem
Let B be a finite Boolean algebra, and 4~ a preferential consequence relation
on B. Then there is a(finite) topological space X and a Boolean translation
cp: B~ 0'(X) such that
for all a, b E B, a~- b(only) if cp(a) ~ cp(b).
(Immediate consequence of Theorems 7.4 and 7.5 above.)
Corollary 7.6 characterizes the relation "~" in topological models of finite
Boolean algebras, thus settling the task of characterizing the "topologically
representable situations" as meant in ~6. The rest of this section will be
spent on clearing up some possibly confusing details and on examining more
closely the relationship between topological models and models based on
partial orderings.
The first remark to make, is that Theorem 7.4 and Corollary 7.6 can be
extended to infinite Boolean algebras. It is unclear, though, whether such an
extension is of any use in connection with examples like those of ~6, since
such puzzles (as well as arguments from practical reasoning) involve only
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finitely many sentences. However, a finite Boolean algebra may have
interesting infinite topological models (for example, on the Euclidean plane,
see ~6). Hence, we might learn something from the infinitary extension of
7.4, as provided in [KLM 90] :
7.7 Definition
i) Let (X, ~) be a partial ordering. A subset a c X is called sniooth
whenever for all x E a, there is a minimal element x' of a such that x' S x.
ii) Let B be a Boolean algebra. A preferential model (of B) is a triple
(X, 5 , cp) such that:
(X, ~) is a partial ordering,
cp is a Boolean translation B~ 0'(X),
for every a E B, cp(a) is smooth in (X, S).
7.8 Proposition (Kraus, Lehmann, Magidor, 1990)
Let B be a(not necessarily finite) Boolean algebra, and let 4~ be a binary
relation on B. Then 4~ is a preferential consequence relation (only) if there
is a preferential model (X, S, cp) of B such that,
for all a, b E B, ~p(a) h~ ~ ~p(b) (only) if a!~ b.
(Proof: see [KLM 90].)
7.9 Proposition Let B be a Boolean algebra, and let (X, S, cp) be a prefe-
rential model of B. Then there is a topology on X such that, for all a, b E B,
a~ b is Crue in the topological model (X, cp)
(only) if
~P(a) ~ ~ ~P(b).
Proof: After a slight modification, the proof of Theorem 7.5 will suffice.
~
7.10 Corollary Let B be a Boolean algebra, and ~- a binary relation on B.
Then ~- is a preferential consequence relation (only) if there is a topological
model (X, cp) such that, for all a, b E B,
a-~ b is true in (X, cp) (only) if a w b.
It follows from Proposition 7.9 that the class of preferential models can be
seen as a subclass of the class of the topological models. How about the
converse? Of course, we have, as a direct corollary of Proposition 7.8
(substituting ~(X) for B and "~" for " 4~ " ) :
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7.11 Corollary Let X be a topological space. Then there exists a partial
ordering (Y, 5) and a Boolean translation ~p : 6'(X) -~ ~(Y) such that
i) for all a, b c X, a~ b (only) if ~p(a) w ~ ~p(b),
ii) for all a c X, cp(a) is smooth in (Y, 5).
Hence, the non-monotony involved in, say, the Euclidean plane can, in
principle, also be achieved by a Boolean translation from ~(E) into some
preferential model. From a geometrical point of view, though, this
construction would be highly unnatural. Moreover :
7.12 Proposition There is no partial ordering (E, ~) on the Euclidean plane
such that, for all a, b c E, a---~ b (only) if a w ~ b.
Proof : For any such partial ordering, and all p, q E E such that p~ q,
{ p, q}-~ { p} is not true, hence { p, q} l~ ~{ p} is not true, hence p 5 q is
not true. Hence, p 5 q(only) if p- q, and a 4~ ~ b (only) if a c b.
Hence, a~ b (only) if a c b, which is not true in the Euclidean plane.
Hence, there can be no such partial ordering.
~
The same argument applies to most (non-trivial) Hausdorff spaces. Hence,
even for a finite Boolean algebra, the class of topological models is much
broader than the class of preferential models.
On the other hand, we have :
7.13 Proposition For every finite topological space X, there is one and only
one partial ordering (X, 5), such that, for all a, b c X,
a~ b (only) if a w ~ b.
Proof : It is easy to see that there is at most one such a partial ordering.
To see that there is at least one, define, for every p E X, OP to be the
smallest open set containing p(which exists because X is finite). Now define
the following strict partial ordering on X: (for p,q E X:)
p ~ q iff Op c Oq (strict subset)
and the associated ordinary partial ordering:
p5q iff p~qorp-q.




Since p is minimal in a, 09 - OP , hence OP n a c b, hence p E b.
Hence, a~ b implies a w ~ b.
On the other hand, suppose that a 4~ ~ b. For every O such that O n a~~Ó,
choose p E a n O. Then, since X is finite, there is a q such that q 5 p and q
is minimal in a.
For such q, if r E Oq n a then O~ c Oq , hence O~ - 09 by the minimality (in
a) of q. Hence r is minimal in a, hence r E b (since a w ~ b).
Hence, Oq n a c b, and Oq n a~ QJ (since q E Oq n a).
Hence, a I~ ~ b implies a~ b.
Another possible source of confusion is the following :
Corollary 7.6 (7.10), in combination with Definition 7.1, suggests that the
open-lemma, the dense-lemma and the closed-lemma (Lemmas 5.17, 5.18
and 5.19, respectively) should be somehow derivable from (the properties
expressed by) P1-P5. Although there seems to be no direct derivation of
5.17, 5.18 and 5.19 from P1-P5, they are valid in every topological space
and, since the class of topological models contains the class of preferential
models, these lemmas state sensible facts about preferential models as well.
However, attempts to state those facts without any reference to topology
would lead to difficulties. For example, given a partial ordering on a finite
space, there is, in general, more than one topology leading to the same
conditional. And for each topology, the lemmas state some facts.
Perhaps the situation is best described as follows : although 5.17, 5.18 and
5.19 may seem, at first sight, to go beyond P1-P51P6, they do not constitute
a restriction on the class of models.
~8 Interim evaluation
We have used a topological notion to provide a simple system of non-
monotonic reasoning. We also have a characterization by means of a sound
and complete axiom system, P1-P51P6. However, as a mathematical investi-
gation of practical reasoning, this system has its limitations. One should
note, in the first place, the lack of expressive power of the language used.
To account for, say, the example from ~ 1(about John not being home at six
o'clock), we would like to have a language closed under n, v, ~ and ~,
where n, v and -, have their usual interpretation, while -~, signifying
implication-as-a-rule, has a meaning that forces the inference relation to be
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non-monotonic, in that b is inferred from "a -~ b, a", but not from "a --~ b,
a, ~b". However, our language only contains sentences of the form a-~ b,
where a and b contain only n, v, and -~. With our delïnitions so far,
sentences like (a ~ b) ~ c or (a --~ b) n a-~ b are meaningless. And
in so far as there is talk of an inference relation between defeasible
conditionals, it is not a non-monotonic one. Hence, the system of ~6 fails to
represent a rather essential aspect of defeasible conditionals.
But even within the boundaries of this limited setup, there are two issues to
be discussed. The first concerns the suitability of the axiom system P1-
PS~P6 for the study of practical reasoning. The second will concern the
suitability of Definition 5.7 and of using topology instead of preferential
semantics (or some form of probability theory).
To start with the first, the axiom system P1-PS~P6 is, as is commonly
acknowledged in the literature on non-monotonic logic, too weak in some
instances of practical reasoning, while too strong in others. Very famous is
the "irrelevance problem": The fact that a F~ b does not imply a n c w b
enables us to represent situations like "birds can 11y", "birds that are pen-
guins cannot fly". But it also prevents inference of "birds that are black can
fly" from "birds can fly". This inference, however, seems to be natural, since
the property of being black is irrelevant, in that it is unrelated to the animal's
ability to fly. Thus, although P1-PSIP6 is weak enough to allow conditionals
to be defeasible (that is, to have exceptions), it is too weak to let these
defeasible conditionals behave as rule.s-with-possible-exceptions. For, an
essential characteristic of such rules in practical reasoning seems to be that
rules are to be applied, unless there is some good reason not to. For
example, in the presence of the rule "any bird can, as a rule, fly", we should
conclude "x can fly" from "x is a bird and x is black", as the information "x
is black" does not give us any reason not to apply the rule.
In the literature on non-monotonic logic, several strengthenings of P1-PS
have been suggested, typically intended to capture this general principle.
Very well-known are the following six candidates (see [Makinson 94]).
(RI) Ifa ~ bandancnb {f L,thenanc 4~ b.
This rule amounts to:
If "if a then b" is (a) valid (rule), and a n c is some situation in which it
could be applied, then it should be applied, unless the result would be an
inconsistent state of knowledge.
This property turns out to be unreasonably strong (see below).
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(R2) If a h b and a n c If ~b, then a n c~ b.
This rule amounts to:
If "if a then b" is (a) valid (rule), and a n c is some situation in which it
could be applied, then it should be applied, unless ~b is explicitly concluded
fromanc.
Although this principle is strictly weaker than Rl, it is still unreasonably
strong. R2 (as well as R1) claims that the following situation is inconsistent:
"birds can fly", "this unknown species, of which we only found some bones,
is to be classified as being a(species of) bird, but we do not know whether it
could fly or not" (see Example 6.5).
(R3) If a 4~ b and a If ~c, then a n c 4~ b.
Of all the rules mentioned here, R3 is the best known (see [KLM 90]) and
the most commonly accepted as a plausible candidate. However, Example
6.6 shows that the Euclidean plane does not satisfy R3. Besides that, the
intuitive story accompanying that example shows that it is questionable
whether R3 is valid in practical reasoning.
(R4) If a v b 4~ c and a If c, then b w c;
or: If a v b w c, then either a 4~ c or b w c.
If the union of two areas looks green, by and large, then at least one of those
areas looks green, by and large, as well. Although R4 seems to have a geo-
metrical motivation, the Euclidean plane does not satisfy R4 (nor R5,
below).
(RS) If a~- b and a n c 4f b, then a n-,c ~- b;
or: If a v b 4~ c and a n b- 1 then either a w c or b w c.
Although RS is much weaker than R3 or R1, example 6.7 shows that there is
reason to consider even RS to be too strong.
And, finally :
(R6) If a L~ b and a n c h~b, then a w-,c ;
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or: If a I~ b and a Lf ~c, then a n c 4f -~b.
R6 is not a real strengthening of PI-PS~P6, since any preferential
consequence relation satifies R6.
(Proof: Using 5.12 iv, 5.10 iii and P2, respectively, we have: if a 4~ b and
a n c w ~b, then a 4~ -,c v~b, hence a 4~ b n(-,c v~b), hence a w~c.)
Assuming P1-PS~P6, each of these properties is (strictly) stronger than its
successor. That R 1 implies R2 follows from the fact that a n c n b 4~ 1
implies a n c F- -,b. To see that R2 implies R3, note that R6 f R2 trivially
implies R3. R3 implies R4: if a v b F~ c and a Ff c, then a v b If ~b
(otherwise a v b F- a would be true, hence a-(a v b) n a w c), hence, by
R3, b-(a v b) n b L~ c. That R4 implies RS is trivial.
Returning to the irrelevance problem, R3 seems to be the principle
underlying the inference of "birds that are black can fly" from "birds can
fly", if we assume that the sentence "birds are typically non-black" is not
true. But R3 is too weak to guarantee, for example, "birds that are green can
fly" (assuming that "birds are typically non-green" is true). 'That inference,
though, is not less natural, since the property of being green is equally
unrelated to the ability to fly. For other purposes, however, R3 (and even
RS) is too strong (see Examples 6.6 and 6.7). Hence, none of the rules R1 to
R6 is entirely convincing. In short, the axiom system P1-PS~P6 is too weak
to capture the behaviour of a defeasible conditional as a rule-with-possible-
exceptions, and this deficit does not have a straightforward solution.
In other respects, though, P1-PS is too strong. Although the axioms are
acceptable as general principles, they do not, of course, constitute hard
mathematical properties of defeasible conditionals as occurring in practical
reasoning. Some researchers criticize P3, P4 or P5, at least in their full
generality. Moreover, in practical reasoning even seemingly uncontroversial
statements like "c ~ a n b implies c--~ a" may have exceptions. (In this
case, a could be a half truth, only acceptable as a fair account when
accompanied by b.) Hence, it seems that in practical reasoning, axioms like
P1-P5, but also R1-R6, function themselves, at best, as rules-with-possible-
exceptions.
The considerations so far all concerned the system of ~6, a system that uses
Definition 5.7 in a rather simplistic way. In the rest of this thesis we will
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hold on to Definition 5.7, but we will use it in more sophisticated ways,
taking the above considerations into account, as much as possible. There is a
number of reasons to maintain Definition 5.7 as the central subject of study.
In part, these arguments cannot be given until after Chapter 3 or Chapter 5.
On the other hand, some of the arguments have already been given in ~7. In
comparison to preferential semantics, our topological presentation enables
us to state and prove insights that would otherwise be hard to achieve (for
example, the Lemmas 5.17, 5.18, 5.19, or Theorems 8.1, 8.3 and 8.7
below). Moreover, as said in ~7, the class of topological models is strictly
larger than the class of preferential models. However, our most important
argument, at this moment, is the psychological advantage over preferential
semantics.
Judging from 5.5 v), the definition itself is less "alien" to ordinary mathe-
matics ("nowhere dense subset" is a standard notion from topology) than
definitions using preferential (or probabilístic) ideas. But especially the
intuitive content of Definition 5.7 depicts defeasible conditionals as an
ordinary notion, useful in modelling rational human behaviour, rather than as
a twisted notion, intended to model sloppy or lazy reasoning.
What remains to be done, for the moment, is a further reflection on
Definition 5.7 itself. In order to defend Definition 5.3 (thus, indirectly, also
Definition 5.7), let us discuss some useful facts and theorems, first.
If X is a topological space, then, according to the dense lemma (Proposition
5.18), a~ b implies a n c~ b if c is dense in a. Since a fi c~ is true
(only) if c is somewhere dense in a, R3 amounts to
" a~ b implies a n c~ b if c is somewhere dense in a",
while every topological space satisfies
" a~ b implies a n c-~ b if c is (everywhere) dense in a".
The motivation behind R3 seems to be that "a ~i c~" expresses that "x E c"
is not a ridiculous assumption relative to "x E a". In view of this, it is good
to know the following:
8.1 Theorem Let X be a topological space X and a, b c X. Then
a~ b (only) if for every c that is dense in a, b is dense in a n c.
The proof of this theorem will be given after Corollary 8.5, below.
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Inspired by R3, let us read "b is not a ridiculous assumption relative to a"
instead of "b is everywhere dense in a". (For example, "x is a penguin" is a
ridiculous assumption relative to "x is a bird".) Then Theorem 8.1 reads:
b is plausibly concluded from a(only) if there is no non-ridiculous extra
assumption c, relative to which b sounds ridiculous or, alternatively, (only)
if b sounds plausible in all ordinary (- non-ridiculous relative to a)
situations a n c.
Closely related is the following alternative characterization of full subsets.
Let X be a topological space. ~7 :- { a c X I X-~ a}, the collection of all
full subsets of X.
8.2 Definition `U c 0'(X) is called a dense-filter (on X) if it is a filter of the
Boolean algebra (0'(X), c) (that is: for all a, b E `U, n n b E 71, and for all
a, b c X such that a E 91 and a c b: b E `U ) and
for all a E 91, a is dense in X.
`U is called a maximal dense-filter if it is a dense-filter, and for every dense-
filter `U ' such that `U c `U ' : v - `U '.
(A maximal dense-filter is a dense-filter which is maximal a~. a dense-filter.
That is not the same thing as a maximal filter that is also a dense-filter. Note
that ~(X) is not a dense-filter, unless X- Q).)
8.3 Theorem ~ is the intersection of all maximal dense-filters.
To prove both Theorem 8.1 and 8.3, we will need the following two results.
8.4 Lemma (d-lemma)
If a c X is not full in X, then there is a d c X such that
d is dense in X,
d n a is not dense in X.
Proof: Suppose that a is not full in X. Then a~ is somewhere dense in X, say
O~ QS, a~ is dense in O. Define d to be O~ v a~ -(O n a)~.
Then d n a n O- Q~, O~ PJ, hence a n d is not dense in X.
For every nonempty O', either O' n O~ ~ QJ, or O' c O.
If0'nO~~~,then0'nd~~.
If O' c O, then O' n a~ ~ Q~ (a~ is dense in O), hence O' n d~ Q~.





If a c X is not full in X, then there is a d c X such that
d is dense in X,
n is not dense in d (that is, d n a is not dense in d).
Proof: Define d as in the proof of 8.4. Then d n a is not dense in d, since
Ond~P~(sinceOna~~~),whileOndna-P~.
0
Proof of Theorem 8.3:
Suppose that a E 7 and v is a maximal dense-filter. Then
a f`U :- { a' n v I a c a', v E `U } is a dense-filter,
`Ucaf`U andaE af`U.
But `U is maximal, hence `U - n f`U and a E`U .
(As said, p(X) is not a dense-filter, unless X- Q~.)
Hence, a is an element of every maximal dense-filter.
On the other hand, suppose that a~~.
Then by 8.4 there is a dense set d such that a n d is not dense in X.
Then { d' c X I d c d' } is a dense-filter.
Let `U be a maximal dense-filter containing this collection.
Then a~`U. (To see this, note that a E`U would imply a n d E 11.
Note that dense-filters (like `U) contain only dense subsets
of X and that a n d is not dense in X.)
Hence, there exists a maximal dense-filter not containing a,
which completes the proof.
a
Proof of Theorem 8.1:
Suppose that a~ b and c is dense in a. Then, by the dense lemma,
anc-~b,hencebisdensein anc.
On the other hand, suppose that a~i b.
Then in a-with-induced-topology, a n b is not a full subset.
By Corollary 8.5, there is a d c a such that
d is dense in a, and a n b is not dense in d
(that is, d n (a n b) is not dense in d).
Then d n b- d n(a n b) is not dense in d,
hence b is not dense in d.
Hence,
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d is dense in a,
and b is not dense in d- a n d,
which completes the proof.
~
Theorems 8.1 shows that something of the idea behind R3 is present in
every topological (or preferential) model. Theorem 8.3 is a rather abstract
variant of 8.1. Both might serve as an argument in favour of the Definition
5.3 as a plausible interpretation of inclusion-up-to-possible-exceptions.
These theorems are not the most important arguments, however, to
appreciate the definition of a full subset.
The notion of a full subset is a natural adaptation of the notion of a dense
subset, provided we take points that we draw (rough spots) more seriously
than idealizations of such points (say, elements of E). Althouoh it is
questionable whether topology, as practised in contemporary mathematics as
well as in this thesis, is fit to capture "rough spots", we could consider rough
spots as representable by some particular kind of nonempty open sets (for
example, circular discs). A better treatment is to be found in [Hjelmslev 23].
A dense subset is a set that is present in every region (that is, a set that
contains elements in every nonempty open subset). The geometrical intuition
behind this notion is that a dense subset is omnipresent in the topological
space. Colouring the points of a dense set blue should make the whole
topological space appear blue. But if we take seriously the idea that a single
point (iniïnitely small) of, say, the Euclidean plane is a negligible object,
than the definition of a dense subset needs adaptation. Instead of containing
a single point in every region, every region should contain a rough point
convincingly contained in the set (whatever that may mean), before we
might consider that set "omnipresent". Adapting the notion of a dense subset
along these lines yields our Definition 5.3.
Reconsidering the meaning of "convincingly contained in the set", we might
just as well accept the following definition:
8.6 Definition A set a c X is called.full-2 (in X) whenever every nonempty
O contains a nonempty O' such that O' ~ a.
This definition is entirely acceptable as an alternative for Definition 5.3. In
view of this it is oood to know that these two definitions are equivalent :
4l
8.7 Proposition A subset of X is full-2 in X(only) if it is full in X.
Proof: Suppose that a c X is full. Then every nonempty O contains a
nonempty O' such that O' c a, hence 0' -~ a.
Hence, a is full-2 in X.
On the other hand, suppose that a c X is full-2. Then every nonempty O
contains a nonempty O' such that O' -~ a, which, on its turn, contains
a nonempty O" such that O" c a.
Hence, a is full in X.
~
Hence, the notion of a full subset has the following properties:
i) if a is full in X, then a is dense in X,
ii) ifaisfullinXandaca'cX,thena'isfullinX,
iii) if a and b are full in X, then a n b is full in X,
iv) a is full in X(only) if every nonempty O contains a nonempty O'
such that a is full in O'.
Most probably, however, the notion of a full subset is not the only notion
having these properties.
Recapitulation
~5 introduced a topological notion that will be the central notion of this
thesis. Several properties of this notion were established. ~6 then presented
a simple way to use this notion to study practical reasoning. (In ~8, this
system turned out to be too simple.) In ~7, it was proven that the list of
properties found in ~5 cannot essentially be extended and the system of ~6
was compared to the approach of [KLM 90].
Despite the fact that we could use the mathematics of their preferential
models to prove our completeness theorem for topological models, the
intuitive content of our topological conditional is not compatible with
preferential semantics. Hence, for the rest of this thesis, the reader is urged
to,forget about any association of "-~" or "{~ " with the idea of preference
of some possible world.r over others. Likewise, these symbols are not to be
associated with probabilistic ideas. Our topological treatment generalizes
intuitions of old-fashioned mathematics and depicts defeasible implication as




The topological notions of Chapter 2 will be used to give a
mathematical caricature of the behaviour of an ímaginary person
handling the rules of classical propositional (monotonic) logic as
if they were rules-with-possible-exceptions. This will be done by
providing an interpretation of nested implicational statements.
That is, of sentences like (a ~ b n c) ~(a ~ b).
~9 Nested Implicational Statements
In all of Chapter 3, L denotes a language generated via n, v, -~ and ~, from
a finite number of basic formulas, "~" being an additional binary
connective. We will use a, b, c, ... to denote subsets of some topological
space and a, b, c, ... as variables ranging over L. a, b, c, ... denote basic
formulas. Hence, a~ b denotes a formula in L, while a~ b is (not a
formula, but) a sentence about two sets, a and b (see Definition 5.7). This
multiple use of the symbol "~" should not cause much confusion.
Suppose that X is a set of possible worlds, and suppose that a, b and c are
sentences interpreted in all the worlds of X. Le., for each of these sentences
and each world of X it has been determined whether that sentence is true or
false in that world. To interpret a sentence like (a ~ b) ~ c, we need to
define, for every world in X, what it means for (a ~ b) to be true in that
world (rather than in the totality of all the worlds). We will assume, in this
chapter, that the extension of (a ~ b) is determined only by the extensions
of a and b: whether (a ~ b) is true or false in a world does only depend on
the positions in X of the worlds satisfying a and b, respectively. In
principle, any pair of subsets of X could occur as the extension of a pair of
formulas. Let us, therefore, define :
9.1 Definition An extended model is a tuple (X, I, cp), where
X is a topological space,
I( ,) is a binary operation on ~(X), such that
for all a, b c X, I(a, b) c X,
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cp is a map L~ 0'(X) such that, for all a, b E L,
cp(a n b) - tp(a) n tp(b),
tp(a v b) - tp(a) u tp(b),
cp(~ a) - cp(a)~,
tp(a -~ b) - I(tP(a), tp(b)).
When ihere is no danger of confusion, we will freely speak about "model
X", "model (X, cp)", "model X based on I" etc., instead of "model (X, I, cp)".
9.2 Definition A formula a E L is called trcte in (X, I, cp), whenever
tp(a) - X.
It will be clear that (X, I, tp) is not for all I( ,) acceptable as something that
provides sensible interpretations for formulas containing implication. For
example, for every a, b E L, we would like a-~ b to be true in (X, I, cp)
(only) if cp(a) -~ tp(b) is true in the topological space X.
9.3 Definition I( ,) is called an inzplication operatoron X whenever
for all a, b c X, I(a, b) - X (only) if a~ b.
9.4 Proposition If (X, [, tp) is an extended model, and I( ,) is an implication
operator on X, then, for every a, b E L, a~ b is true in (X, I, cp) (only) if
cp(a) -~ cp(b) is true in the topological space X.
(Provable by elementary check.)
9.5 Example For every topological space, the "trivial" operator, defined by
T(a, b) - X if a~ b, and T(a, b) -~ if a~i b, is an implication operator.
The operator Q( ,)("material implication"), defined by Q(a, b) - a~ u b is
not an implication operator, unless the space is monotonic (see Definition
5.13).
In connection with the geometrical motivation of Definition 5.7, there is a
very natural implication operator on every topological space :
9.6 Definition Let X be a topological space, and a, b c X. Then O(a, b) is
the union of all (open) O c X such that O n a-~ b.
Hence, for all w E X, w E O(a, b) (only) if there is some O such that w E
O and O n a-~ b. This amounts to the following: a sentence a-~ b is
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defined to be true in world w whenever "in some neighbourhood of w,
practically all worlds that satisfy a do also satisfy b".
Note that O(a, b) is open for all a, b c X.
9.7 Example If E denotes the Euclidean plane, and P a line in E, then
O(E, E~) - E, O( C, e~) - e~. Note that O(E, F~) n E g~~, but O(E, o~) n E-~ e~
is true.
9.8 Proposition Let X be a topolo~ical space. Then:
i) for all a, b c X, O(a, b) n a~ b,
ii) O( ,) is an implication operator.
Proof: Suppose that O n(O(a, b) n a) ~ Q~. Say p E O n (O(a, b) n a).
Then p E O(a, b), hence, there is an O' such that O' n a-~ b and p E O',
hence O n(O' n a) ~ J. Since O' n a~ b, there is an O" c O such that
O"n(O'na)~Q~ and O"n(O'na)cb.
But O"' .- O" n O' c O(a, b), hence
O"' n(O(a, b) n a) ~ Q~ and O"' n(O(a, b) n a) c b.
Hence, O(a, b) n a -~ b.
To see that O( ,) is an implication operator, suppose that a~ b. Then
X n a-~ b, and X is an open set. Hence O(a, b) - X. On the other hand,
suppose that O(a, b) - X. Then i) implies a~ b.
0
9.9 Corollary O(a, b) is the largest (open) O such that O n a~ b. Note
that, for all a, b c X, a~ ~ b is the largest V c X such that V n a c b.
9.10 Proposition Let X be a topological space. Then the following state-
ments are equivalent:
i) X has discrete topology (i.e. every subset of X is open),
ii) for all a, b c X, O(a, b) - a~ u b,
iii) for all a c X, O(a, Q~) - a~.
Proof:
i) ~ ii): If X has discrete topology, then a~ b(only) if a c b, by whích ii)
easily follows.
ii) ~ iii) is trivial.




Using the implication operator O( ,), we can now interpret rules of inference
as follows.
9.11 Defïnition If a~, ... , am, bi, ... , b„ are formulas of L, then
the rule a~' ~ ~ ~ ' am
b~,...,b~
is called topologically valid or O-valid whenever
the formula a ~ n... n am -~ b ~ n... n b~ is true in every extended model
based on O( ,)(that is, in every extended model (X, O( , ), ~p) ).
Note that this definition involves nested implicational statements whenever
any of the formulas a~, ... , am, b~, ... , b~ contains the symbol "~".
9.12 Example The rule a bb' a is topologically valid (this is an easy
corollary of Proposition 9.8 i). However, the rule
a-~ b, a, ~b
is not
b
topologically valid : if E is the Euclidean plane, and 2 is a line in E, then
O(E, E~) - E, and O(E, C~) n E n E~ E~ is not true.
9.13 Theorem a~ b is topologically valid.
anc-~b
Proof: Let X be a topolo~ical space, and a, b, c c X.
Suppose that O n O(a, b) ~ P~. We may assume that O c O(a, b).
ThenOna-~b.
IfcisdenseinOna,thenOnanc-~b,henceOcO(anc,b).
[f c is not dense in O n a, then there is an O' c O sueh that
O'na~P~,and0'nanc-~.
ThenO'nnnc-~b,hence0'c0(anc,b).
Moreover, O' n O(a, b) ~ GJ, since O' ~ QJ.
In both cases, there exists an O' c O such that
O' n O(n, b) ~ P~ and O' c O(a n c, b).
9.14 Corollary If X is a topological space, and a, b c X, such that a-~ b,
then, for all c c X, there is an open subset V of X such that
X~ V (practically all worlds are in V)
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V n a n c~ b (under the extra assumption "w E V", w E n n c
implies, as a rule, w E b.)
(Namely V- O(a n c, b).)
A special case of Theorem 9.13 is the topological validity of
a~ b
an~b~ b
In this special case, the above remarks yield the existence of a set V such
that X~ V and V n a n b~ ~ b. However, in this special case, it is clear
that we could take V- a~ v b, since a~ b implies X~ a~ U b and
(a~ v b) n a n b~ ~ b. Hence, we could say that this special case of
Theorem 9.13 is nothing more than the following triviality: "if a -~ b is true,
then the set of its counterexamples (that is, a n b~) is a negligible minority in
X."
Warning Theorem 9.13 allows us to think of the rule of monotony as valid,
be it only up to possible exceptions. Our system is non-monotonic, neverthe-
less, in that "a ~ b is true in the extended model (X, O, cp)"
does not imply "a n c~ b is true in the extended model (X, O, cp)".
Nor does "a ~ b is true in every extended model (X, O, cp)"
imply "a n c~ b is true in every extended model (X, O, cp)".
In other words, the topological validity of b does not imply the
topologically validity of a b c (see Example 9.12).
In general, the topological validity qf a and b does nnt imply the
b c
a
topologically validity qf - .
c
9.15 Theorem Each of the following rules is topologically valid:
c~a, c-~b c-~anb c~anb
c~anb c~a c~b
















Proof: Let X be a topological space, and a, b, c, d c X.
For most of the rules above, it is possible to prove an even stronger
statement, as follows.
If O ~- O(c, a) and O, - O(c, b) then O ~ n O, n c~ a and
O ~ n O~ n c ~ b (by the open-lemma).
Hence O ~ n 02 n c~ a n b, hence O ~ n O, c O(c, a n b).
Hence, O(c, a) n O(c, b) c O(c, a n b), which immediately implies
O(c, a) n O(c, b) ~ O(c, a n b).
Likewise :
O(c, a n b) c O(c, a), O(c, a n b) c O(c, b),
O(c, a) c O(c, a v b), O(c, b) c O(c, a v b),
O(c, a u b) n O(c n a, d) n O(c n b, cl) c O(c, d),




O(c n a, b) c O(c, a~ U b),
(since v n a-~ b implies v -~ a~ U b)
O(c, a~ u b) n O(c, a) c O(c, b),
(since~ (a~ ~ b) n a c b)
O(c n a, b) n O(c n a, b~) c O(c, a~),
O(c, a) n O(c, a~) c O(c, b).
The topological validity of modus ponens and the rule of monotony was
established in Proposition 9.8 i) and Theorem 9.13, respectively. The rest is
trivial.
The importance of this theorem will be explained in the next section.
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~10 Defeasible Rules of Inference
Let us think of an imaginary person who uses the rules of propositional logic
as rules-with-possible-exceptions. He knows about the distinction between
object-language and meta-language. On the object level, he continuously
uses ~...v... to interpret implicational statements. On the metalevel, he
draws conclusions using the rules of inference of Theorem 9.15. The symbol
"~" is the symbol that we use to denote the person's deducibility relation (it
is not part of the person's object-language). For example, what we write as
a~b, a~c
a~bnc
is known by him as "if b is deducible from a, and c is deducible from a, then
b-and-c is deducible from a" or, simpler, as the process of writing
b c
bnc
somewhere within an argument or proof tree. (Note that modus ponens, in
the form by which it was included in Theorem 9.15, also functions as such a
rule in practical reasoning: if a and b are formulas such that b is deducible
from a, and, in some situation, with some concrete interpretation of the basic
formulas occurring in a or b, a is true, then modus ponens allows us to
conclude that b, with the same interpretation of the basic formulas, is also
true in that situation.)
However, our imaginary person handles some of these rules ( namely modus
ponens and the rule of monotony) as if they were rules-with-possible-
exceptions. The notion of topological validity, now, can be seen as a
mathematical image of the reasoning behaviour of such a person. Thus, our
imaginary person appreciates each of the laws of classical propositional
logic, distinguishes between implication (~...v...) and deducibility (~), uses
an unambiguously defined and fixed language (having n, v, and ~),
distinguishes between an objectlanguage and a metalanguage etc, etc. Note
that the terms objectlanguage and metalanguage are meant, here, to refer to
the person's objectlanguage and metalanguage. They are not to be confused
with our objectlanguage and metalanguage, when reading, for example,
Definition 9.11 or Theorem 9.15. For example, "~" is not part of the
person's object language.
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The rules of inference of Theorem 9.15, when interpreted as valid-without-
exceptions, are known to be a complete characterization of classical
propositional logic. Thus, the person could be said to reason non-
monotonically "on the metalevel" while accepting each of the laws of
classical propositional (monotonic) logic as valid-with-possible-exceptions.
The laws that the person appreciates as valid (be it only up-to-possible-
exceptions) include the principle of monotony: the person appreciates "if c is
deducible from the assumptions a~, ... , a~, then c is deducible from a~, ... ,
a~, a~~~" as valid. Nevertheless, "if c is deducible from the assumptions a~,
... , a~, and c is not deducible from a~, ... , an, a~t~" is regarded as a
consistent situation :
a~ n-.-na„ ~c
is topologically valid, but
a~ n..- n a~ n a~}~ ~ c
a~ n... n a~ ~ c, ~(a~ n-.. n a~ n a~~~ ~ c)
a~ n...na„ na„t~ ~c
is not.
Likewise, it follows by Example 9.12 that modus ponens, as handled by our
person, is accepted as valid, but may have exceptions. It is important to note
that our person handles the other rules of Theorem 9.15 as rules withnut
exceptions. This is easily seen by reconsidering the proof of Theorem 9.15.
a~b, a-~c, d
For example, is topologically valid.
a~bnc
(For all X and all n, b, c c X, O(c, a) n O(c, b) c O(c, a n b). )
Hence, if our person has concluded that b-and-c is deducible from a on the
grounds that both b and c are deducible from a, this conclusion will not be
withdrawn on the arrival of whatever new information (d).
Hence, although ihe mathematical elaboration may leave room for
improvement, Theorem 9.15 can be said to support ihe following tentative
conclusion. The typical monotonic character of classical propositional logic
is not a consequence of any of the following :
1) accepting the rule of monotony,
2) accepting that rule and all "classical laws",
3) using an unambiguously defined formal language,
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4) making a distinction between objectlanguage and meta-
language, or between implication and inference,
5) using -,...v... to interpret implication on the objectlevel,
6) any combination of 1) - 5).
It is a consequence of adopting monotnnic reasoning habits on the metale-
vel. The collection of axioms that is usually assumed to characterize propo-
sitional logic does not suffice to characterize these reasoning habits. Most
probably, there is no other set of rules that manages to capture, completely,
these habits, since any such set of rules will involve implicational state-
ments, in one way or another, that will be susceptible of a non-strict
interpretation. This latter statement, however, is no more than a conjecture,
and is certainly not supported by Theorem 9.15. Let us state it, more provo-
catively, as follows : in Chapter 1, it was defended as thinkable that non-
monotonic reasoning detïes complete axiomatization or formalization.
Likewise, however, it is thinkable that monotonic reasoning defies complete
axiomatization in the eyes of a person that persistently reasons non-
monotonically.
There is a number of results that reinforce the above interpretation of
Theorem 9.15. The first we will present is Theorem 10.3, below. This result
states that there is no difference between topological validity and classical
validity, provided we restríct ourselves to rules of a very simple kind, thus
generalizing Theorem 9.15. Other, more subtle, reinforcements will be an
"alternative definition" of the notion of topological validity (Definition
12.11), Boutilier's Theorern (Theorem 12.24), and Corollary 12.25.
10.1 De~inition A formula (in L) is called classical whenever it does not
contain the symbol "~". If a and b are classical formulas, then a--~ b is
called a standard formula. (Other formulas are not.)
A rule `~~' "' '`~m is called a standard rule whenever each one of
B~, ... , B~
A~,... , Am, B ~,... , B~ is a standard formula.
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10.2 Defnition A classical model is an extended model based on material
implication, that is, an extended model (X, Q, cp) where Q(a, b) - a~ u b for
all a, b c X.
A rule `4 ~' '~~' A m is called classically valid whenever the formula
B~,...,B~
A~ n... n Am ~ B~ n... n Bn is true in every classical model.
As is well kown, if ap, ... , a~, b~, ... , b~ are classical formulae, then the rule
a~ ~ b~ , ... , an --~ b~
ap ~ bp
is classically valid (only) if for every collection, M, of possible worlds in
which a ~~ M b ~,... , a~ kM b~ are true, ao ~M bp is also true.
10.3 Theorem A standard rule `~ ~'~~~' A m is topologically valid (only)
B~,...,Bn
if it is classically valid.
(For a related result, see Theorem 11.12.)
Proof: If the rule is topologically valid, it is valid in all models with discrete
topology. But in those models, O(a, b) - a~ v b for all subsets a, b
(Proposition 9.10). Hence the rule is classically valid.
On the other hand, if the rule is classically valid, it can be proved using the
rules from Theorem 9.15. Now it suffices to notice (supposing all appearing
rules to be standard) :
If A~, ... ,
Am
B~, ... , Bn
is topologically valid (and C is a standard for-
mula), then A~' -" ' Am' C is topologically valid.
B~,...,B~
(Proof: For all X and all a, b c X, a~ b implies a n O ~ b for open O,
and every standard formula is, in every extended model, interpreted by an
open set, since O(a, b) is open for all a, b c X, and all X. )
ii) If A ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ' `~ m and B ~ ' ' ' ' ' B" are topologically valid, then
Bi,...,B~ C~,...,Ck
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A ~'... ' A m is also topologically valid.
C~,...,Ck
(Proof: Use i) above and Proposition 5.11 ii).)
~
For example, a~ b is topologically valid, since,
~b --~ ~a
forallXandalla,bcX,
O(a, b) --~ O(a n h~, b),
O(a n b~, b) n O(a n b~, b~) c O(a n b~, a~),
O(a n b~, a~) n O(a~ n b~, a~) c O(b~, a~), and
O(a n b~, b~) - O(a~ n b~, a~) - X.






Warning In the sequel, we will give some of the proofs by just showing
such a scheme, representing only the core of the proof. Typically, these
schemes can easily be turned into complete proofs by repeated use of the
open-lemma, Theorem 9.13, validity of rules previously achieved, etc.
However, the schemes in itself do typically not constitute complete proofs.
~11 Topologically Valid Rules
Let us examine topologically valid rules more closely. Theorem 10.3 tells us
which standard rules are topologically valid. Before we study the topologícal
validity of non-standard rules, let us first make some rather obvious remarks.
11.1 Definition A substitution is a function 6: L~ L such that,
for all a, b E L,
6(a n b) - 6(a) n 6(b),
6(a v b) - 6(a) v 6(b),
6(~ a) - ~ 6(a),
6(a ~ b) - 6(a) ~ 6(b).
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If a~,... , a~ are the basic formulas of L, then for every row A ~,... , A~ of
formulas of L there is one and only one substition 6 such that 6(a~) - A~, for
i- 1, ... , n. On the other hand, for every substition there is one and only one
row A ~,... , A~ satisfying those conditions.
11.2 Theorem (Substitution theorem)
If A~,... , Am, B i,... , B~ are formulas of L, such that
A~, ... , Am
B~, ... , B~
is topologically valid, then for every substitution 6,
6(A1), ... , 6(Am)
6(B~ ), ... , 6(B~ )
is also topologically valid.
Proof: This is a trivial consequence of the definition of topological validity
(Definition 9.11).
It is not straightforward to explain the "sense" of non-standard rules. This is
not because non-standard rules do not make sense, but because there is a
variety of possible views. Of course, the notion of topological validity does
not depend on the choice of a particular point of view. Therefore, we will
not exhaustively distinguish and explain all kinds of viewpoints.
One possibility is, to extend the story of our imaginary person of ~ 10. Let
us, therefore, suppose that this imaginary person introduces the symbol "~"
in his object language to denote implication-with-possible-exceptions. Let us
also assume that the person appreciates precisely the topologically valid
rules as valid. We will use two different symbols, " h" and "-~",
corresponding to the person's distinction between deducibility and
implication. We, on the other hand, treat these two symbols as synonyms.
For example :
11.3 Example (Concerning modus ponens)
i) a 4~ b
c4~a~b
is topologically valid, since, for every topological space X, and all a, b c X,
O(a, b) n c-~ O(a, b), hence O(a, b) c O(c, O(a, b)), hence
O(a, b) ~ O(c, O(a, b)).
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ii) c~ p' c~ p~ q is topologically valid.
c I~ q
(Proof: This and some of the following examples will be an easy corollary of
Theorem 11.5 below.)
ii) states that, if our person observes that a certain context supports the
proposition p, as well as p~ q, then q is concluded to be supported by that
context. In other words : the person appreciates
P, P~q
q
as a valid proof-step.
On the other hand,
iii) c ~ p' c~ p~ q' c~ q is not topologically valid.
c I~ q
(Proof: In the Euclidean plane E, let c denote a line, p- E and q- c~. Then
O(c, p) n O(c, O(p, q)) n O(c, q)~ ~ O(c, q) amounts to E n E n c~ c~,
which is not true.)
That is, if our person also knows that q is not supported by that context, that
observation is not withdrawn and, moreover, the situation is not considered





is topologically valid, as well as
cl~p, cwp~q, cF--,q
c ~ 1 , although
c4~p, cF-p~q, c~~q, c4fq
vi)
cwq
Finally, for the sake of completeness,
cl~p, cF-~pvq, c~fq
1
is not topologically valid.
is topologically valid.
(Proofs: iv) and v): use the open-lemma and ii).
vi): In the Euclidean plane E, let c denote a line, p- E and c~ - c~. Then
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0(c, p) n O(c, O(p, q)) n O(c, q~) n O(c, q)~ -~ O(c, q)
amounts to E n E n E n c~ c~, which is not true.
vii): For every topological space X, and all c, p, q c X,
O(c, p) n O(c, p~ u q) c O(c, q).
Hence O(c, p) n O(c, p~ u q) n O(c, q)~ ~ QJ.)
ll.4 Example (The "meaning" of implication for our imaginary person)
i) c~ q is not topologically valid.
c l~ p --~ q
(Proof: If X is the real line, c the set of rational numbers, p- X and q- c,
then O(c, q) ~ O(c, O(p, q)) amounts to X ~ QJ, which is not true.)
Apparently, our imaginary person does not appreciate the proof step
q
P~q
Not even "as a rule". On the other hand,
ii) c~ q is topologically valid.
c4~(cnp~q)
(Proof: By Theorem 9.13, c~ q is valid. By 11.3 i), c n p~ q is
cnp4~q cL~(cnp~q)
valid. The open-lemma provides the rest.)
The resulting notion of implication ("~", as treated by our imaginary
person) seems to be somewhat different from the conception of implication
that is common in mathematics. In mathematical reasoning, an utterance "a
implies b", when done in a certain context, does not actually mean "a
implies b". It means: "a, together with everything known or assumed so far,
implies b". Our person seems to think of "~" as having a different meaning.
Our person seems to insist on being explicit about hidden assumptions :
knowing "this is a penguin", the statement "if this is a bird, then it is a
penguin" would not necessarily be accepted. On the other hand "if this is a
bird and a penguin, then it is a penguin" would be considered true. This is
affirmed by the following:
cF~pnq--~r, c4~q
cF~p-~r
is not topologically valid.
~6
(Proof: If X is the real line, c the set of rational numbers, p- X and q- r-
c, then O(c, O(p n q, r)) n O(c, q) ~ O(c, O(p, r)) amounts to X---~ Q~,
which is not true.)
Hence, the person does not accept a statement p~ r as correct only on the
grounds that both q and p n q-~ r are true.
11.5 Theorem
c~ p~ q and
c F- p-~ q' c~ p--~ r are topologically valid.
cw(pnr~q) c~p~(qnr)
In general, we have :
If a, b, c E L such that ba- is topologically valid, then
c F- a
c4~b
is also topologically valid.
Proof: Suppose that -ba is topologically valid.
Then, for every extended model (X, O, cp),
~p(a) ~ cp(b) is true in X, hence O(~p(a), cP(b)) - X, hence,
by Theorem 9.13, O(~p(c) n cp(a), ~p(b)) is full in X, hence,
by the open-lemma :
O(~p(c), ~p(a)) ~ O(~p(c) n ~p(a), ~p(b)).
But O(~p(c), ~p(a)) n O(~p(c) n cP(a), cp(b)) c O(~p(c), ~p(b)).
Hence, O(~p(c), ~p(a)) ~ O(tp(c), ~p(b)).
Hence, (c ~ a) -~ (c ~ b) is true in (X, O, ~p).
0
Likewise : If a~, ... , a~, b, c E L such that




For example, the fact that









The converse of Theorem 11.5 is not true, not even if c is a basic formula
not occurring in the formulas a~, ... , a~ or b:
11.6 Example
i) p' P~ q' q~ r is not topologically valid.
r
(Proof : ifp - e, q- E, r- e~, then p n O(p, q) n O(q, r) ~ r amounts to
C n E n E~ E~, which is not true.)
c4~p, c4~p-~q, cF-q~r
ii) is topologically valid.
cl~r




So much for our imaginary person. It will be clear, though, that the
imaginary person will continue to be a major source of inspiration in the
sequel. In the mean time, we cannot ignore the following altemative point of
view. Let us think of an agent whose set of sentences is closed under n, v,
~(having their usual meaning) and ~(signifying implication-up-to-
possible-exceptions). The meaning of -~ is thought to be such that it forces
the agent's inference relation to be non-monotonic, in that, for every pair a, b
of sentences in the agent's language, the assumptions a~ b, a lead to b as a
conclusion, but together with ~b, they do no longer lead to the conclusion
that b is true. This phenomenon is then expressed by the fact that the rule
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a~ b, a a-~ b, a, ~b
b is topologically valid, but b is not.
11.7 Example (Birds ór, penguins)
As a consequence of Theorem 10.3,
b~f, p-~bn~f
p ~ ~f
is topologically valid, but so is
b~f, p~bn-,f
p -~ f
As a matter of fact,
b~f, p-~bn~fiii)
~p
On the other hand,
iv) b~f, p~bn , p
is topologically valid (since O(a, QS) c a~).
is not topologically valid, while
f
b~f, p~bn~f, pv) is.-~f
(Proof of iv) : if b- E, ~- E, f- è~, then O(b, fl n O(p, b n f~) n p-~.f
amounts to E n E n C~ C~, which is not true.
Proof of v) : For all X, and all b, f, p c X, O(~~, b n.~) n p ~,f~ is true. By
the open-lemma, O(b,.fl n O(p, b n~) n p-~.~ is also true. )
These statements (that is, iii), iv) and v)) could be read as follows:
If an object is such that:
if it is a bird, then it can t7y,
if it is a penouin, then it is a bird and it cannot fly,
then : the object is not a penguin.
But if (it satisfies these conditions and) it is a penguin,
then it cannot fly.
b~f, p~bn~f, b
f
is also topolo~ically valid, but
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b~f, p~b~~f, bvii) is not.




Proof of vii): if b- E, p-~, f- E~, then O(b, fl n O(p, b n f~) n b~~
amounts to E n E n E~ F, which is not true.
11.8 Example (Concerning the deduction principles)
Comparing 11.7 ii) to 11.7 ivj, we notice that
c~' "~ ' cn does not imply
a~b
The reverse also fails:
c i,..., c ~, a
b
a' b b is topologically valid, but
a~ b
is not.
(If n- e~, b - B, then b~ O(a, b) amounts to e-~ 2S, which is not true.)
The two principles involved are called deduction principles, and their failure
seems, at first sight, undesired. But, in view of the example in ~ 1(about
John not being home at six o'clock), the deduction principles should not be
true : Let p denote "it is six o'clock, now", and q: "John is home, now". Then
p~ q' p' ~q is acceptable, but p~ q' ~q is not, since
~q p ~ ~q
this latter inference would allow us to conclude "John is never home at six
o'clock" from "John is always home at six o'clock and John is not home,
now" (whether it is six o'clock, now, or not).
On the other hand,
p~ q' ~q is acceptable, but p~ q' p' ~q
P~q q
(as explained in ~ 1), because of the meaning of p--~ q.
is not
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Despite failure of the deduction principles as formulated above, we do have:
ii)
a n b ~ c and
a~~b v c
are topologically valid (by
a~~bvc anb-~c
Theorem 10.3).




(Proof: O(a, b) n X ~ O(a, b), hence O(a, b) c O(X, O(a, b)).
And, of course, O(X, O(a, b)) n X ~ O(a, b).)
On the other hand,
anb-~c
iv) is not topologically valid.
a-~(b~c)
(Proof: Let X be the real number line with its usual topology, let a be the
set of rational numbers, b- X, c- a, then O(a n b, c) ~ O(a, O(b, c))
amounts to O(a, a) ~ O(a, QJ), i.e. to X~ P~, which is not true.)
Oddly enough,
v) a n b- ~ c
is topologically valid (see 11.3 i) ).
a~(anb~c)









(For all b, c c X, O(b n O(b, c), c) - X. By Theorem 9.13,
O(a n b n O(b, c), c) is full in X, etc.)
ll.9 Example (Concerning the rationality laws)




(R1) is not topologically valid.
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Proof: In t~ , the set of complex numbers, define a-~, b-~`(Q , c-
IR. Then O(a, b) -~, O(a n b n c, Q~) - IR~, O(a n c, b) - IR~, hence
O(a, b) n O(a n b n c, ~)~ ~ O(a n c, b) amounts to ~ n IR ~ IR~,
which is not true.
i,) a~ b, a n c~i b
is not topoloQically valid.
anbnc-~1
Proof: With the same definitions as in i),
O(a, b) n O(a n c, b)~ --~ O(a n b n c, Q~) amounts to ~ n IR ~ IR~,
which is not true.
~
ii)
a~ b, a n c~~b ( R2) is not topologically valid.
anc~b
Proof: With the same definitions as in i), O(a n c, b`-) - IR~, O(a n c, b) -
IR~, hence O(a, b) n O(a n c, b~)~ ~ O(a n c, b) amounts to t~ n IR -~
IR~, which is not true.
a-~b, anc~ib
ii') is not topologically valid.
anc-~-,b
Proof: With the same definitions as in i),
O(a, b) n O(a n c, b)~ ~ O(a n c, b~) amounts to r~ n IR ~ IR~, which is
not true.
iii)
a~ b, a~-~c (R3) is topologically valid.
anc~b
Proof: Suppose it is not valid. Then, for some topological space X, and for
some a, b, c c X, O(a, b) n O(a, c~)~ -fi O(a n c, b), hence:
O(a n c, b)~ is somewhere dense in O(a, b) n O(a, c~)~, say:
O(a n c, b)~ is dense in O n O(a, b) n O(a, c~)~, the latter being
nonempty.
Then O n O(a, b) n O(a, c~)~ c O(a n c, b)~, since this latter set is both
dense and closed in the former.
Now define U:- O n O(a, b), V:- O(a, cc)c
(SothatUnVcO(anc,b)~,andUna-~b.)
Then: Since U n V~ Q~ (i.e., U~ O(a, c~)), we know that U n a~i c~.
Hence, c is somewhere dense in U n a, say
62
O'cU,cdensein0'na,and0'na~P~.
Then O' n a-fi c~, hence O' Q O(a, c~), hence O' n V~~Ó.
But O' n V c U n V c O(a n c, b)~, hence
O' n O(a n c, b)~ ~ D.
But, since c is dense in O' n a and O' n a~ b, we know that
O' n a n c~ b, hence O' c O(a n c, b), contradiction.
a~b, anc~b
iii') is topologically valid.
a-~-,c
Proof: Suppose it is not valid. Then, for some topological space X, and for
some a, b, c c X, O(a, b) n O(ca n c, b)~ ~ O(a, c~), hence:
O(a, c~)~ is somewhere dense in O(a, b) n O(a n c, b)~, say:
O(a, c~)~ is dense in O n O(a, b) n O(a n c, b)~, the latter being
nonempty.
Then O n O(a, b) n O(a n c, b)~ c O(a, c~)~, since this latter set is both
dense and closed in the former.
Now define U:- O n O(a, b), V:- O(a n c, b)~.
(So that U n V c O(a, c~)~, and U n a~ b.)
Then: Since U n V~ Q~, (i.e., U a O(a n c, b)), we know that
Unanc~-ib.
Hence, b~ is somewhere dense in U n a n c, say
O'cU,b~densein0'nanc,and0'nanc~QJ.
Then O' n a n c-H b, hence O' c~ O(a n c, b), hence O' n V~ P~.
But O' n V c U n V c O(a, c~)~, hence
O' n O(a, c~)~ ~ ~
Hence, O' n a~i c~, say
O" c O', c is dense in O" n a, and O" n a~ Q~.
O" na~b,hence0" nanc~b.
But b~ is dense in O" n a n c, contradiction.
avb~c, a-flc
b~c
Proof-scheme, using iii') :









v) (RS) is topologically valid.
an-,c~b





a-~b, anc~~b (R6) is topologically valid as a consequen-
a~~c
ce of Theorem 10.3.
Recapitulating : R3, R4, RS and R6 are topologically valid, R 1 and R2 are
not It is interesting to note that assuming the "ordinary" validity of R 1 or R2
is generally thought to be unreasonably strong, while "ordinary" R3, R4 and
RS are sometimes defended as acceptable ( for example, in [KLM 90] or
[LM 92]).
ll.10 Example (Concerning modus tollens)
i) a~ b is topologically valid, by Theorem 10.3.
~b ~ ~a
ii)
a-~ b, ~b is not topologically valid: O(E, E~) n e-~ ~Ó is not
~a
true (where E denotes the Euclidean plane, and 'c a line in E).
iii) For all a, b E L, if a is topologically valid, then b~ l is
b a~1
also topologically valid.
Proof: We will prove that a~ b implies O(b, ~Ó) -j O(a, Q~), by proving
that it implies O(b, QJ) c O(a, QS) :
We know that O(b, QJ) n b- P~. Hence, O(b, ~Ó) n b n a- P~.
But b is dense in a, and O(b, P~) is an open seL Hence O(b, QJ) n a-~.
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Hence, O(b, P~) c O(a, Q~).
~~
iv) c~ p~ q c~ q~~ is topologically valid, by Theorem I 1.5.
cl~p-~1
v) c~ p~ q c~~q is topologically valid. The core of the proof
c w -,p









is not topologically valid.
Proof: Let C be a line in the Euclidean plane E. If c- E, p- E, q- B~, then





a~ b and a~ b are topologically valid (Theorem
anc-~b an~b~b
a~ b, a, c a~ b, a, ~b
ii) b and b are not.
(Proof of the latter : if a- E, b - e~, then O(a, b) n a n b~ --~ b amounts to
E n E n e--~ E~, which is not true. The former is not valid, by the substitution
theorem.)
The rules i) and ii) above are somewhat disturbing. We will return to this
issue in Chapter 5. Suffice it to say, at this moment, that for all a, b c X,




as valid, could be said to accept, as a rule, the principle "if a~ b is true,
then typically it is true-without-exceptions". That is, if there is no reason to
assume that an implicational statement has exceptions, it is assumed to have
none. Although this sounds reasonable, the question may arise whether it is
possible to find mathematical caricatures displaying different behaviour in
this respect, while still featuring rules of inference with possible exceptions.
We end this section with the following useful theorem, generalizing many of
the above examples.
11.12 Theorem Let ao, ... , a", b~, ... , b" be classical formulae.
Then the following two statements are equivalent :
the rule
a~ ~ b~ , ... a" ~ bn~ ao
b~~
ii) the rule
a~ ~ b~ '... ' a" ~ b"
Proof:
at~ -~ b~t
i) ~ ii) : Suppose that the rule
aa~bp
rule of P 1-P5. Then, by the Completeness Theorem of ~7 ( Corollaries 7.6
and "1.10), there is a topological model (X, cp) such that
a~ ~ b~ ,... , a" ~ b" are true, and a~ ~ b~ is not.
Let (X, O, cp' ) be the ( unique) extended model such that, for every basic
formula a of L, ~p'(a) - ~p(a).
Then a~ -~ b~ ,... , a" ~ b" are true in (X, O, cp') , but
att ~ b~ is not.
Hence, cp'(a~ ~ b~) - X, for i - 1, ... , n, hence
~p'(a i~ b i ) n... n ~p'(a" ~ b") n ~p'(ao) ~ N'(bo)
amounts to X n... n X n ~p'(at~) -~ ~p'(bt~), which is not true.
Hence, the rule
a~ ~ b~ ,... , a" -~ b", ap
is topologically valid,
is a derived rule of P 1-P5.
a~ ~ b~ , ... , a" ~ b" is not a derived
is not topologically valid.
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To understand ii) ~ i) : Suppose that the rule a~ -~ b~ 'ao~~ b~ a" ~ b" is
a derived rule of P1-P5, and that (X, O, cp) is an extended model.
Define O:- cp(a ~~ b ~) n... n cp(a" -~ b").
Then O n ~p(a~) -~ ~p(b~), for i- 1,... , n.
Since the rule above is a derived rule of Pl-P5, it follows that
O n cp(ao) ~ ~p(b~),
which was to be proven.
To illustrate the crucial step in this argument by an example :
a~b, a-~c, a, b
the rule is topologically valid, since, defining
c
0:-0(a,b)n0(a,c),Ona~bandOna~c,henceOnanb~c.
~12 Other Implication Operators
The properties of inference-as-a-rule-with-possible-exceptions, as found in
the preceding three sections, rely on the choice of the implication operator.
The operator O( ,) that we used turned out to be quite suitable. In this
section, we will consider some alternatives, and investigate their behaviour.
A particularly interesting construction is the following.
U-validity
Let X be a topological space.
12.1 Definition For all a, b c X,
U(a, b) -{ w E X I every O such that w E O, O n a~ Q~ contains
an0'suchthatwE O',O'na~~,0'na-~b }.
12.2 Proposition For all (X and all) a, b c X,
i) U(a, b) - X (only) if a~ b, (U( ,) is an implication operator)
ii) U(a, b) - O(a, b) n á if a~i b.
(Where á denotes the closure of a, see appendix B, in particular B.7.)
Proof:
i) If a~ b, then for every O: O n a -~ b, hence U(a, b) - X.
On the other hand, if U(a, b) - X, then every O such that O n a~ P~
contains an O' such that O' n a~ P~ and O' n a ~ b.
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Then O' contains an O" such that O" n a~ Q~ and O" n a c b.
Hence a ~ b.
ll)
If w E á (that is, every O containing w contains elements of a), then
w E U(a, b) (only) if w E O(a, b) :
If w E U(a, b), then w E X, X is open and X n n~ P~,
hence, there is an O c X such that
wE O,Ona~P~ andOna~b.
Hence, w E O c O(a, b).
On the other hand, if w E O(a, b), then every O such that
w E O and O n a~ QS also satisfies
w E O n O(a, b), O n O(a, b) n a~~ (since w E á),
andOnO(a,b)na~b.
Hence, w E U(a, b).
If w~ á, then w E U(a, b) (only) if a~ b,
which is seen as follows.
That a~ b implies w E U(a, b) follows from i).
Now, suppose that w E U(a, b) and that w~ á.
Say,wE OandOna-~.
Let O' be such that O' n a~ QJ.
Then wE O~O' and (O~O')na~P~.
Since w E U(a, b), there is an O" c O v O' such that
wE O",O"na~~and0"na~b.
ButOna-P~,hence(O"n0')na~Q~.
Moreover, (O" n O') n a ~ b. (And O" n O' c O'.)
Hence, a ~ b.
0
A closer look at the proof above yields the following alternative formulation
of Proposition 12.2 :
12.3 Corollary For all a, b c X, and all w E X,
w E U(a, b) (only) if
either w~ á and a~ b,
or w E á and w E O(a, b).
Hence, Definition 12.1 amounts to the following: if there are no a-worlds in
"the" direct environment of w, then a~ b is true in w(only) if it is tnae in
the totality of all the worlds. If there are a-worlds arbitrarily close to w, then
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a~ b is true in w(only) if, within some environment of w, almost all a-
worlds are b-worlds.
12.4 Definition A rule a~' ~-' ' am is called U-valid whenever
b~,...,b~
the formula a~ n... n am ~ b~ n... n b~ is true in every extended model
based on U( ,) (that is, in every extended model (X, U( ,) , ~p) ).
12.5 Proposition a~ b is not U-valid.
anc~b
Proof: Let E be the Euclidean plane, E a line, P a point on C.
If a- B, b- E `{ P} and c-{ P}, then a~ b is true, a n c~ b is not.
Hence, U(a, b) - X, but U(a n c, b) - O(a n c, b) n(a n c) - Q~, since
O(a n c, b) - O(a n c, ~Ó) -(a n c)~.
12.6 Definition A standard rule
a~ ~ b~ ,... , a~ -~ b~
ao~bo
.strongly U-valid whenever, for all topological models (X, cp) :
U(~Pía ~), cp(b ~)) n... n U(~P(a~), ~P(b~)) ~ Uí~P{ao), ~Píbo)).
is called
12.7 Proposition For every standard rule, the following statements are
mutually equivalent:
i) the rule is a derived rule of P1-P5,
ii) the rule is strongly U-valid,
iii) the rule is U-valid.
(Sketch of the) proof : If A~~, ... , An}~ are standard formulas, and
A~ ''" '`4" is strongly U-valid, then `4~ '~~~ A" ' A"}~ is
Ap A~~
also strongly U-valid.









a~b, a-~c ~PS) a-~c, b~c
anb-~c avb~c
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P1 and P2 are, obviously, strongly U-valid.
For P3 : it is easy to prove that for all X and all a, b c X,
O(a, b) n O(a n b, c) c O(a, c).
By Proposition 12.2 and the fact that
a nb c a, (see B.8)
it follows that P3 is strongly U-valid.
That P4 and PS are strongly U-valid, can be proved in a similar way.
ii) ~ iii) is a trivial consequence of the definitions.
To see iii) ~ i), suppose that the rule
a~ ~ b~ , ... a„ ~ b~
is not a
ap~bp
derived rule of Pl-P5. Then, by the Completeness Theorem of ~7
(Corollaries 7.6 and 7.10), there is a topological model (X, cp) in which
a ~-~ b ~,... , an ~ bn are true, and ap ~ b~ is not.
Define X' :- X x[0, 1], equipped with product topology (see Appendix B).
Let (X', U( ,), cp') be an extended model such that, for i- 0, ... , n,
~p'(a~) - cp(a;) x{ 0}, ~p (b;) - ~p(b;) x{ 0}.
(Note that cp(a;) x{0} is essentially the same space as cp(a;).)
Then, using Proposition 12.2 i) and ii) respectively, it is easy to see that
UX,( ~p'(a;), ~p'(b;)) - X', for i- l, ... , n, while, on the other hand,
UX,( ~p'(ap), ~p'(bo)) is not full in X', since
UX~( ~p (ao), ~p'(b~)) c cp' (ap ) c X x{ 0}
Hence, the rule is not U-valid.
0
As an easy consequence of Proposition 12.2, we have :
a~b, a
12.8 Proposition b is U-valid.
Proof: For all X and all a, b c X:
If a~ b, then U(a, b) n a- a- O(a, b) n a.
If a~i b, then U(a, b) n a- O(a, b) n á n a- O(a, b) n a.
But O(a, b) n a~ b.
Hence, U(a, b) n a~ b.
To recapitulate, a standard rule is
i) O-valid (only) if it is classically valid
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ii) U-valid (only) if it is a derived rule of P1-P5.
For rules that are not standard, however, there is a considerable difference
between topological validity (O-validity) and classical validity, as was seen
in ~ I 1. It is hard to understand what it could mean for a non-standard rule to
be "derived from P1-PS". One is inclined to say that no non-standard rule
can be derived from P1-P5. On the other hand, U-validity of non-standard
rules is a well-defined notion.
Onvalidity
Another possibility is to change the conception of a model, for example in
the following way. Let X and Y be topological spaces, and ~: Y-~ X a
continuous map. We think of the elements of X as possible worlds and, for
every w E X, of rc-I(w) as the collection of objects in that world. The
topology on Y induces a topology on 7c 1(w), for every w E X. Thus, the
triple (~, X, Y) represents a"topological space of topological spaces".
Given such a triple, we could define, for all a, b c Y,
Tn(a, b) :- 7z 1({ w E X I 1ci(w) n a ~ b})
and evaluate sentences and rules in the extended model (Y, Tn, cp). Note
that, if X is a one point space, then Tn( ,)- T( ,), the trivial implication
operator, see Example 9.5.
In general, however, Tn( ,) is not an implication operator. (We will not
prove this remark. It is an easy corollary of the proofs of 14.3, 14.4 and
14.5, see Chapter 4.) Hence, this construction is not entirely satisfying. A
better operator to use, in combination with these triples, is the operator
On( , ), defined as follows :
12.9 Defnition For all a, b c Y,
O,~(a, b) :- ~t(O), where O is the largest open subset of X such that
7ct(O) n a ~ b is true (in Y).
A rule a~' ~~~' am is called On-valid whenever, for all triples
b~,...,b~
(n, X, Y) and all extended models (Y, O~, cp), the formula
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aln...na~, ~ b~n...nbn
is true in (Y, On, cp).
The rule is called strictly On-valid whenever, for all such extended models,
cp(a~ n... n am) c cp(b~ n... n b~).
This constnzction generalizes both the trivial implication operator and O( ,):
If X- Y and n(y) - y for all y E Y, then On(a, b) - O(a, b) for all a, b c Y.
On the other hand, if X is a one point space (and n is the only existing map
Y~ X), then On(a, b) - T(a, b) for all a, b c Y.
Moreover On( ,) is, for every triple (tt, X, Y), an implication operator on Y
(which can be proved along the same lines as Proposition 9.8 ii ).
12.10 Proposition
i) The rule a~ b is not Onvalid,
anc-~b
ií) A standard rule is O,~valid (only) if it is a derived rule of Pl-P5.
Proof: Although i) is a consequence of ii), we will give a direct proof:
Let Y be IRZ, X- IR, tt(u, v) :- u, for all (u, v) E Y.
Definea-Y,b- { (u,v)E YIv~O },c-Y`b.
Then a~ b is true in Y, hence On(a, b) - Y.




Hence, On(a n c, b) - Q~. Hence,
On(a, b) -~ On(a n c, b) is not true, which proves i).
Proof of ii): As in Proposition 12.7, we will, for every standard rule,
establish the equivalence of
1) the rule is O,~valid,
2) the rule is strictly Onvalid,
3) the rule is a derived rule of P1-P5.
3) ~ 2) can be proved along the same lines as the corresponding part of
Proposition 12.7. As an example, we will prove P3 to be strictly Onvalid.
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Let (~, X, Y) be a triple and a, b, c c Y. Let O ~ be the largest open subset
of X such that ~ t(O~) n a-~ b. Let OZ be the largest open subset of X
such that nI(02) n a n b~ c. Then
nt(O~ n0z)na - n t(O~)nn t(Oz)na~c.
Hence, O~ n 02 is a subset of the largest open O' c X such that
n-t(O') n a ~ c.
Hence, n t(O~ n Oz) c O~(a, c). Hence
O,~(a, b) n O,~(a n b, c) - n t(O i) n n~(02) -
- n-t(O~ n OZ) c On(a, c),
which proves that P3 is strictly On-valid.
2) ~ 1) is trivial.
1) ~ 3) : Suppose that
a~ -~ b~ '... ' an ~ bn is a standard rule that is
ao ~ bp
not a derived rule of P1-P5. Then, by the Completeness Theorem of ~7
(Corollaries 7.6 and 7.10), there is a topological model (Y, cp) such that
cp(a;) ~ cp(b;) is true in Y, for i- 1, ... , n, while cp(ao) --~ cp(b~) is not true
in Y (hence, Y ~ QJ).
Define X:- { x} for some x, and n(y) - x for all y E Y.
Using the triple (~, X, Y),
O,~(a;, b;) - T(a;, b;) - Y, for i- 1, ... , n,
while On(a~, b~) - Q~.
Hence,




It is possible to generalize this construction further, by using infinite rows
X~ ~-X2F ~? X3~ ...
instead of triples X~~ Y. We will not proceed in this direction, since
this will not yield anything essentially new or interesting for the purposes of
this thesis.
There is, however, one adaptation of On-validity that we cannot ignore.
Replacing On( ,) by O( ,) in Definition 12.9, triples can also be used for an
interesting "alternative definition" of O-validity :
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12.11 Definition
A rule a~' ~~~' am is called O'-valid whenever, for all triples (n, X, Y)
b~,...,b~
and all extended models (Y, O, cp), the formula
a~n...nam ~ b~n...nb~
is true in (Y, O, cp).
12.12 Proposition A rule is O'-valid (only) íf it is O-valid.
(Proof: Elementary.)
Definition 12.1 ] amounts to the following. An object y E Y in world x-
n(y) E X satisfies a~ b whenever, in some open set containing y, almost
all objects that satisfy a do also satisfy b. It might be, of course, that every
open set containing y contains objects from worlds different from y's world.
That is, whether y satisfies a~ b or not, might depend on the truth value of
a and b for objects near y, in worlds near x. Note that this does not
necessarily mean that y itself has equivalents in worlds different from x.
This construction seems closer to our mental picture of implication than the
straight definition of O-validity, and might help our understanding of
phenomena such as 11.7 iii), iv) and v). Moreover, it might improve one's
appreciation of using "-~" to interpret inference as done in Definition 9.11.
Thus, this constnaction reinforces the remarks made in ~ 10.
S-validity
A possible disadvantage of the operator O( ,) is the fact that it doesn't
satisfy the deduction principles (i.e.: there is a difference between
a a, b
b~c' c ' anb~c'
etc.).
This forces us to be cautious when formulating "practical" reasoning
problems as rules (see 11.7 and 11.8). There is no alternative operator that
behaves better in this respect :
12.13 Proposition Let X be a topological space, and I( ,) an operator on
~(X) such that
i) for all a, b, c c X, a~ I(b, c) (only) if a n b-~ c,
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ii) for all a, b c X, I(a, b) c X.
( I( ,) is not assumed to be an implication operator.)
Then for all a, b c X, I(a, b) - a~ ~ b, and X is monotonic.
Proof: If I( ,) satisfies i), then for all p E X, and all a, b c X,
{ p}-~ I(a, b) (only) if { p} n a~ b.
But { p}~ I(a, b) ( only) if p E I(a, b),
and { p} n a~ b (only) if p E a~ U b.
Hence, for all a, b c X, I(a, b) - a~ u b.
By i) it holds that (for all a, b, c c X)
a-~b~UC (only)if anb~c.
By Proposition 5.15, X is monotonic.
0
As a matter of fact, in connection with the idea behind the deduction
principles, the operator O( ,) behaves correctly, in the following sense.
If X is a set of possible worlds, and a, b, c are propositions, then restricting
one's attention to the worlds satisfying a, the extension (w.r.t. this
collection) of the sentence "b --~ c" equals the extension of "a n b~ c"
w.r.t. the whole collection of possible worlds. In other words, a world
satisfying a satisfies "b -~ c" w.r.t. the a-worlds (only) if it satisfies "a n
b~ c" w.r.t. all possible worlds :
12.14 Proposition Let X be a topological space, and a, b, c c X.
Let Ou(a n b, a n c) denote the largest O c a(open in a) such that
Onanb~c.
Then (a n) OQ(a n b, a n c) - a n O(a n 6, c).
Proof : There is an O(open in X) such that
Ona-Oa(anb,anc),
hence O n a n b~ c, hence O c O(a n b, c).
Hence, Ou(a n b, a n c) c a n O(a n b, c).
On the other hand,
an0(anb,c)nanb-~anc, and
a n O(a n b, c) is open in a.
Hence, a n O(a n b, c) c OQ(a n b, a n c).
a
Propositions 12.13 and 12.14 notwithstanding, one might still wonder
whether there exist implication operators (on non-monotonic spaces) that




(The latter is O-valid, but the former is not, see 11.8 iv) and vi).)
The answer to this question is yes, since, for every finite space, there is such
an implication operator, as will be proved below, and there exist (many)
non-monotonic finite topological spaces, by Theorem 7.5.
12.15 Definition Let X be a finite topological space. For all a, b c X,
S(a, b) denotes the union of all S c X(not necessarily open) such that
Sna--~b.Arule
a~' "' ' am is called S-valid whenever the formula
b~,...,b~
a~ n... n am -~ b~ n... n b~ is true in every extended model (X, S, cp) with
finite space X.
12.16 Proposition Let X be a finite topological space. Then :
i) For all a, b c X, a~ u b c S(a, b),
ii) For all a, b c X, S(a, b) n a~ b
(i.e., S(a, b) is the largest S c X such that S n a ~ b),
iii) S( ,) is an implication operator on X.
Proof : i) is true, because (a~ U b) n a c b, hence (a~ U b) n a~ b.
To see ii), note that S~ n a-~ b, S2 n a~ b implies (S ~ U SZ) n a-~ b,
and that S(a, b) is a union of finitely many sets.
iii) is an easy consequence of Definition 12.15 and ii) above.
~
12.17 Proposition The rule a~ b is S-valid.
anc~b
Proof : For all X, and all a, b, c c X, S(a, b) n a~ b.
Hence (5.12 iv) ), S(a, b) -~ a~ v b.
But a~~bc(anc)~ubcS(anc,b),by 12.16i).
Hence, S(a, b) -~ S(a n c, b).
0
12.18 Proposition The rules
a n b~ c and
a-~ (b ~ c) ~e S-valid.
a~(b~c) anb~c
Proof : For all X, and all a, b, c c X,
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i) S(anb,c)nanb~c,henceS(anb,c)na~b~UC.
But b~ U c c S(b, c).
Hence, S(a n b, c) n a-~ S(b, c).
Hence, S(a n b, c) c S(a, S(b, c)).
ii) S(a, S(b, c)) n a~ S(b, c),
hence S(a, S(b, c)) t--~ a~ u S(b, c).
But a~ c (a n b)~ u c c S(a n b, c), by 12.16 i),
and S(b, c) ~ S(a n b, c), by Proposition 12.17.
Hence, a~ U S(b, c) -~ S(a n b, c).
By Proposition 5.12 ii),
S(a, S(b, c)) ~ S(a n b, c).
At first sight, the operator S( ,) looks more natural than O( ,), but it has
some annoying properties :
12.19 Proposition The rule
a~ b, a~ c
is not S-valid.
a~bnc
Proof : Let X be { 1, 2}, with a topology having as open sets: QS, X and { 1}.
Definea-X,b-{1},c-{2}.
Then S(a, b) - a, S(a, c) - c and S(a, b n c) - Q~.
Hence, S(a, b) n S(a, c) ~ S(a, b n c) is not true in X.
~
(Of course, S(a, b) - X and S(a, c) - X does imply S(a, b n c) - X.)
Hence, despite Proposition 12.17, S-validity could not have been used to
obtain Theorem 9.15.
T-validity
In 9.5 the trivial implication operator, T( ,), was defined. The main
advantage of this operator is that T-validity of formulae is tightly connected
with mathematical properties of the relation "-~", as we will see below.
12.20 Definition Let X be a topological space. For all a, b c X,
T(a, b) :- X if a-~ b, and T(a, b) :- ~ if a-fi b.
A formula of L is called T-valid whenever it is true in every extended model
based on T( ,). A rule
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a ~ , . . . , a r„
b~,...,b~
is T-valid whenever the formula a~ n... n am ~ b~ n... n b~ is T-valid.
Note that if (X, T, cp) is an extended model based on T( ,), and cp(a;) - a;,
for i- 1, ... , 4, then, say, ~(a ~~ a2) v(a3 -~ a4) is true in X(only) if
cp(a~ ~ a2) - QS or cp(a~ ~ a2) - X. (For all a, b c X, T(a, b) is either X or
~. Hence, if a~ b is a standard formula, then cp(a ~ b) is either X or QS.)
Hence, ~(a~ ~ a2) v(a3 ~ a4) is true (only) if a~ ~i a2 or a3 ~ a4.
Likewise, it is easy to see that a standard rule is T-valid (only) if it is a
derived rule of PI -PS.
In particular, we have:
12.21 Proposition The rule a~ b is not T-valid.
anc~b
Hence, T-validity does not allow a result like Theorem 9.15. The
construction is of interest, nevertheless, because of an appealing connection
with the O-operator (Theorem 12.24, below).
12.22 Definition A formula of L is called O-valid whenever it is true in
every extended model based on O( ,). A rule
a~, ... , am
b~,...,bn
is called strictly D-valid whenever, for all extended models based on O( ,),
cp(a~ n... n am) C cp(b~ n... n b~).
12.23 Definition The order of a formula of L is defined inductively as
follows. For all a, b E L:
order(a) - 0 if a is a basic formula,
order(~a) - order(a),
order(a n b) - order(a v b) - max { order(a), order(b) },
order(a ~ b) - max { order(a), order(b) } f l,
Instead of "order(a) - n" we just say "a is a formula of order n".
Note that the formulae of order 0 are precisely the classical formulae of
Definition 10.1.
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The essence of the following theorem was stated in [Boutilier 89] in the
context of preferential semantics. We give a straightforward topological
reconstruction of the proof found in [Boutilier 94b].
12.24 Boutilier's Theorem Let a E L be of order 1. Then
a is O-valid (only) if a is T-valid.
Proof: We will prove, for every a E L of order 1,
~a is not O-valid (only) if ~a is not T-valid,
by proving:
there is an extended model (X, O, cp) such that cp(a) ~ Q~ (only) if
there is an extended model (X', T, cp') such that cp'(a) ~ Q~.
Since a is of order 1, it is a Boolean combination of classical formulae and
conditionals of classical formulae. But "a~ v... v ak is not O-valid" implies
that at least one of a~, ... , ak is not O-valid. Likewise, "a~ v... v ak is
not T-valid" implies that one of a ~, ... , ak is not T-valid. Hence, without
loss of generality, we may assume :
a - (a~ ~b~)n...n(an~bn)n
~(antl ~ bntl) n... n~(antm ~ bntm) n a0
where ap, ... , anfm, bl, ... , bnfm are classical formulae.
1) Suppose that (X, O, cp) is an extended model such that cp(a) ~ Q3.
Say, w E cp(a).
Define U:- cp( (a ~~ b ~) n... n(an ~ bn) ).
Then U is an open subset of X.
Let (U, T( ,), cp') be the (unique) extended model such that,
for every basic formula a of L:
cp'(a) - cp(a) n U.
Then, for i- 1, ... , n:
U n ~p(a;) ~ ~p(b;),
hence a; ~ b; is true in (U, T, cp'),
hence cp'(a; -~ b;) - U.
On the other hand, for j- 1, ... , m:
w~ ~Q(antj -~ bntj) and w E U,
hence, U n cp(antj) ~ cp(bn~j),
hence, ~P~(antj ~ bntj) - T(~~(antj)~ ~Q (bnfj)) - Q~.
Since w E cp(ao) n U- cp'(a~),
cp'(a) ~ ~.
Hence, (U, T, cp') is an extended model such that cp'(a) ~ Q1.
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2) Suppose that (X, T, cp) is an extended model such that cp(a) ~ QS.
Say, w E cp(a).
Choose any object w' such that w' ~ X, and define :
X' :- X u {w'}.
A topology on X' is defined as follows:
v c X' is open in X' whenever
either v - X'
or v c X and v is open in X.
It is easy to check that this defines a topology on X', and that the topology
on X equals the topology (on X) induced from X'.
Let (X', O( ,), cp') be the (unique) extended model such that,
for every basic formula a of L:
cp'(a) n X - cp(a)
and w' E ~p(a) (only) if w E ~p(a).
(The above construction amounts to adding a"copy" of w to the space X:
w' satisfies the same basic formulas as w.)
As before, we assume that :
a - (a~ ~b~)n...n(a~~bn)n
~(antl ~ bntl) n... n-,(anfm ~ bntm) n a~.
Note that w' E cp'(ao), since w E cp(ao).
Moreover, for all a, b c X',
w' E O(a, b) (only) if X' n a~ b
(since X' is the only open subset containing w').
Hence (as is straightforward to check), for i- 1, ... , mfn,




and w' E cp'( ao ).
Hence, w' E cp'(a), and ( X', O, cp') is an extended model such that cp'(a) ~ PJ.
~
There is a number of remarks to be made about this theorem.
First, note that the formula ((a --~ b) -~ (a n c~ b)) is O-valid, but not T-
valid (Proposition 12.21). Hence, Boutilier's theorem cannot be extended to
formulas of higher order.
Furthermore, although this theorem may seem to be, at first sight, a
strengthening of Theorem 10.3, it constitutes an entirely different result. For
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example, Boutilier's theorem cannot be used to prove the topological validity
of the rule of monotony, as this amounts to proving the O-validity of the
(second order) formula ((a ~ b) ~(a n c~ b)).
Boutilier's theorem may also seem, at first sight, an abstract, technical
peculiarity. The following example, however, will illustrate its applicability.
Let us first recapitulate some definitions.
A rule b is O-valid (only) if ( the formula) a~ b is O-valid.
A rule a is strictly O-valid (only) if ~a v b is O-valid.
b
In 11.9 iii), we saw that the rule
a~b, a-H~c
anc~b
is O-valid. Boutilier's theorem helps us to prove that it is not strictly O-valid.
The formula
~((a -~ b) n--,(a ~~c)) v(a n c-~ b))
is a first order formula. Hence, it is O-valid (only) if it is T-valid, hence
(only) if, for every topological space X, and all a, b, c c X,
T(a, b) - X, T(a, c~) - Q~ implies T(a n c, b) - X, that is :
a~ b, a~ c~ implies a n c ~ b.
This latter statement, however, is not true, as we saw in Example 6.6.




where a~,... , a~, b ~,... , bm are first order formulae.
In particular, we can prove in this way that a standard rule is T-valid (only)
if it is strictly O-valid. And as a corollary of this :
12.25 Corollary A standard rule is strictly O-valid (only) if it is a derived
rule of P 1-P5.
Note that these remarks ( in particular Corollary 12.25) reinforce the
interpretation of O-validity of standard rules as validity-up-to-possible-
exceptions ( see ~ 10).
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Recapitulating ~ 12
Neither U-validity, rtor On-validity, nor S-validity, nor T-validity could
have been used to obtain Theorem 9.15. O'-validity is equivalent to O-
validity.
~13 Comparison with Other Approaches
At the end of Chapter 2, the reader was urged to forget, for the rest of this
thesis, about any association of "~" with preference of some possible
worlds over others. We will now have to return to that issue, though only
temporarily, in order to compare our constructions with some of the already
existing constructions.
If (X, 5 ) is a partial ordering (of possible worlds), we may define,
for a, b c X,
Dc(a, b) :- { w E X I w n a L~ ~ b}
n -
v
and Uc(a, b) :- { w E X I w n a 4~ ~ b}
where, for every w E X,
~
w:-{ vE XIvSw } and w:-{ vE XIwSv },
n
called the downcone and the upcone of w, respectively.
(~ ~ was defined in 7.3).
Each of these operators can be used to evaluate (sentences containing)
nested conditionals in preferential models. In [Makinson 93], this is referred
to as the downcone construction and the upcone construction, respectively.
It will be clear that it is also possible to define downcone-validity and
upcone-validity of rules, similar to our definition of O-validity, U-validity,
etc.
The operator Uc( ,) is, in general, not an implication operator. For, if





a- { w i, w~ } and b- { w2, w3 }, then a 4~ ~ b, but wZ ~ Uc(a, b), hence
Uc(a, b) ~ X. Moreover, X lf~ Uc(a, b).
Hence, the upcone construction seems to be not very appropriate.
The downcone construction, on the other hand, is much more interesting.
The operator O( ,), as defined in 9.6, generalizes the downcone
constniction, in the following sense : if (X, S) is a partial ordering, we may
define, in accordance with the proof of Theorem 7.5,
a c X is open whenever w c a for all w E a.
n
It is now easy to see that, with respect to this topology on X,
O(a, b) - Dc(a, b) for all a, b c X.
Hence, every downcone operator is the O( ,) operator of some topology.
As a corollary, the downcone construction shares all phenomena found for
O( ,), in particular those indicated in 9.13, 9.15 and ~ 10. Although the
downcone-validity of modus ponens and the rule of monotony was
mentioned in [Boutilier 89], Theorems 9.15, 10.3, 11.5, 11.12 and Example
10.9 were never noticed before, as far as I know.
Moreover, our results are more general, in that not every O( ,) operator is
the downcone operator of some partial ordering, not even on spaces for
which there does exist a partial ordering providing the right consequence
relation. For example, if (X, S) is the following partial ordering :
w~r`
w2 w3
Then the definition above yields the topology
~~ - {Q}, {w2}, {W~}, {w2, W3}, X },
which has the property that ( for all a, b c X) a~ b (only) if a 4~ ~ b.
But the topology T2 :- { Q~, { w2, w3 }, X} also has this property. -
If we let O;( ,) denote the O-operator that is based on the topology i;, for i-
1, 2, then O~(,) equals Dc( ,), but O ~(,) does not equal OZ( ,).
(For example, O ~ ( { w2 } , QJ ) - { w3 } , but 02( { w2 } , ~Ó ) - QJ.)
Since S is the only partial ordering on X yielding this consequence relation,
there is no (other) partial ordering on X for which the downcone operator
equals 02( ,). Thus, 02( ,) is not a downcone operator on the set X.
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In general: on a single preferential model, there typically exist several
different topologies providing the right consequence relation, each one
leading to an O( ,) operator, one of them being the downcone operator.
Summarizing, we could say that, in ~9, ~ 10 and ~ 11, we found some new
results about the downcone construction, and a number of other operators
displaying the same behaviour. It is important, though, to note the following
as well.
Makinson criticizes the downcone construction on the grounds that "like the
upcone one, (it) does not correspond closely to the basic idea underlying
normality semantics". In other words, the downcone construction is not well
motivated for preferential semantics. From our topological perspective,
however, the operator O( ,) is very natural; O(n, b) is the largest region in
which a~ b holds, where it is taken for granted that a region is an open
set. In a preferential model, however, this identification is not so natural.
Essentially, because the topological space associated with a preferential
model will typically be a"pathological" space: a structure that happens to
satisfy the requirements of a topological space without being a"carrier of
geometrical intuition". In short, the downcone construction is better
motivated by our topological presentation than by preferential semantics.
One more (important) reason to prefer the topological intuition over the
preferentíal idea, is the following. To appreciate the interpretative remarks
of ~ 10, it is necessary to appreciate the non-standard conditional as a
plausible interpretation of inference. While preferential semantics depicts the
defeasible conditional as something that takes only the most normal
possibilities into account (which may be a negligible minority among all
possibilities), the topological semantics pretends to take every possibility
into account, be it in a not too pedantic way. It is not claimed that our
construction is entirely convincing as a plausible interpretation of inference.
But the downcone construction (that is, the preferential interpretation of the
operator O( ,)), does not support the remarks of ~ 10 at all.
In [Gabbay 95], a"fibring" construction was used to evaluate nested
conditional sentences. This construction, unlike the downcone construction,
does correspond to the idea underlying normality semantics. Gabbay's
construction resembles T~validity, being more general in one respect and
less general in another. Gabbay uses a"multi-layer" construction (which
corresponds to our suggestion of using infinite rows of spaces and maps
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instead of triples). On the other hand, the preferential idea does not support
any relationship between objects in one world and objects of another, while
in a triple (~, X, Y), there is one topology on Y, instead of a separate
topology on rt-t (w) for every w E X. For topological semantics, this latter
generalization seems unproblematic. But T~( ,), as said, is not an
implication-operator, in general. Its adaptation, On( ,), does not validate the
rule of monotony and is therefore unsuitable to obtain results like Theorem
9.15.
Some existing approaches towards nested defeasible conditionals are
strongly connected with modal logic. For example, the main advantage of
the downcone construction is its connection with the modal system S4. This
connection has a topological equivalent. We will not give a detailed
exposition, since it is a straightforward adaptation of the connection as
described in [Boutilier 89]. It is based on the fact that for all topological
spaces, X, and all a, b c X,
O(a, b) - ((a~)o v(a n(a~ U b)o )o
(where ao and á denote the interior and the closure of a, respectively).
As is well-known, the calculus of n, ~, ~ and o in topological spaces is
equivalent to the modal system S4, o playing the role of the 0-modality.
Hence, the formula above gives rise to a translation from L into the modal
language of S4 such that every formula of L is O-valid (see 12.22) (only) if
its translation is a tautology of S4. (As a corollary of Boutilier's work and
the remarks above, rules are downcone-valid (only) if they are topologically
valid.)
This and similar connections have lead some people ([Lamarre 91],
[Boutilier 94]) to tackle the task of finding suitable strengthenings of P1-PS
(see ~8) by studying extensions of S4. For example, [Boutilier 89] pointed
out that joining R3 to P1-PS corresponds to using the modal system known
as S4.3. To incorporate the most important adjustments, however, this
approach will not be general enough.
For example, if a~ b is to be valid, but a~ b is not,
anc~b an-~b~b
or if
a-~ b, ba, ~b is to be invalid, but a~ b,b a, c is to be valid
(c being a basic formula not occurring in a or b), we will have to consider
modal systems that do not satisfy the substitution theorem. Since very little
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is known about such modal systems, it seems useless to proceed in this
direction. Likewise, it will be of little use to search for more convincing
implication-operators, since this would necessarily lead to systems that do
satisfy the substitution theorem.
Conclusions of Chapter 3
In this chapter it has been shown that there exist non-monotonic formalisms
in which modus ponens and the rule of monotony are valid-up-to-possible-
exceptions, as well as all other laws of classical propositional logic. As a
consequence, the rules of classical propositional logic do not determine the
meaning of deducibility and inference as implication-without-exceptions.
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Chapter 4
Universal Quantification up to Possible Exceptions
The notion of a full subset will be used to interpret sentences in-
volving a non-strict universal quantifier. The material presented
is to be seen, in the first place, as preliminary for the next chap-
ter, although the subject is of interest on its own.
~14 For practically all ...
The notion of a full subset arose, in ~5, as an attempt to capture an intuitive,
geometrical idea by a mathematical notion. Gíven a topological space X and
a, b c X, we read a-~ b as "the elements of a are in b, up to possible ex-
ceptions". So far, we thought of such phrases as non-standard interpretations
of implicational statements. However, we could just as well read a~ b as
"practically all elements of a are in b", and think of it as a non-standard in-
terpretation of a statement involving a universal quantifier, namely "b'x E a
[ x E b]". In order to investigate this possibility, we will extend our
repertoire of geometrical examples, first.
Back to Geometry
The notion of a full subset can be used to interpret a sentence like "for prac-
tically all points P, Q: P is distinct from Q", by using the product topology
on E x E (where E denotes the Euclidean plane). It is easy to see that this
sentence, thus interpreted, is true: {(P, Q) E E x E I P~ Q} is full in E x E,
since it is both open and dense in E x E. The statement "for practically all
points, P, and practically all lines, E,: P is not on E" requires the definition of
a topology on the collection of lines. We will use the construction explained
in appendix B, using the idea of a quotient topology. In the sequel, G deno-
tes the collection of lines in the Euclidean plane (while E denotes the collec-
tion of points of the Euclidean plane).
14.1 Proposition E x G--~ {(P, E) E E x G I P is not on E}.
Proof: Define H:- {(x, y, p, q, r) E IR5 I(p, q) -(0, 0) }.
Then IRS `H equals E x(IR3 `{(0, 0)} x IR).
According to Appendix B(in particular, the subsection about the topology
on the set of lines in the Euclidean plane), G can be identified with a
quotient space of the space IR3 `({ (0, 0) } x IR). As a consequence, there
exists an equivalence relation - on IR5 `H and a quotient map
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n: IRS `H ~ (IR5 `H) I -
such that
i) (IRS `H) ~~ can be identified with E x G,
ii) {(P, E) E E x G I P is not on E} can be identified with a set
a c(IR5 `H) I- such that
n1(a)-{ (x,y,p,q,r)E IR5`Hlpxtqytr~0 }.
But the set {(x, y, p, q, r) E IRS I px t qy t r~ 0} is full in IRS, since it is
open and dense in IRS. Hence, it is full in IRS `H, by Proposition 5.11 i).
The proposition now follows from Lemma 14.2 below.
~
14.2 Lemma Let X be a topological space, -- an equivalence relation on X
such that the quotient map ~: X~ Xl~ is an open map.
Then for every n c X:
a is full in X~- (only) if nt(a) is full in X.
Proof:
Suppose that a is full in X~~.
Then for every nonempty O, open in X,
~(O) is nonempty and open in Xl~ (since n is open).
Since a is full in X~~, there is a nonempty O' c n(O), open in XI-,
such that O' c a.
Then O n n 1(O') is nonempty and open in X, and
O n n1(O') c rt t(a).
Hence, nt(a) is full in X.
On the other hand, suppose that ~ t(a) is full in X.
Then for every nonempty O, open in X~--,
the set 7c1(O) is nonempty and open in X.
Hence, there is an O' c 1t1(O) such that
O'~~ÓandO'cn t(a).
Then n(O') c a.
Since ~ is open, ~t(O') is open in X~-.
And ~(O') ~ ~, since O' ~ ~.
Hence, a is full in XI-.
0
Likewise, it is possible to give a precise meaning to sentences like :"given
a line, practically all lines are not perpendicular to that line", "for practically
all pairs (m, E) of lines : e and m are not pazallel", "for practically all pairs
(m, e) of lines : E and m aze distinct", etc., etc.
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Some Warnings
In classical logic, universal quantification has a number of properties that
allow us to take a certain amount of notational freedom. For example,
~1xE X [ ~dyE Y [ a(x,y) ]]
is essentially the same statement as
b'yE Y[ b'xE X[ a(x,y) ]]
or ~IxE X, yE Y[ a(x, y) ].
As we will prove, below, our non-standard universal quantification does not
allow this freedom, and we will have to be very careful and specific when
formulating such statements.
Another point of deviation, also having notational consequences, is the fol-
lowing. In classical logic, if a, b c X, then the statement
dXE a[XE b]
is equivalent to
dXE X[X~ a Or XE b].
This allows us to simplify formal language considerably, by using notations
like b'x [ x~ a or x E b].
However,
"for practically all x E a: x E b" (i.e., a~ b)
is not equivalent to
"for practically all x E X: x~ a or x E b" (i.e., X~ a~ U b)
(see 5.12 iv)
nor to "for practically all x E X: x E O(a, b)" (i.e., X~ O(a, b))
(see Example 9.7 : O( E, E~) - B~, but E ~ B~ is not true).
It is not clear whether these phenomena are only annoying coincidences of
the mathematical elaborations chosen, or that they are intrinsic to the intui-
tive notions we tried to capture. Concerning the "non-commutativity" of the
quantifiers [Weydert 93] found similar results in a probabilistic approach.
On the other hand, our counterexamples, as used in the proofs below, are of
a highly artificial nature. Moreover, in 14.9 below, we will show that there
exist other elaborations in which the quantifiers do commute.
14.3 Proposition I Warning
Let X and Y be topological spaces, and a c X x Y.
"For practically all xE X: for practically all yE Y:(x, y) E a"
does not imply
"For practically all yE Y: for practically all xE X:(x, y) E a".
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Proof ~ counterexample :
Define X- Y:- Qi and let cp be a bijection (R ~ IN.
Define v:- {(x, y) E X x Y I cp(y) - z ~ x ~ cp(y) t 2}
and a:- v~ (that is, (X x Y) ~ v).
Then, for all xE X,
the set { yE Y I(x, y) E a} is full in Y,
since { yE Y I(x, y) E a~ } contains at most one element.
Hence,
for practically all xE X: for practically all yE Y:(x, y) E a
is true.
But, for every yE Y,
the set { xE X I(x, y) E a} is not full in X,
since { xE X I(x, y) E a~ } contains a non-empty open interval.
Hence,
for practically all yE Y: for practically all xE X:(x, y) E n
is not true.
14.4 Corollary ~ Warning
Let X be a topological space, and a c X.
"For practically all (x, y) E X x Y:(x, y) E a"
does not imply
"For practically all yE Y: for practically all xE X:(x, y) E a".
Proof: With X, Y and a as in the proof of 14.3, it is not difficult to see that
XxY~a istrue.
~
14.5 Proposition ~ Warning
Let X and Y be topological spaces, and a c X x Y.
"For practically all xE X: for practically all yE Y:(x, y) E a"
does not imply
"For practically all (x, y) E X x Y:(x, y) E a".
Proof I counterexample :
Deiine X- Y:- IR. A rational block is a nonempty open subset of IR x IR
of the form
{ (p,q)E IRxIRIa~p~~3 andy~q~8}
for some a, ~i, y, S E(R (such that a ~(3 and y ~ 8).
Let O~, OZ, ... be an enumeration of all rational blocks. Construct a row
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(x ~ , Y ~ ), (x2, Y2), ...
of elements of IR x IR such that (for i, j- 1, 2, ... )
(x;, Y;) E ~;
and y~ ~ yi whenever i~ j.
Define v :- { (x ~ , y ~ ), (xZ, yZ), ... } and a :- v~.
Then, for every xE X,
the set { yE Y I(x, y) E a~ } contains at most one element, hence
Y~{ yEYI(x,y)E a }.
Hence,
for practically all xE X: for practically all yE Y:(x, y) E a
is true.
But v- a~ is dense in X x Y, hence X x Y~ a is not true.
Hence,




Now that we have seen some properties that non-strict universal quantiiica-
tion does not satisfy, we will present one property that it does satisfy and
that makes it suitable for the purposes of Chapter 5.
14.6 Theorem (Independence Theorem)
Let X and Y be topological spaces and a, b c X.
Then a~ b implies a x Y-~ b x Y.
(In other words, a(x) ~ b(x) implies a(x) n c(y) ~ b(x).)
Proof: Although this result is an easy corollary of Lemma 14.2, we will give
an elementary proof.
Suppose that b is full in a.
Then, for every O, open in X x Y, such that O n(a x Y) ~ QS,
there are OX, Oy, open in X and Y, respectively, such that
OXxOYCO
and (OX x Oy) n(a x Y) ~ QJ.
Then OX n a~ Q~.
Since b is full in a, there is an O' c OX such that
O'na~~and0'nacb.
Then (O' x Oy) n(a x Y) ~ P~, and
(O'xOy)n(axY) c bxY.
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Hence, a x Y~ b x Y.
It is also true that a x Y ~ b x Y implies a--~ b, provided that Y~~.
This will be referred to as the reverse of the independence theorem.
14.7 Corollary Let X be a topological space and a, b c X.
Then a~ b implies (a n b~) x a ~ X x b.
In other words, a(x) ~ b(x) implies ( a(s) n~b(s) n a(t)) ~ b(t).
(Proof: By 14.6, a~ b implies (a n b~) x a~(a n b~) x b, which implies
(anb~)xa-~Xxb, by5.l0iv.)
This result states that our defïnitions (and, essentially, we are still investiga-
ting Definition 5.7) display behaviour that is typically associated with rules-
with-possible-exceptions. If a(x) -~ b(x) is valid-as-a-rule, then the occur-
rence of an exception does not invalidate this rule, and one is inclined to
apply it again, on a next occasion: the premisses a(s), ~b(s) and a(t) allow
b(t) as a conclusion. Of course, a(s), -,b(s), a(t) and s- t do no longer allow
b(t) as a conclusion.
In short : if a rule is valid but has an exception, the rule still applies in
other, "independent" situations.
This seems to be an essential general principle of the calculus of rules-with-
possible-exceptions.
With our definitions, the principle above only applies if the new situation is
entirely independent from the former one. It does not apply, ín general, if
this independence is only partial. For example, if a(s, t) and b(s, t) are predi-
cates of two variables, then the fact that a(s, t) -~ b(s, t) is valid-as-a-rule
does not imply that a(s, t) n~b(s, t) n a(s', t) ~ b(s', t) is valid-as-a-rule,
not even if b does not rely on t:
14.8 Proposition ~ Warning
Let X and Y be topological spaces, a c X x Y and b c X, such that
a~bxY.
Then, in general, it is not true that
{(x~,x2,y)E XxXxYI(x~,y)E a,(x2,y)E a and x~ ~ b}-~
{ (x~,x2,y)E XxXxYIx2E b }
(In other words :
a(x, y) ~ b(x) does not imply a(x~, y) n--,b(x~) n a(x2, y) -~ b(x2).)
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Proof ~ counterexample :
Define X - Y :- IR,
a(x, y) a~ z x S y 5 2x (and a:- {(x, y) E X x Y I a(x, y) })
b(x) :r~ x~ 0 (and b:- { xEX I b(x) })
Then a-~ b x Y is true.
Y
x
But a(x ~, y), ~b(x ~) implies x ~- y- 0,
and y- 0, a(x2, y) implies x2 - 0, i.e., ~b(x2).
Hence, a(x ~ , y) n~b(x ~ ) n a(x2, y) -~ ~b(x2) is true.
Since the combination of assumptions a(x ~, y), ~b(x ~), a(x2, y) is consistent
(being equivalent to x ~- x2 - y- 0),




Let X and Y be topological spaces, and a c X x Y. The "proposition"
"for practically all y E Y:(x, y) E a"
is a statement about x E X. Hence, its extension is some subset of X. In
14.3, 14.4 and 14.5, we assumed without further thought that this extension
equals { x E X I{ x} x Y -~ a}. But this is not the only possibility. For





(That is, the largest O c X such that O x Y-~ a.)
To get an idea of the difference: if X- Y - I R, then according to the origi-
nal, straightforward definition, 0 is in the extension of
"for practically all y E Y: x- 0"
but not in the extension of
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"for practically all y E Y: x~ 0".
According to the new definition, however, 0 is in the extension of
"for practically all y E Y: x~ 0"
but not in the extension of
"for practically all y E Y: x- 0".
Proof: For all O c X: O--j { 0} ~, hence O x Y~{ 0} ~ x Y.




On the other hand, there is no O c X such that O x Y~{ 0} x Y and 0 E




Although this may seem awkward, at first sight, it becomes quite natural if
we realize that this construction describes in which regions (- open sets) a
quantificational statement should be considered true, while the straightfor-
ward construction is concerned about points.
Using this construction ( or any other alternative) will also have notational
consequences. For example, if X and Y are topological spaces, a(x, y) is a
predicate with extension a c X x Y and xo E X, then
"for practically all y E Y: a(xo, y)"
could denote
Y~{yEYI (x~,y)Ea}
(that is equivalent to { xt~ } x Y~ a), but also
X~ E U O
OcX,
OxY~ a
(that is equivalent to: for some (open) O c X containing xo, O x Y~ a).
This notational confusion is a serious disadvantage. The construction above,
however, also has one major advantage: using this construction to interpret
nested quantiiicational sentences yields commutating quantifiers, as we will
see, below.
94
In the theorem below, a c X x Y x Z is the extension of some ternary predi-
cate a(x, y, z), OX denotes the extension of
"for practically all x E X: a(x, y, z)",
OX y denotes the extension of
"for practically all y E Y: for practically all x E X: a(x, y, z)".
Likewise for Oy and Oy X.
OZ denotes the extension of
"for practically all (x, y) E X x Y: a(x, y, z)".
Then the theorem states that, with the new definition of these extensions, the
three sentences
"for practically all x E X: for practically all y E Y: a(x, y, z)",
"for practically all y E Y: for practically all x E X: a(x, y, z)",
and "for practically all (x, y) E X x Y: a(x, y, z)"
are mutually equivalent (that is, they have the same extensions).
14.9 Theorem Let X, Y and Z be topological spaces, and a c X x Y x Z.
Let OX be the largest open subset of Y x Z such that X x Ox -~ a.
Let OX y be the largest open subset of Z such that Y x Ox y~ OX.
Let Oy be the largest open subset of X x Z such that Y x Oy -~ a.
Let Oy X be the largest open subset of Z such that X x Oy X~ Oy.
Let OZ be the largest open subset of Z such that X x Y x OZ ~ a.
Then
Ox,Y - OZ - Oy X.
Proof:
1) X x Y x OZ ~ a, hence Y x OZ c Ox, hence, OZ c Ox Y.
2) Y x OX y ~ OX, hence (by Theorem 14.6),
XxYxOXy--~XxOx.
But X x OX ~ a. Hence, by the open-lemma and 5.11, X x Y x OX y~ a.
Hence, Ox y c OZ .
Hence, Ox y- OZ . Likewise, Oy x- OZ .
~
In ~ 12, we saw that even within the sphere of influence of Definition 5.7,
there is a variety of plausible definitions for (the extension of) implicational
statements. Likewise, there does not exist a unique, most natural definition
of the extension of quantificational statements. As long as we restrict oursel-
ves to non-nested quantificational clauses, however, there is no need for a
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separate definition of an extension (in view of Definition 5.7). Hence, for the
rest of this thesis, we will adhere to the straightforward interpretation of
quantificational-statements-with-possible-exceptions, despite possible ad-
vantages (see, for example, Theorem 14.9) of other constructions.
~15 Examples
As our original aim was the study of practical reasoning, we will discuss, in
this section, a number of situations from practical reasoning in which non-
strict universal quantification plays a role.
Crowds
With the definitions of ~ 14, it is easy to see that
for practically all (x, y) E IR x IR : x~ y.
This phenomenon is not unusual in practical reasoning. The sentence
expresses that, given elements x and y, we may safely conclude that x is
distinct from y, disregarding exceptions, which seems reasonable for ex-
tremely large and homogeneous sets, such as the set of all birds, the set of
all human beings, or even the set of spectators in a crowded footballstadion.
15.1 Definition A topological space X is called a crowd whenever
for practically all (x, y) E X x X: x~ y.
For example, IR and the Euclidean plane are crowds, finite spaces are not.
15.2 Proposition A topological space X is a crowd (only) if every non-
empty O(open in X) contains nonempty O' and O" such that
O'n0"-fó.
Proof: Suppose that X is a crowd, that is
{ (x,y)E XxXI x~y } isfullinXxX.
If O is nonempty and open in X, then O x O is nonempty,
hence there are O' and O" such that
O'x0"cOxO,
O'x0"~Q~,
O'x0"c { (x,y)E XxXI x~y }.
Hence, O' c O, O" c O, O' ~ Q~, O" ~ QS and O' n O" -~.
On the other hand, suppose that every nonempty O contains nonempty O'
and O" such that O' n O" - Q~.
Let O be nonempty and open in X x X. Say,
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O~ ~Q~, 02~~ and O~ x02c0.
Then either O~ x 02 c{(x, y) E X x X I x~ y}(and there is
nothing left to be proved), or
O~ n02~Q~.
In that case, there are nonempty O' and O" such that
O'c0~ n02,0"cOi n02 and0'n0"-~
(because of the assumption).
Then O' x O" c O, O' x O" ~~, and
O'x0"c{ (x,y)E XxXI x~y }.
Hence, X is a crowd.
15.3 Corollary If X is a crowd, then X is infinite.
15.4 Corollary If X is a Hausdorff space without isolated points (see B.2
and B.9), then X is a crowd.
Proof: Suppose that X is a Hausdorff space without isolated points. Then
every nonempty O c X contains at least two distinct points, hence it
contains two disjoint nonempty open subsets. By 15.2, X is a crowd.
~
In a crowd every element is exceptional :
15.5 Proposition Let X be a crowd, and p E X. Then X`{ p} is full in X.
Proof: Let O c X be nonempty.
By 15.2, there are nonempty O~, 02 c O such that O~ n OZ - Ql.
Then either p~ O~ or p~ OZ.
Hence, O contains a nonempty open subset of X`{p}.
Hence X ~ X`{p}.
15.6 Example Let X be a crowd, and xo E X. Let R c X x X be the rela-
tion defined by :
xRy :~ x~x~andy~x0.
Then for practically all (x, y) E X x X: x R y,
( and even for practically all x E X: for practically all y E Y: x R y),
but not for practically all y E Y: x~ R y.
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Reading x R y as "person x knows person y", then the situation is one in
which (practically) every person in the crowd (X) knows everyone, but there
is one person (xo) in the crowd that does not know anyone, and is not known
by anyone.
The Paradox of the Barber
In a town there is a(male) barber, who is said to shave those and only those
men in town who do not shave themselves. Symbolically represented, b is
such that
shaves(b, y) -~ ~shaves(y, y)
and ~shaves(y, y) ~ shaves(b, y).
According to classical logic, ( ~) implies
shaves(b, b) H ~shaves(b, b),
a contradiction.
In practice, however, if a general statement "obviously" amounts to a
contradiction when applied to a particular instance, then it is equally obvious
that that general statement was meant to exclude that particular instance. For
example, if John says to Mary :"All the girls I have seen were considerably
less beautiful than you," this does not apply to Mary herself, as it is obvious
that Mary is not less beautiful than herself. In fact, it is not unusual for a
general statement to have "obvious" exceptions for other but similar reasons.
For example, if John says to Mary: "I have never seen a girl as beautiful as
you," this does not imply that John never saw Mary, although Mary is as
beautiful as herself.
Likewise, the sentence "the barber shaves those and only those men in town
who do not shave themselves," interpreted as a sentence that could occur in
everyday life, rather than in a logic textbook, does not imply "the barber
shaves himself if and only if he does not shave himself."
Indeed, if we use our non-standard interpretation, then (~) is not
contradictory :
15.7 Example For x, y E IR, define
S(x, y) :t~ ( x- y and y E Q~ ) or ( x- 0 and y~ Q~ ).
Then { y E IR I S(0, y) }- IR `Q~ u{0}, and
{ y E IR I,S(y, y) }- IR `Q~ .
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Hence, { y E X I S(0, y) } H{ y E X I~S(y, y) }.
What is a Constant ?
In the classical example of a logical argument :
Every human is mortal,
Socrates is human
Socrates is mortal
Socrates is a constant. This essentially means that "to be Socrates" is
(assumed to be) a predicate that applies to one and only one object. That is,
if x"is Socrates" and y"is Socrates", then x equals y.
Let us, therefore, define :
15.8 Definition If X is topological space, then a constant (in X) is a C c X
such that
i) C~~,
ii) CxC -~ { (x,y)E CxCI x-y }
(inshort: xE C,yE C -~ x-y).
15.9 Example If X is a topological space, and p E X, then { p} is a con-
stant. {0, 1} is not a constant in IR.
15.10 Example If X-{ 1, 2}, i-{Q~, { 1}, X}, C- X is a constant. (Note
that the set {(1,1) } is the smallest nonempty open subset of C x C with
product topology. Hence, a subset a c C x C is full in C x C(only) if (1,1)
E a.)
A constant in X that contains more than one element could be thought of as
a vague element of X. Note that "Socrates has property P" just means that
being Socrates implies having property P. Likewise, if a(x) is a predicate
with extension a c X, and C is a constant in X, then "C has property a"
(that is, "a(C)") just means
XE C ~ XE a.
For example, if X and C are as in Example 15.10, and a-{ 1}, then a(C) is
true, but
xE C,x~ a ~i 1
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(since C `a - {2}, and {2} -y Q~).
Hence, if a vague element has a property, the denial of this property (for the
same vague element) is not necessarily inconsistent. Of course, for ordinary
elements this cannot occur.
15.11 Proposition C is a constant (only) if there is a p E C such that
i) { p} is open in C,
ii) for all nonempty O, open in C: p E O.
Proof: 1) Suppose that C is a constant. Let O be a nonempty open subset of
C-with-induced-topology. Then O x O is nonempty and open in C x C.
Since C is a constant, there exist OI, O2, open in C, such that
O~ x02cOx0,
O i x 02 ~ fÓ, (hence, O ~~ P~ and O~ ~~)
0~ X~2C { (X,y)E XXX~ X-y }.
Hence, there is an element p E C such that O~- OZ -{ p}.
In particular, { p} is open in C.
Now suppose that there exists a nonempty O', open in C, such that p~ O'.
Then CxC ~i { (x,y)E CxCI x-y }.
(T'he latter isn't even dense in the former, since O' x{ p} is nonempty and
open in C x C, but does not contain elements of {(x, y) E C x C I x- y}.)
But C is a constant. Contradiction.
Hence, every nonempty open subset of C contains p.
2) On the other hand, suppose that p E C is an element satisfying i) and ii).
Then every nonempty open subset of C x C contains { p} x{ p}.
Hence, { p} x{ p} is full in C x C.
Hence, {(x, y) E C x C I x- y} is full in C x C, by 5.10 iv).
Moreover, C ~ QS, since p E C.
Hence, C is a constant.
0
15.12 Corollary If X is a Hausdorff space, and C is a constant, then there
is a p E C such that C-{ p}.
Proof: Suppose that C is a constant.
Let p be the (unique) element of C satisfying 15.11 i) and ii).
Then p is the only element of C such that { p} is open in C.
If X is a Hausdorff space, then so is C.
Hence, if C~{ p}, say q E C and q~ p, then
there exist Op, Oq, open in C, such that
p E Op, q E Oq and Op n Oq - QJ.
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In particular, Oq is nonempty and p ~ Oa. Contradiction with 15.11 ii).
Hence, C - { p } .
U
The Sorites Paradox
Consider the following slight adaptation of the Sorites paradox (see
[Hjelmslev 23]). The combination of assumptions
i) If I can lift n milligrams, then I can lift n t 1 milligrams
ii) I can lift 2 milligrams
does not imply
iii) I can lift any weíght.
~3 or
Hence, in some way, the (vague) "set" { n E IN I I can lift n milligrams } is
a counterexample to the principle of induction. The crucial point seems to be
that the implicational statement i) is valid only as-a-rule, while at the same
time, no concrete exceptional n E IN can be indicated. Although it is
questionable whether the defeasible conditional at issue here is not entirely
different from the defeasible conditional studied in this thesis, it is
nevertheless possible to represent the Sorites paradox using our topological
notions :
On the interval (0, 1) (:- {x E IR I 0 ~ x ~ 1}) we define the following
topology :
i:- {(0, x) I x E[0, 1]}.
It is easy to check that ((0, 1), i) is a topological space, be it a somewhat
unusual (pathological) one. To distinguish this space from the interval (0, 1)
with the topology induced from IR, we denote ((0, 1), ti) by ~i.
1
Define V:- {(n, s) E IN x,b I s ~-}
n
0 1 2 ... n
We intend to think of ,b as a collection of possible worlds, each containing
the objects 0, l, 2, ... . Then V could be said to represent a(vague) sub"set"
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`U of IN : instead of (n, s) E V, we will say "in world s, n is an element of
`U", or write n E S`U.
This "set" ~1 fails to satisfy, in some way, the principle of induction.
Since { s E,b I n E S`U }~{ s E b I n f 1 E S`U }(as is not difficult to
prove), we could say that the " set" `U satisfies the sentence
if n is an element of `U, then n t 1 is an element of `~,
interpreted as a rule-with-possible-exceptions.
Since { s E~ I O E S`U }-,S, the "set" `U satisfies
0 is an element of `U.
But, for example, { s E~ I 37 ~ ti`U }-y ps.
Moreover, { s E,b I for all n E IN : n E s`U }- Q~.
In this sense, `U models sets like { n E IN I I can lift n milligrams
Equivalence Relations
As ís well known, an equivalence relation on a set X is a binary relation on
X that is symmetric, transitive and reflexive, i.e., a relation ~ satisfying
for all x, y E X such that x-- y: y-- x (symm)
for all x, y, z E X such that x~ y and y- z: x~ z (trans)
for all x E X: x- x (refl)
If X is equipped with a topology, it makes sense to talk about relations satis-
fying, for example, (symm) up-to-possible-exceptions. It is not difficult to
give an example of a space and a relation satisfying (symm), (trans) and
(refl) thus interpreted, such that each of them has exceptions :
For p, q E IR, define




Hence, (symm) is valid-up-to-possible-exceptions. (Symm) indeed has ex-
ceptions : 0-- 1, but 1~f 0.
Likewise, (trans) is valid, up to exceptions : 1-- 2, 2- 0, but 1~f 0.
(refl) is also valid-up-to-possible-exceptions, since
IR--~{ xE IRIx-x }.
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However, 0 ~f 0.
In this way, the relation -- on IR satisfies-up-to-possible-exceptions the re-
quirements for an equivalence relation, although it is not symmetric, not
transitive, and not reflexive.
Preferential Consequence Relations
Something similar can be done with preferential consequence relations
instead of equivalence relations :
15.13 Proposition There exists a triple (B, 5, I~ ) such that
i) (B, ~) is a Boolean algebra equipped with a topology,
ii) 4~ is a binary relation on B,
iii) B is a crowd (see Definition 15.1),
iv) PI-PS are valid-up-to-possible-exceptions, that is:
for practically all a(E B) : a 4~ a,
fer practically all a, b, c such that a F~ b and b 5 c: a 4~ c,
for practically all a, b, c such that a I~ b and a n b F~ c: a I~ c,
for practically all a, b, c such that a 4~ b and a I~ c: a n b I~ c,
for practically all a, b, c such that a F- c and b F- c: a v b{~ c.
v) The rule of monotony is valid-up-to-possible-exceptions
(that is, for practically all a, b, c such that a 4~ b: a n c 4~ b,
vi) The rule "if a~- b, then not a L~ ~b" is valid-up-to-possible-
exceptions. That is,
{(a,b)EBxBla4~b} ~ {(a,b)EBxBlalf~b}.
Proof: Let B be the Boolean algebra (~(IN), c, n, ~, .~, P, IN ).
The topology on B is defined as follows :
V c~(IN) is open whenever for all a E V there is an n E IN such that
O~,n:-{bE0'(IN)Ibn{1,...,n}-an{1,...,n} } c V.
With this topology, 6'(IN) is a Hausdorff space without isolated points, as is
easy to see. By Corollary 15.4, B is a crowd.
For a, b E B, define
a L~ b:~ a c b and (a, b) ~~,
where ~- { ({ 1 }, { 1 }), ({ 1,2}, { 1,2,3}) }.
Then it is straightforward (but tedious) to prove that (B, F- ) satisfies iv), v)
and vi) of the proposition.
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Although some of the rules do not have exceptions this time, a considerable
number of them do. P I has exceptions, since { 1} lf { 1}.
P2 has exceptions, since
{ 1,2} F- { 1,2} and { 1,2} c{ 1,2,3} but { 1,2} If { 1,2,3}.
P3 and P4 do not have exceptions.
PS has exceptions, since
{ 1} w{ 1,2,3} and {2} ~- { 1,2,3}, but { 1,2} If { 1,2,3}.
The rule of monotony has exceptions, since
{ 1,2,3} h{ 1,2,3}, but { 1,2} If { 1,2,3}.
The rule mentioned in vi) also has exceptions, since
~ 4- P~, but fÓ If IN is not true.
This proposition shows how our non-standard interpretation of universal
quantification can be used to enlarge the expressive power qf the language
used to formulate plausibility postulates for reasoning behaviour.
A triple (B, S, 4~ ) that satisfies the requirements of the proposition can be
seen as a caricature of a person that accepts-up-to-possible-exceptions the
rules of classical propositional logic. This caricature is better than the one in
Chapter 3 in at least one respect: the interpretation of validity-up-to-
possible-exceptions is more direct and natural. Note that by requirement iii)
and Proposition 15.5, every single sentence of B is exceptional. This effect
could never have been achieved with preferential semantics. However, the
system above is not very useful, in that almost all combinations of postulates
will have a representation of this kind. Moreover, there is no nesting of
implicational statements. That is, unlike the system of Chapter 3, the idea of
Proposition 15.13 does not give rise to a(useful) notion of validity, like
topological validity. (This is the main reason why we did not elaborate the
tedious parts of the proof of 15.13. ) The question remains, how to use our





The topological notions of Chapter 2 will be used in an other,
more direct way to model the reasoning behaviour of a person
who interprets rules of inference as rules-with-possible-
exceptions.
~16 Plausible Validity
In Chapter 3, we assumed that the extension of a defeasible conditional is
completely determined by the extensions of the antecedent and the
conclusion. In fact, this extension was explicitly defined, using an
implication operator on the collection of possible worlds. As said in Chapter
1, however, any attempt to define a detailed semantics of defeasible
conditionals is expected to fail. The meaning of an implicational statement
(that is, the user's intention) might depend on aspects of the context that
were not formalized.
In this chapter, we will no longer assume that the extension of a
(conditional) sentence is a subset of a collection of possible worlds. Instead,
we will work with a set M, representing a person's repertoire of sentences,
and we will identify a proposition like "a ~ b" with the collection of pairs
(a, (3) E M x M for which the person considers the sentence a-~ ~3 to be
true. The precise meaning of the sentences in M remains unspecified, in the
same way as the exact nature and identity of possible worlds may remain
unspecified in possible worlds semantics.
M is not assumed to be closed under n, v, ~ and -~. In order to define




we will work (alongside with M) with the language L that was used in
Chapter 3. To avoid confusion between formulas from L and sentences from
the person's repertoire M, we will call the elements of M"possible
meanings". The basic formulas from L will be treated as variables ranging
over M(and M thus represents the collection of possible meanings a basic
formula can have).
If M is equipped with a topology, then the ideas of Chapter 4 allow us to





"for practically all a, ~3, y E M such that a-~ ~3 is (accepted as) true,
a n y-~ ~3 is also (accepted as) true."
In this way, the inference rule becomes a statement about the person's
behaviour. Propositions will be statements (not about worlds, but) about
elements of M.
The Definitions : Models
Let pl, pZ, ... be an infinite row of basic formulas. For n- 1, 2, ..., let L~
denote the language generated from pl, ... , pn via n, v, -~ and - ,. Then
L ~ c L2 c L~ c...
The union of these sets is called L.
Let M be a set.
In the sequel (in particular, in the definition below), M" denotes the n-fold
product M x... x M. For every map 6: { 1, ... , n}-~ { 1, ... , m}, 6 denotes
the assc~ciated .rubstit~~~tiori, that is the unique map L~ -~ Lm satisfying
( for all a, b E L~ )
6(a -~ b) - á(a) -~ 6(b),
6(a n b) - 6(a) n 6(b),
6(a v b) - 6(a) v ~(b),
6(-~ a) - ~ 6(a),
and 6(p~) - p6~;~, for i- 1, ... , n.
For every a c M", define
6(a) - { (x~, ... , xm) E Mm ~ ~X6~~~, ... , x6~n~~ E a }.
Then 6 denotes a map ~(M~) ~~(Mm).
Note that if n- m and 6 is a bijection, then 6 is just a permutation of
coordinates.
16.1 Definition A possible meanings assigrament (on M) is a row
(~~)~ - 1,2,...
of maps L~ -~ lP(Mn) such that
i) for n, m- 1, 2, ... , and for all a E Ln :
~Pntm~a) - ~Pn~a) x Mn',
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ii) for every injective map 6 :{ 1, ... , n}~{ 1, ... , m},
and for all a E L~,
~m~6(a)) - 6(~n(a)).
For example, the statement (a, (3) E cp2(pl n p2 ~~p2) should be read as
"a and (3 are two sentences such that the person considers a n(3 -~ ~(3 to
be true." Note that, in contrast with L, M is not necessarily closed under n,
v, ~ and ~.
In view of our intentions, as presented in the beginning of this section,
conditions i) and ii) above seem reasonable.
i) expresses that, for example, for every triple (a, (3, y) E M-~, whether the
person accepts a~~3 as true or not does not depend on y.
ii) expresses that the assignment (~p~~) is permc~tation-irzvnrian.t : replacing
basic formulas by others does not essentially change the extension of
formulas. For example, if a- pi ~ p2, n- 2, m- 4, a(1) - 4 and 6(2) - 3,
then ii) amounts to the statement
~P4(p4 ~ p3) - {(X~, ... , x4) ~ (x4, x3) E ~P2(pl ~ p2) }.
Property ii) guarantees that there is no "hidden" information in the choice of
basic formulas.
Furthermore, note that i) and ii) imply, for m 5 n,
~Pn(pm) - Mm-~ X ~1(pl) X M~-m
(proof: use a: { 1}~{ l, ... , n}, 6( I )- m and a:- pl)
and that i) is a consequence of ii)
(proof: use 6: { ] , ... , n } ~ { I , ... , nfm }, a(k) :- k, k - 1, ... , n).
16.2 Definition A possible meanings model is a pair (M, (~p~)n - 1,2,... )
such that M is a set and (cpn)n - ~,~, is a possible meanings assignment on
M.
Examples
It takes some preliminary work to ~ive examples of possible meanings
models. One possibility is to use the implication operators O( ,) and U( ,)
that were defined in Chapter 3. The resulting models may or may not be
realistic models of rational behaviour, but they are needed to prove some
important results.
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16.3 Definition A possible meanings model (M, (rp~)„ - ~ 2 ) is called stiff
whenever, for n- 1, 2, ... , for all a, b E L~ :
~p~(a n b) - tp~(a) n~Pn(b),
(pn(a v b) - (pn(a) u ~Pn(b),
(~r,(~ a) - M" ~ (~r,(a).
If M is equipped with a topology, then (M, (rpn)n - ~ 2 ) is called O-stiff
whenever it is stiff and for n- 1, 2, ... , and for all a, b E Ln :
rp~(a -~ b) - O(~P„(a), rp~(b)),
where O( ,) is the O-operator of Chapter 3(Definition 9.6).
Likewise, it is called U-stiff whenever it is stiff and for n- 1, 2, ... , and for
a11a,bE Ln:
~p~(a ~ b) - U(cQ„(a), ~p~(b)),
where U( ,) is the operator defined in Definition 12.1.
Iri t{2e seyuel tive will write "let M be a possible meanings rnodel" as
shorthandfor "let (M, (rp,~)n - t ~ ) be a~ossible meanings model and let
M be equipped with sorrie topology. "
16.4 Lemma Let X and Y be topological spaces, a, c c X, and b, d c Y.
If a x b~ c x d, then either a-~ c or b- QS.
Proof: If axfi~cxd,then axb~cxY (S.lOiv),
hence axb-~(anc)xb (S.lOiiand5.l0iv).




16.5 Lemma Let X and Y be topological spaces, and a, b c X.
Let OX( ,) and OXXY( ,) denote the O-operators in X and X x Y,
respectively. Then
OX(a, b) x Y- Oxxy(a x Y, b x Y).
Proof:
1) OX(a, b) n ca -~ b. By the independence theorem,
(OX(a, b) n a) x Y ~ b x Y, i.e.
(OX(a, b) x Y) n(a x Y) ~ b x Y.
Hence, OX(n, b) x Y c Oxxvla x Y, b x Y).
2) Suppose that O ~ x OZ c OXXY(n x Y, b x Y), and that O ~ x Oz ~~ó.
Then (O~ x OZ) n(a x Y) ~ b x Y, i.e.,
(O~ na)x02-~bxY.
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Since O~ ~ QJ, it follows by the reverse of the independence theorem that
O~ na~b,
hence O ~ c OX(a, b) and O ~ x Oz c OX(a, b) x Y.
Hence, OXXy(a x Y, b x Y) c OX(a, b) x Y.
LJ
We are now ready to aive examples of possible meanings models.
16.6 Example If M is a topological space, and V c M, then there is one
and only one possible meanings assignment ( ~pn)~ - ~, such that (M,
(tPn~n-1,2,... ) is O-stiff and ~p~(p1) - V.
Proof: Condition i) of Definition 16.1 is a straightforward consequence of
Lemma 16.4. Condition 16.1 ii) is then easy to see. Note that 16.1 ii) implies
that cp~(p~) - M'-~ x V x Mn-' for n- 1, 2, ... and i- 1, ... , n. Hence,
demanding stiffness guarantees that (cp~~)~~ - ~ Z is unique.
L~
16.7 Lemma Let X and Y be topological spaces, and a, b c X.
Let UX( ,) and UXXy( ,) denote the U-operators in X and X x Y,
respectively. Then
Ux(a, b) x Y- UxxY(a x Y, b x Y).
Proof ( relying on 12.2, 12.3, 14.6 and 16.4) :
If Y- P~, then the statement is trivial. Let us therefore suppose that Y~~.
If a~ b is true, then a x Y ~ b x Y is also true, and
UX(a, b) x Y- X x Y- UXXY(a x Y, b x Y).
If a -~ b is not true, then a x Y ~ b x Y is not true (since Y~~Ó), hence
UX(a, b) x Y -(OX(a, b) n á) x Y
anC UxXy(a x Y, b x Y) - OxXy(a x Y, b x Y) n a x Y.
But a x Y - á x Y- á x Y(see B.12).
Hence, by 16.5,
(OX(a, b) n á) x Y- (OX(a, b) x Y) n(a x Y) -
- OhXy(a x Y, b x Y) n a x Y.
Hence, UX(a, b) x Y- UXXy(a x Y, b x Y)
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16.8 Example If M is a topological space, and V c M, then there is one
and only one possible meanings assignment (cpn)~ - ~,2,.., such that (M,
(~Pn)n-1,2,... ) is U-stiff and cp~(pl) - V.
(Proof: Similar to the proof of 16.6; use Lemma 16.7 instead of 16.5.)
It is not straightforward to give an example of a possible meanings model
that is not stiff. Nevertheless, non-stiff models should not be regarded as
uninteresting or nonsensical. For example, if the person considers a E M to
be a half truth, acceptable only when accompanied by (3 E M, then a n~3 is
accepted, but a is not. That is :
~P2(PZ ~ p2) 3 (a, ~), but ~p~(pl) ~ a,
hence
tP2~Pr ~ P2) ~~P2(Ai) (- ~PI(P1) x M),
hence, M is not stiff.




More Definitions : M-validity
Let M be a possible meanings model, and let a ~,... , a~n, b~,... , b„ be
formulae from L. Say, a ~,... , a~,,, b~,... , b„ E LN.
16.9 Definition The rule
a~, ... , a m
b~,...,b„
is called M-valid whenever
~Ptv(a i) n... n~PN(an,) ~~Ptv~b ~) n... n cpN(b~)
is true in the topological space MN.
Note that this definition does not really depend on N, since
~pN(a ~ ) n... n~PN(am) ~~PN(b ~) n... n ~pN(b~)
implies
~px(a~) n... n ~pK(am) -~ ~px(b~) n... n ~pK(b„),
for all K such that a ~,... , am, b~,... , b~ E LK.
(Proof: If N ~ K, then 16.1 i) implies
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~K(ai) -~N(ai) x MK-N for i- 1, ... , m
(likewise for b~, i- 1, ... , n),
hence
~px(a i ) n... n ~pK(am) ~ ~pK(b ~) n... n cpK(b„),
by Theorem 14.6.
If K ~ N and M~~, use the reverse of Theorem 14.6.
If M- Q1, then cpK(a~) - Q~, for all i and all K.)
16.10 Proposition If 6:{ 1, ... , N} -~ { 1, ... , K} is an injective map and
a~, ... , an, 6(a~), ... , 6(am)is M-valid, then is also M-valid.
bi, ... , b~ 6(b~), ... , 6(b~)
(Proof: Use 16.1 ii) and Theorem 14.6.)
16.11 Theorem Suppose that M is a possible meanings model, and that a~,
... , am, b ~,... , b~ E L~. Let c be a formula of L~tK that does not contain
any of the basic formulas pl, ... , pN.
If the rule
a~, ... , am a~, ... , am, c
is M-valid, then is M-valid.
b~,...,b~ bi,...,b„
Proof: If c does not contain pl, ... , nor pN, then
(pNtK(C) - MN X(PK(C') for some formula c' E LK.
Note that cpN~K(a~) - cpN(a~) x MK for i- 1, ... , m.
Likewise fur b~, i- 1, ... , n.
Hence
~pN(a ~) n... n~PN(am) ~~PN(b i) n... n ~pN(b~)
implies
(~N(a~) r1 ... n cpN(am)) x ~PK(c~)
~ (cpN(b~) n ... n cp~(bn)) x ~PK(c~),
which implies
(~PN(a~) r1 ... rl ~N(am)) x ~PK(c~)
~(~pN(b~) n... n ~pN(b~)) x MK,
which is equivalent to
~PNtK(a~) rl ... n ~QNtK(am) ~ ~NtK(c)
~ (~PNfK(b~) (1 ... ll (QNtK(bn),
that is,
ai, ... , a n,, c
bi. ... , b~
is M-valid.
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16.12 Corollary If c E L has no basic formulae in common with any of the
formulas a~, ... , am, b~, ... , b~ , and a~' "~ ' am is M-valid, then
bi,...,bn
a~, ... , am, c
is M-valid.
(Proof: Use 16.10 and 16.1 1.)
16.13 Example If M- IR, (M, ( cp~)~ - ~ 2 ) is O-stiff and V:- cp~(pl) :-
(0, 1) v (1, ~) , then




But{ (x,y)E IR'-I (xCOory~O)andxE Vandy~ V }-
{ (x,y)E IR~I y-landxE V }-Vx{1},
andVx{1}-yVxV. Hence,Vx{I}-fiMxV.
Hence, ~P2(pi ~ p2) ~ tP2(p1) ~~P2( ~pa) ~~P~(P2).
Note that pl ~ p2' pl' ~p2 is M-valid, as well as p1 ~ p2' pl (see
~p2 p2
also Theorem 16.14 below).
16.14 Theorem If M is an O-stiff possible meanings model, then every rule
that is O-valid (see Definition 9.1 1) is M-valid.
Proof:
Suppose that (M, (cp~)„ - ~ 2 ) is O-stiff, that a~, ... , a~,,, b~, ... , b~ E LN,
and that
a~, ... , am
b~~ --- ~ bn
is O-valid.
Let (X, O, cp) be an extended model such that X- MN and cp(p~) - cpN(p~)
for i- l, ... , N. Since M is O-stiff,
~pN(a~) - ~p(a~), for i- 1, ... , m.
Likewise for b~ , i- 1, ... , n.
Since a~' '~~ ' am is O-valid,
b~,...,b~
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N(a i) n... n ~p(am) ~ ~p(b i ) n... n ~p(b~).
Hence,
cpN(ai) n... n ~pN(am) ~ ~pN(b~) n... n ~p~(b„),
that is,
ai' "' ' am is M-valid.
b~,...,b~
0
The reverse of this theorem is not true :
16.15 Corollary If M is an O-stiff possible meanings model, and a, b, c are
three distinct basic formulas from L, then
a ~ b, a, c
b
is M-valid, but not O-valid.
Proof: By 16. l4 and 9.12, a~ b' a is M-valid. The corollary now
follows from Theorem 16.1 1 and Example 11.11 ii).
A Closer Look at U-stiff Models
16.16 Theorem If M is a U-stiff possible meanings model, then every rule
that is U-valid (see Definition 12.4) is M-valid.
Proof: Similar to the proof of 16.14.
~
Note that pl ~ p2 ~ p1 is O-valid as well as U-valid (see
P2
Proposition 12.8).
pl ~ pz is O-valid, but not U-valid (see Proposition 12.5).
I~l ~ P3 ~ p2
16.17 Proposition Let M be a U-stiff possible meanings model, and V:-
cP~(p1). Then the followin~ two statements are equivalent :
i) pl ~ p2 is M-valid,
pl ~ P3 ~ p2
ii) V is dense in M or V~ is dense in M.
Proof: If V is full in M, then (by Theorem 14.6 and 5.10 iv)
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VxM~MxV and VxMxV-~MxVxM,
hence cp3(pl ~ p2) - M3 -~p3( (P1 n p3) -~ p2).
Likewise, if V- Q~, then cp3(pl -~ p2) - M-~ - cp~( (pl n p3) ~ p2).
Hence, we may assume without loss of generality that M~-i V and V~~Ó.
If M~i V and V~ QJ, then (by 16.4)
VxM~MxV and VxMxV~MxVxM,
hence (using 12.2 and 12.3)
~p~(pi~pz)-0(VxM,MxV)xM n VxMxM.
and cp3((plnp3)~p2)-0(VxMxV,MxVxM) n VxMxV.
(Note that cp~(p1 n p3) - V x M x V and that V x M x V- V x M x V by
B.12.)
ButO(VxM,MxV)xMcO(VxMxV,MxVxM).
(To see this : for all O c M x M,
O n(V x M) ~ M x V implies (by 14.6 and 5.10 iv)
(OxM)n(VxMxV)-~MxVxM.)
Hence, cp3(pl -~ p2) c O(V x M x V, M x V x M).
Hence,
~P3(pi ~ p2) ~ ~P3( (pi ~ p3) ~ p2)
is true (only) if
O(VxM,MxV)xM n (VxMxM) ~ VxMxV,
i.e. (O(VxM,MxV)n(VxM))xM ~ VxMxV.
It easily follows from 14.6 and 16.4, that this is true ( only) if
either0(VxM,MxV)n(VxM) - QJ,
or M ~ V .
Of these two statements, the latter is true ( only) if V is dense in M.
To see that the the former is true (only) if V~ is dense in M, we first note
that O(V x M, M x V) is an open set and that V x M- V x M (see B.12).




Now suppose that V~ is dense in M.






By 14.6 and 16.4, it is easy to see that the latter is true (only) if
O ~ n V- d or OZ ~ V,
which is equivalent to O~ n V- Q~, since V~ is dense in O,.
Which proves that O(V x M, M x V) c V~ x M, i.e.,
O(VxM,MxV)n(VxM) - Q~.
On the other hand, if V~ is not dense in M,





Hence, O(V x M, M x V) n(V x M) ~ QJ.
16.18 Example Let M be a U-stiff possible meanings model, such that
V- cp~(pl) is full in M, V ~~ and V ~ M. (For example, M- IR and V-
IR ` {0}.)
Then pl ~ p2 is not M-valid.
pl n ~p2 ~ p2
Proot`. Since V is full in M, V x M~ M x V is true (14.6 and 5.10 iv),
hence
cp3(pl~p2)-U(VxM,MxV)-M2.
Since V~ -~ V is not true, and V~ QS,
V x V~ ~ M x V is not true (by 16.4),
hence, ~p-~( (pi n-,p2) -~ p2) - U(V x V~, M x V) -
-0(VxV~,MxV)n(VxV`~.
Hence, cp3( (pl n-,p2) -~ p2) c( V x V` ).
Hence,
~P~(pi ~ P2) ~ rP3( (pi n ~pz) -~ p2)
would imP1Y cp~(pl -~ p2) ~( V x V` ~,
i.e., M'- ~ ( V x V` ~- V x V` (see B.12),
which would imply (by 14.6 and 16.4)
M~ V`, hence M- V`, i.e., V~ is dense in M.
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But V is full in M, and M~ Q~.
Hence,
rP3~Pi ~ Pz) ~ tP3( (Pi n~pz) -~ pz)
is not true.
Plausible Validity
Example 16.18 shows that the statement
Pl ~ P2
Pl ~ P3 ~ P2
is M-valid"
is strictly weaker than the statement
a~b
"for all a, b, c E L: is M-valid."
anc~b
However, if a person's repertoire M satisfies the former, but not the latter, it
is still fair to say that the person obeys-up-to-possible-exceptions the rule of
monotony, since it amounts to the statement:
"for practically all a, ~3, y E M such that a~~3 is (accepted as) true,
a n y-~ ~3 is also (accepted as) true."
Likewise, the M-validity of, say,
P1 ~ P2 ~ P1 ~ P3
Pl ~ PZ ~ P3
is enough to say that the person obeys (up-to-possible-exceptions) the "and-
introduction rule". In view of the remarks of ~ 10, this should make us
curious which laws are obeyed by all per,cons obeying the rules of classical
propositionnl logic. Hence, let us define :
16.19 Definition A rule is called plnusibly valid whenever it is M-valid in
all possible meanings models M in which the following rules are M-valid :
(where a, b, c and d denote fnur distirtct basicformulas)
c~a, c~b c~anb c~anb
c~anb c-~a c-~b














16.20 Corollary If a, b, c are three distinct basic formulas, then
a ~ b, a, c .
b
is plausibly vahd,
a -~ b is plausibly valid,anc-~b






Proof: Direct corollaries of previous results (16.11 (f 16.19), 16. I 2, 16.19,
and 16.18, respectively).
~
16.21 Corollary If c E L has no basic formulae in common with any of the
formulas a~,... , am, b~,... , b~ , and
then





Proof: Direct corollary of Theorem 16.11.
~
is plausibly valid,
16.22 Corollary Suppose that a ~,... , am, b i,... , b~ E LN and that 6:{ 1,
... , N}~{ 1, ... , K} is an injective map.
If a~' "' ' am is plausibly valid, then ~~a~~' '~- '~~am~ is also
bi, ... , b~ 6(bi), ... , 6(b~)
plausibly valid.
Proof: Direct corollary of Proposition 16.10.
Il7
Bold Validity
16.23 Definition A rule is called boldh~ valid whenever it is M-valid in all
stiff possible meanings models M in which the rules of Definition 16.19 are
M-valid.
Then results similar to 16.20, 16.21 and 16.22 can still be proved, as well as
the following :
16.24 Proposition If a~, a~, ... , a" do not contain the symbol "~", then
the following two statements are equivalent :
i)
a~' "' ' a" is boldly valid,
ao
ii) a~,... , a" ~ a~ holds classically.
Proof: Suppose that ao, a~, .. . , a" E LN do not contain "~".
1) If a~,... , a" I- ao , then in every stiff model M,
(pN(al) n ... n (p~,(a") c ~PN(a0),
hence,




2) If a~ a a" is boldly valid, then it is also M-valid in the ( unique) O-
0
stiff model with M - {0,1 }(discrete topology) and V- tpi(p1) -{ 1}.
And it is easy to see that M-validity of




in that model is
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~17 Evaluation
With the definition of bold validity, this thesis has come to an end. It is to be
noted, though, that it is not our intention to propose any of the formalisms in
this thesis as a concrete description (or prescription) of an inference engíne,
as is usually the goal in other approaches towards non-monotonic logic.
They are intended to be an aid in understanding the nature of non-monotony
in practical reasoning (and not, in the first place, to invent better systems of
artitïcial reasoning).
The notion of bold validity is a formal description of an inference relation on
classical propositional logic extended with a binary connective "--~" that
represents defeasible implication. (That it is an extension of the classical
inference relation follows from Proposition 16.24.) Bold validity, interpreted
as a description of a person displaying non-monotonic reasoning behaviour,
is more convincing than topological validity (as defined in Chapter 3).
In the first place, the core of the detïnition (namely, the detïnition of M-
validity), is a more direct representation of validity-as-a-rule-with-possible-
exceptions. The M-validity of a rule amounts to a(non-standard) universally
quantified statement about sentences, instead of worlds. For example, the
validity of the rule
a~b, a
b
is interpreted as "for practically all sentences a and (3 from the person's
repertoire such that the person accepts a ~(3 and a as true, (3 is accepted as
well."
In the second place, no fixed semantics of implication was assumed, in that
the exact nature of the elements of M was left unspecified, as well as the
exact content of statements like
(a, (~) E ~P2(P1 -~ p2).
The concrete semantical idea of Chapter 2(Definition 5.7) was used onlti~ to
define what it means to accept a rule of inference as a defeasible rule.
Although our only concrete examples of possible meanings models used
explicit definitions, like O( ,) or U( ,), other, more flexible, models were
not excluded (see the definitions of plausible and bold validity, Definitions
16.19 and 16.23).
In fact, since we did not assume M to be closed under n, v, ~ and ~, we
did not exclude persons with a"flexible" interpretation of implication. For
example, in the formula
P3 ~ (A1 ~ PZ),
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the person might use different interpretations of implication, depending on
the concrete interpretation of p3. This represents the possibility that, for two
concrete sentences a and ~3, the meaning of a~(3 might depend on more
than just a and (3. On the other hand, by demanding stiffness, we did restrict
the possible flexibility of the connectives n, v and -~. The notion of plausible
validity does not even have this restriction.




a ~ b, a, c
a~b
is boldly valid, but is not.
an-,b--~b
a -~ b, a, ~b
b is boldly valid, but b is not.
Hence, a person whose inference relation matches with bold validity
displays more natural reasoning behaviour than a person that reasons
according to topological validity (see Example 1 1.1 1). For this reason, bold
validity might be easier acknowledged as a fonnal description of a person
"accepting the rules of classical propositional logic as niles-with-possible-
exceptions."
Nevertheless, the approach of ~ 16 resembles the approach of Chapter 3, in
that the notion of full subset is still the core of the system, and that the
system arises in a natural way from this notion.
Comparison with other approaches
Although, as said, neither plausible validity nor bold validity is proposed as
a"definitive" system, it is interesting to compare the behaviour of these
notions with some of the existing approaches. Since our system does not
address matters of causality or inertia in changing domains, we will restrict
our attention to a number of systems that propose solutions to the
irrelevance problem or related issues.
Preferential entailment (see [LM 92]) is an approach in which, given a set 0
of defaults, a new set ~' of defaults is defined, called the rational closure of
~. Preferential entailment solves the irrelevance problem, in that the rational
closure of 0-{ a w b} contains a n c 1~ b if c is logically independent from
a and b, but it does not contain a n~b 1~ b. That is, in the presence of the
rule a w b and assumptions a and c, preferential entailment allows the
conclusion b, whenever c is independent from a and b, but not if c-~b.
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However, if b, c, f, p, and w are five distinct basic formulas, then in the
presence of the rules b h f (birds fly), p h bn-,f ( penguins are birds that
do not íly), c~ w (crows have wings) and the assumptions p and c,
preferential entailment fails to conclude w, as [Asher 95] correctly points
out. Using 16.21, on the other hand, it is easy to see that
b-~f, p-~bn~f, c~w, p, c
w
is plausibly valid as well as boldly valid (since c~w, c
w
valid and none of the other premisses contains c or w.)
Likewise, in the presence of the rules a F~ b, c F~ d and the
~b and c, preferential entailment does not conclude d, but
a-~ b, c--~ d, a, -,b, c
d
is easily seen to be plausibly valid as well as boldly valid.
(2)
In [Benferhat et al. 93], these and similar deficiencies of preferential
entailment were called "the drowning effect", and a rather ad hoc solution
was presented. A more fundamental solution (from the viewpoínt of
mathematical logic) was given in [GMP 93], using probabilistic notions (in
particular, entropy).
[Asher 95] also mentions
and
a-~ b, a~ c, a, ~b
c




It is not known whether one or both of these rules is plausibly valid or
boldly valid. Preferential entailment does not sanction these inferences.
We will return to (3) and (4) in the next subsection.
Each of these three approaches (i.e., [LM 92], [Benferhat et al 93], and
[GMP 93]) is restricted to inferences of this simple kind. Unlike bold
validity, they cannot be seen as descriptions of "classical propositional logic
extended with a defeasible conditional," since the defeasible conditional is
not a(nestable) connective in these formalisms.
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On the other hand, comrnonsense entnibnent (see [Asher 8z Morreau 91 ] or
[Asher 95]), an attempt to formalize "the calculus of generics", does define a
non-monotonic entailment relation on a language having a defeasible
conditional as a connective. The approach solves (1) and (2); it solves (3)
and (4) only after considerable changes (see [Asher 95]). In general,






are plausibly valid (boldly
valid), then a~' ~~~' a" is also plausibly valid (boldly valid).
c
(Proof: Direct corollary of the Definitions 16.19 (16.23), ! 6.9 and
Proposition 5.11 ii.)
Although this might seem to be a point in our favour, it is questionable







but should not be valid.
an~b~c
should be valid,
Although there is little difference between "the calculus of generics" and
"the calculus of rules-with-possible-exceptions", the approach of ~ 16 is very
different from commonsense entailment. We assume that the axioms or
principles governing the calculus are themselves rules-with-possible-
exceptions. Hence, a formal characterization of this calculus requires not
only a set of axioms, but also (and in the first place) an adequate formalism
that handles these axioms as rules-with-possible-exceptions. We could say
that the latter is completed with the introduction of the notions of ~ 16.
However, the choice of a suitable set of axioms leaves room for discussion.
Possible Further Research
In ~ 16, we simply used the ordinary axioms of classical propositional logic
as the "axiom set". As we saw, that choice gave a number of satisfying
results. However, it is certainly not the only possibility. Let us consider an
example.
We interpreted the rule of monotony as
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"for practically all a, (3, y E M such that a---~ (3 is (accepted as) true,
a n~y ~(3 is also (accepted as) true."
However, accordina to Chapter 4, this is not equivalent to
"for practically all a, (3 E M such that a-~ (3 is true :
for practically all y E M: a n y~(3 is also true."
This reformulation seems acceptable as an alternative for the former inter-
pretation of rnonotony. We could even consider
"for all a, (3 E M(without exceptions) such that a~(3 is true :
for practically all y E M: a n 7~(3 is also true."
Moreover, one could add one or more axioms, for example,
a ~ ~b
-,(a ~ b)
Or even seemingly bizar rules, like
a n b, ~a
a ~ ~b
(To defend this rule, we could audaciously reason as follows : if a and ~3
are sentences such that a n(3 is acceptable, but a is not, then "apparently",
a is a half truth, acceptable only when accompanied by (3. The only situation
in which it makes sense to accept a n(3 as well as ~a, is that a suggests
something that is known to be not true, because ~3 is also true. That is, there
exists a y such that a~ y and a n(3 ~~y are true. Audaciously accepting
R6 (an ordinary consequence of P1-P5, see ~8), this implies a~~~3.)
Coming back to the rules (3) and (4), these inferences seem to be
applications of the "general principle" of Chapter 4(see p. 92). Slightly
reformulating (4), for example, the underlying argument seems to be the
following.
The inference of p~ e(penguins have eyes) from b-~ f(birds fly), p-~ b,
p~-i f and b-~ e is correct, since p~ b suggests the existence of a rule
"for practically all Z such that b~ Z: p-~ Z",
Z- f constitutes an exception to this rule, and Z- e is an independent new
instance. Hence, by the general principle of Chapter 4, we can apply the rule
toZ-e: b~e yields p~e.
Likewise, the idea behind accepting (3) seems to be the following.
The inference of c from a~ b, a--~ c, a and -,b is correct, since "a"
suggests the existence of a rule
"for practically all Z such that a~ Z: Z",
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Z- b constitutes an exceptions to this rule, and Z- c is an independent, new
instance. Hence, by the general principle of Chapter 4, we may apply the
rule to Z- c: a-~ c yields c.
A very interesting task for the future would be to find "direct" translations
(in the spirit of ~ 16) of these reasoning patterns.
Other important issues to deal with are of a more fundamental nature. For
example, reconsidering the proof of Proposition 16.17, we can prove that in
every U-stiff model M in which the rule of monotony is M-valid, the rule of
monotony is, in fact, "strictly" M-valid, in that
rP3(pi ~ pa~ ~~P3( (pi n p3) -~ p2).
This means that the person accepts a n~~ (3 for all a, ~3, y E M(without
e~reE~tions) for which a~~3 is accepted. Nevertheless, in some of these
models, the rule
Pi ~ Pz
Pi ~ ~P2 ~ P2
is not M-valid (see Example 16.18).
We could say that in such M, monotony is valid-without-exceptions (that is,
exceptions in M), but does mysteriously have exceptions "in L".
In this context, it is well to remember that the conditions 16.1 i) and ii) are
iather weak. We might wonder whether it is possible to add one or more
plausible conditions to Definition 16.1, in order to prevent oddities of this
kind. (Demandin~ M to be closed under n, v, ~, and ~ would be an
unreasonably stron~ condition, since this would exclude the possibility of a
"flexible" meaning of implication, as explained earlier in this section.)
Recapitulation
The detinitions of ti 16 enable us to study non-monotonic logic as an ordinary
and respectable discipline of mathematical logic.
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Summary and Conclusions
Although non-monotonic logic arose as a subdiscipline of artificial
intelligence, the potential of the subject for the tïeld of mathematical logic
should not be underestimated, as non-monotony is connected with the most
important difficulties in formalizing practical reasoning. Practical reasoning
seems to be governed by general principles that function as rules-with-
possible-exceptions. Hence, mathematical axioms, when interpreted in the
usual way, will not suffice to describe the underlying calculus.
In this thesis, the expressive power of the language used to formulate
principles of reasoning has been extended to enable the interpretation of
formal axioms as valid-up-to-possible-exceptions in a number of ways. The
core of each system is the notion of a full subset (Definition 5.3), a
topological generalization of intuitions stemming from Euclidean geometry
(a subject that preceded Aristotelean logic). This notion gives rise to a
topological semantics of defeasible implication in a natural way (Definitions
5.7 and 6.1). A sound and complete axiomatization is established, relying for
the proof on a result of [KLM 90] (in fact, we find the same axiom system).
The notion of a full subset is then used to detïne semantics of nested
implicational statements (Chapter 3). This semantics is associated with two
issues. In the first place, we think of an imaginary person that handles
(some) rules of inference as rules-with-possible-exceptions (see ~ 10). With
the semantics defined in ~9, the person turns out to obey-up-to-possible-
exceptions every law of classical propositional logic, including modus
ponens and the rule of monotony. Thus, it ís shown that it is possible for a
non-monotonic formalism to obey-up-to-possible-exceptions the rule of
monotony.
A much more interesting conclusion is that the rules of classical
propositional logic do apparently not determine the usual interpretation of
implication (and inference) as implication-without-exceptions.
In the second place, the formalism can be seen as extending classical
propositional logic with a binary connective denoting "defeasible
implication." Seen in this way, the non-monotony of the inference relation
has nothing to do with "non-deductive reasoning" or "jumping to
conclusions", but is a necessary consequence of the presence of a defeasible
conditional in the language; correct, deductive reasoning from defeasible
premisses is non-monotonic. (More provocatively: correct, deductive
reasoning in general is non-monotonic.)
T'he setup of Chapter 3, using nested implicational statements, is not entirely
convincing, however. It does not constitute a direct interpretation of
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defeasible rules-of-inference as (say) quantiiicational statements about
sentences. (This is important, since the conclusions above might be
consequences of technical peculiarities, cf. ~ 12: U-validity, Onvalidity and
S-validity do not support those conclusions.) Moreover, the behaviour of
the formalism is not in all respects in accordance with typical human
reasoning behaviour (see Example 11.11). The constnaction of forrnalisms
that behave better in this respect requires a more general setup.
Fortunately, the notion of a full subset can also be used to interpret
(universally) quantificational statements up-to-possible-exceptions, see
Chapter 4. This idea provides some useful insights for practical reasoning in
itself (see ~ 15) and can indeed be used to give a direct interpretation of
defeasible rules of inference (see ~ 16). Two easily achieved inference
relations (bold validity and plausible validity) reinforce the conclusions of
Chapter 3, by showing that the rules of classical propositional logic do not
lead to "ordinary" propositional logic if these rules are interpreted as rules-
with-possible-exceptions. That is, the axiom system that is usually thought to
characterize, a.o., the classical notions of inference and deducibility,
presupposes "the right understanding" of these notions.
Moreover, the approach of ~ 16 is more general than the one of Chapter 3, in
that ít is not limited to the collection of rules of classical propositional logic.
The choice and investigation of other "sets of rules", however, is beyond the
scope of this thesis.
Readers who want to know more without reading the whole thesis are advi-





This appendix contains standard definitions and results from elementary
Boolean logic, in particular, concerning Boolean algebras. Some of the
proofs have been (partly) skipped. The reader is referred to any standard
textbook on Boolean algebras, for example [Abbott 69].
A.1 Definition Let X be a set. A partial ordering (on X) is a binary
relation ~ satisfying:
i) for all p E X: p S p,
ii) ifp,q,rE X,p~qandq5r,thenpSr,
iii) if p, q E X, p ~ q and q S p, then p- q.
A.2 Definition A Boolean algebra is a structure (B, S, n, v, ~, 1, T),
where B is a set, 5 is a partial ordering on B, n and v are binary operations
on B, ~ is a unary operation on B, and L and T are elements of B, such that
i) for all a, b, c E B: a S b and a 5 c (only) if a S b n c,
ii) for all a, a', b, c(E B) :
bn(ava')Sc (only)if bnaSc andbna'Sc,
iii) for all a, b, c: if b n a S c and b n(~a) ~ c, then b ~ c,
iv) for all a, b, c: if a ~ b and a 5~b, then a ~ c,
v) foralla: 1Sa and aST.
A.3 Example If X is a set, then (~(X), c, n, v, .~, QJ, X) is a Boolean
algebra.
Instead of " the Boolean algebra (B, ~, n, v, ~, -L, T)", we will typically
write "the Boolean algebra (B, S)" or "the Boolean algebra B", if there is no
danger of confusion.
A.4 Definition Let B~ and B2 be Boolean algebras (we will write 5~, 52, n
~, n2 , etc.). A Boolean translation from B ~ to Bz is a map cp: B~-~ Bz
satisfying :
i) for all a, b E B ~ such that a 5~ b: ~p(a) ~~ ~p(b),
ii) for all a, b E B ~:~(a n~ b) - cp(a) n2 ~p(b),
iii) for all a, b E B~: tp(a v~ b) - cp(a) v2 ~p(b),
iv) for all a E B ~: ~p( ~ ~(a) )-~2(~p(a)).
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A.5 Typical Associations and Notations
If B is a Boolean algebra, X is a set and ~p: B-~ 6'(X) is a Boolean
translation, then the elements of B are sometimes thought of as sentences or
propositions. The elements of X are typically called possible worlds.
If a E B and w E X, we say that
w~~X ~~ a ("a is true in world w" )
whenever w E ~p(a).
This is sometimes abbreviated to w kX a, w~~ a or even to w~ a, if
there is no danger of confusion.
Hence, for all a E B,
~p(a) -{ w E X I w~ a},
"the set of all possible worlds in which a is true. For this reason, ~p(a) is
sometimes called the extension of the proposition a.
Furthermore, if a and b are elements of B, we say
a ~ ~X,~P) b
whenever
~p(a) c ~p(b).
This is sometimes abbreviated to a~X b, a~~ b or a~ b.
Note that with these notations, the properties A.4 i), ii), iii) and iv) amount
to:
i) for all a, b E B: if a 5 b, then a~ X b,
ii) for all a, b E B, w E X: w~ a n b(only) if w~ a and w~ b,
iii) for all a, b E B, w E X: w~ a v b(only) if w~ a or w~ b,
iv) for all a E B, w E X: w~~a (only) if w k~ a,
respectively.
A.6 Definition If ~p: B ~~ BZ is a bijective Boolean translation, then it is
called a (Boolean) isnrnorphism. If there exists a Boolean isomorphism tp:
B i-~ B2, then B ~ is called ison2orphic wrth B2.
A.7 Proposition If B is a.finite Boolean algebra (that is, if the underlying
set B is finite), then there is a(finite) set X such that B is isomorphic with
~(X).
Proof: Define X-{ p E B I for all q E B, if q 5 p, then q-1 or q- p}.
(The elements of this set are called the atoms of B.)
Define for all a E B:
~p(a)-{pEXIpSa}.
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It is elementary (but tedious) to check that ~p: B~~(X) is a Boolean
translation, and that it is a bijection. Hence, B is isomorphic with ~(X).
Moreover, since B is finite and X c B, X is finite.
~I
In general :
A.8 Proposition If B is a Boolean algebra, then there is a set X and a
Boolean translation cp: B~ G~(X) such that cp is an injective map.
Proof: Let S denote the Boolean algebra ~( { 0}). Then S-{ 1, T}.
Let X be the set of all Boolean translations B~ S.
Define for all a E B:
~p(a) -{ T E X I ~(a) - T}.
Then the map cp: B~ p(X) is a Boolean translation, as is easy to check.
The proof that cp is injective requires the axiom of choice, and is therefore
skipped.
~
A.9 Definition ~ Construction I Example Let V be any set.
Let L be the language generated via n, v, and ~, with the elements of V as
basic formulas, and two extra basic formulas, LL and TI,.
Then for every Boolean algebra B and for every map f: V~ B, there is one
and only one map f: L~ B satisfying
i) for all v E V: f(v) - f(v),
ii) for all a, b E L: f(a n b) - f(a) ng f(b),
iii) for all a, b E L: f(a v b) - f(a) vB f(b),
iv) for all a E L: f(~a )-~B( f(a) ),
v) f(L~) - LB and f(T~) - TB.
For a, b E L, define
a I- b:~ for every Boolean alaebra B and for every map f: V~ B,
f (a) 5 f (b),
and a- b: t~ a~ b and b~ a.
Then - is an equivalence relation on L.
Let n: L-~ L~- be the associated quotient map, and define
B(V) :- L~-.
It is easy to see that there exists a binary relation 5' on B(V) such that
for all a, b E B(V) : n(a) 5' n(b) (only) if a~ b.
Likewise, it is easy to see that there exist binary operations n' and v' on
B(V) such that
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for all a, b E B(V) :~(a) n' ~(b) - ~(a n b)
and for all a, b E B(V) : 7t(a) v' 7c(b) - ~(a v b),
and a unary operation ~' on B(V) such that
for all a, b E B(V) :~'( n(a) )- n( ~(a) ).
If we define
L' :- n(L~)
and T' :- ~(TL),
then it is also easy to see that (B(V), 5', n', v', -,', 1-', T') is a Boolean
algebra. This Boolean algebra is called the,free Boolean algebra generated
by (the elemenzs nf) V.
It satisfies the following property :
A.10 Proposition (Using the names and notations of A.9)
For every Boolean algebra B and every map f: V-~ B there is one and only
one Boolean translation f' : B(V) ~ B such that
for all v E V, f(v) - f'(~(v)).
(Proof: Elementary.)
A.11 Remark ~ Warning If any of the notations, symbols and terms used in
A.9 and A.10 is used somewhere else in this thesis, we do typically raot want
to refer to A.9 and A.10. Exceptions to this rule are the symbol -, the
symbol ~, the notation B(V), and the term "the free Boolean algebra
generated by (the elements of) V."
A.12 Proposition If V is finite, then B(V) is finite.
Proof: Let S denote the Boolean algebra p( { 0}).
By the defïnition of B(V), there are (at most) as many Boolean translations
B(V) -~ S as there are maps V~ S. If V is finite, there are only finitely
many maps V-~ S. Hence, taking a closer look at the proof of A.8, we see
that there exists an injective map B(V) ~~(X), for some finite set X.





This appendix contains preliminaries from elementary topology. Well-known
results will be stated without proof as "facts". Proofs of these, as well as
additional information about notions and definitions, can be found in any
standard textbook on topology, for example in [Gaal 64].
B.1 Definition Let X be a set. A topology on X is a collection i of subsets
of X satisfying :
t) X E ti, Q~ E T,
ii) If a and b E T, then a n b E ~,
iii) If ai E T for all i E I, then ~ ai E T.
iEI
"Let (X, i) be a topological space" means: let ~t be a topology on X.
Sometimes we just say "let X be a topologícal space". a c X is called an
open subset of X whenever a E T.
In this thesis, variable names like O, O', O ~, etc. are used exclusively for
open sets. In addition, we will skip the word "open" as much as possible.
B.2 Definition A space X is called a Hausdorff space whenever
for every p, q E X such that q~ p there exist OP, Oy C X such that
p E OP, q E Oq and Op n Oq - P~.
B.3 Example If X is a set, then ~(X), the collection of all subsets of X, is
a topology on X, called the discrete topology. The collection { Q~, X} is also
a topology on X, called the trivial topology.
Any set equipped with the discrete topology is a Hausdorff space. A set
equipped with the trivial topology is not a Hausdorff space, unless the
underlying set is empty or contains only one element.
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B.4 Example The Euclidean plane, IR2, is standardly assumed to be
equipped with the Euclidean topology, defined as follows: O c IR~ is open
whenever for all p E O there is a circular-disc-without-boundary contained
in O and containing p. ~ -,
Hence, circular-discs-without-boundary are open, i~ ~,~~
all unions of such sets are open and every open set is 4 `~~, J ~
a union of such sets. That is, the open sets of the
Euclidean plane are precisely the unions of circular-discs-without-boundary.
B.5 Example Likewise, IR is canonically equipped with the topology
consisting of all unions of open intervals.
Intuitively, a topology on a set X is a device that describes how the points of
X are geometrically "glued together". Typically there exists more than one
topology on every set, corresponding to different ways of glueing the points.
Not all topological spaces are equally convincing as carriers of some
geometrical intuition. For example, topologies on finite spaces are typically
difficult to interpret geometrically. Such spaces are sometimes called
"pathological spaces" (a notion that does not have a precise definition.)
B.6 Definition If (X, ~) is a topological space and a c X, then a inherits a
topology from X, called the induced topology (on a) :
~a:-{OnaIOE~}
This amounts to b c a being open in a (only) if there is some O, open in X,
such that b- O n a.
(Again, it is easy to check that this defines a topology on a.)
E'or example, the interval (V2, 1] is not open in IR, but it is open in [0, 1].
It is custom to generalize this definition, by calling any b c X open in a
whenever b n a is open in n.
B.7 Definition Let (X, i) be a topological space, and a, b c X.
a is closed (in X) whenever a~ is open (in X).
(a is closed in b whenever a n b is closed in b with induced topology.)
a is dense (in X) whenever O~~ implies O n a~ Q1.
(a is dense in b whenever a n b is dense in b with induced topology.)
a is nowhere dense (in X) if there is no nonempty O in which a is dense.
The closure of a, written as á, is the smallest closed set containing a.
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The irateriorof a, written ao, is the laroest open set contained in a.
B.8 Facts a is dense in X(only) if á- X.
If a is both dense and closed in X, then a- X.
ForallacX, aacacá.
If a c b, then á c b and ao c bo.
If ao c h, then ao c bo.
B.9 Definition An isolated pnint of a space X is a p E X such that { p} is
an open subset of X.
(For example, in IN with discrete topology, 0 is an isolated point. In IR,
however, 0 is not an isolated point.)
B.10 Definition Let (X, iX) and (Y, tiy) be topological spaces. The product
topology on X x Y is the smallest topology on this set containing iX x iY :-
{ OX x Oy I OX E iX and Oy E ty }. Note that this set itself is not a
topology on X x Y, as it does not satisfy B.l iii).
This amounts to a c X x Y being open (only) if for every (x, y) E a there
are Ox and Oy, open in X and Y, respectively, such that (x, y) E OX x Oy
acid OX x Oy c a.
Oy ~.:.,,.,. ~ ~
` J L ~`~
OX
B.11 Facts The product topology on IR x IR is the same as the Euclidean
topology. For every c E IR, the induced topology on { c} x IR is the same as
the standard topology on IR (see Example B.5).
B.12 Facts If X and Y are topological spaces, a c X and b c Y, then
axb-á xb
(where a x b denotes the closure in XxY of a x b, n denotes the closure in X
of a, and b denotes the closure in Y of b).
Likewise, (a x b)o - ao x bo.
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B.13 Definition Let X be a topological space, and - an equivalence relation
on X. Let n: X-~ XI-- be the quotient map. Then XI- is standardly equipped
wíth the quotient tvpology, defined as follows : a c Xh is open whenever
1[ t(a) is open in X.
B.14 DeBnition Let X and Y be topological spaces. A map f: X~ Y is
called continuous whenever for every O, open in Y, f`~(O) is open in X.
It is called open whenever for every O, open in X, f(O) is open in Y.
B.15 Fact If X is a topological space and n: X~ XI- is a quotient map,
then the quotient topology is the largest topology on X~-- for which ~ is
continuous.
Open quotient maps
For Chapter 4, (14.1 and 14.2) we will need the following standard
definitions and facts (in particular, Corollary B.20 and Proposition B.21.)
B.16 Definition For i- 1, 2, let X~ and Y~ be topological spaces and let f~
be a map X~ -~ Y~. Then the map f~ x f~ is the map X ~ x X, ~ Y ~ x YZ
defined by
(f ~ x fz)((x ~, xz)) -(f ~(x i), fz(x2)) for all (x~, xz) E X ~ x Xz.
This map is called the product map (of f ~ and f2).
B.17 Facts The product map of two surjective maps is a surjective map.
The product map of two continuous maps is continuous, the product map of
two open maps is open.
B.18 DeFinition A map f: X~ Y is called a quotient map whenever
i) f is surjective,
ii) for all a c Y, O is open in Y(only) if f~(O) is open in X.
(cf. Definition B.13.)
B.19 Fact If a map is surjective, continuous and open, then it is a quotient
map.
B.20 Corollary The product of two open quotient maps is an open quotient
map. (Proof: Every open quotient map is surjective, continuous and open.
Now apply B.17 and B.19)
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The topology of the set of Euclidean lines.
The collection G of lines of the Euclidean plane is the quotient space of a
subset of IR-~, namely in the following way. We may identify the Euclidean
plane with IRZ. Then every line E in IR'- is determined by an equation
pxtqyfr-0,
for some p, q, r E IR.
(That is, there are p, q, r E IR such that e-{(x,y) I px -t- qy t r- 0}.
On the other hand, for every (p, q, r) E IR-~ such that
(p, 9) ~ (~, 0)
this equation determines a line in IR'-.
Moreover, the equations p~x f q~y t r~ - 0 and p,x f q,y f r, - 0 determine
the same line (only) if there is a~, E IR such that ~. ~ 0 and
(~P~~ ~q~, ~r~) - (p~, q2. r?).
Detïne
H:- {(p, q, r) E IR-~ I(p, q) -(0, 0) },
and, for (p~, q~, r~) and (p,, q2, r2) E IR3 ~ H,
(P~, q~, ri) -- (P2~ q2~ r~) :r~
there is a~, E I R such that ~, ~ 0 and (i~p ~,~,q ~,~,r ~)-(p2, q2, r2).
Then there is a 1-to-l-correspondence between the elements of G and the
elements of (IR3 ~ H) ~ ~.
This latter set, in its turn, is standardly equipped with a topology (namely a
quotient topology of an induced topology of the standard product topology
on IR-~). By using the 1-to-l-correspondence, G is equipped with a topology.
The geometrical idea behind the above construction is the following.
Given a plane, E, choose a point P(in Euclidean space) not in E. Let O be
open (in the Euclidean space) not containing P. For every point Q in O there
is one and only one plane through P perpendicular to the line PQ. The
intersection of this plane with E is either empty or a line. Thus, with every O
is associated a set of lines in E(by ignoring that empty set). Now, the open
sets of G are precisely the sets that arise in the way described above.
B.21 Proposition ~t: IR-~ `H ~ G is an open quotient map.
Proof: If O is an open subset of IR-~, and ~, E IR`{0}, then
~,O(:-{ ~,xlxE O })
is open in IR-~ as well.
Hence, suppose that O is an open subset of IR-~ `H. Then
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n-~(n(O)) - U ~O,
~,eIR
which is open in IR-~, by B 1 iii).
Moreover, since H is a linear subspace of IR-~, ~ 1(n(O)) c IR-~ `H.
Hence, n~(~(O)) is open in IR-~ ` H. That is, ~(O) is open in (IR-~ `H) I-.
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Samenvatting
Niet-monotone logica bestudeert redeneervormen waarbij eenmaal
getrokken conclusies kunnen worden teruggetrokken op grond van nieuwe
informatie. Menselijk redeneren van alledag is niet-monotoon. Wiskundig
redeneren daarentegen is monotoon, in die zin dat daar uit méér gegevens
nooit mínder conclusies getrokken kunnen worden. Hoewel het niet moeilijk
is om met wiskundige hulpmiddelen kunstmatige niet-monotone formalismen
te ontwerpen, blijkt menselijk redeneergedrag keer op keer intelligenter:
doelmatiger en beter aangepast aan alledaagse problemen. Weliswaar
voldoet ook menselijk niet-monotoon redeneren aan zekere algemene
wetmatigheden, maar deze wetmatigheden lijken niet voor precieze
wiskundige beschrijving vatbaar. In de wiskunde is een regel ofwel geldig,
en dan heeft hij geen uitzonderingen, of hij heeft uitzonderingen, maar dan is
hij niet geldig. In het dagelijks leven hanteren we daarentegen voortdurend
regels die uitzonderingen hebben, maar "in-de-regel" geldig zijn. Ook de
wetmatigheden van (menselijk) niet-monotoon redeneren lijken het karakter
te hebben van regels met mogelijke uitzonderingen.
In dit proefschrift worden een aantal manieren beschreven om de uitdruk-
kingskracht van de wiskundige taal te vergroten, zodat we formele axiomás,
die we willen opvatten als regels-met-mogelijke-uitzonderingen, toch van
een precieze betekenis kunnen voorzien. Gemeenschappelijke kern van de
systemen is het topologische begrip "volle deelverzameling", dat geïnspi-
reerd is op intuïties uit de Euclidische meetkunde (verrassend genoeg een
traditioneel wiskundig onderwerp, en van oudsher een belangrijke inspiratie-
bron voor klassieke, "monotone" logica). Met dit begrip is het eenvoudig om
betekenis te geven aan "verbiddellijke" of "genaakbare" implicatie (Eng.
defeasible implication; notatie "~" of " 4~ ").
We vinden een volledig stelsel van axiomá s, waarbij we voor het bewijs
gebruik maken van het werk van [KLM 90]. Het blijkt overigens om het
zelfde axiomastelsel te gaan. Dit topologische begrip wordt vervolgens
(hoofdstuk 3) gebruikt om ook betekenis te geven aan "geneste" implicaties,
zoals bijv. in (a ~ b n c) ~(a -~ b) of ((a -~ b) n a) ~ b. We kunnen het
resultaat op twee manieren bekijken. Op de eerste plaats kunnen we het
formalisme beschouwen als een wiskundige karikatuur van een persoon die
sommige inferentie regels beschouwt als geldig-op-mogelijke-
uitzonderingen-na. In ons foi~nalisme volgt de persoon alle regels van
klassieke prapositie logica, inclusief modus ponens en de monotonie regel
(a ~ b) ~(a n c-~ b). Gezien door de ogen van een wiskundig redenerend
buitenstaander, die de monotonie regel als regel-zonder-uitzonderingen
interpreteert, redeneert de persoon echter niet-monotoon; de monotonie regel
is niet geldig-zonder-uitzonderingen. Wat uit ons formalisme blijkt is, dat het
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mogelijk is een ander implicatie-begrip te hanteren dan het "klassieke", met
behoud van alle klassieke logische wetten, mits we zo consequent zijn het
alternatieve implicatie-begrip ook te gebruiken om die logische wetten te
interpreteren.
In de tweede plaats kunnen we het formalisme beschouwen als een manier
om "genaakbare" implicatie als logisch voegteken toe te voegen aan
klassieke propositie logica. Als gevolg van de betekenis van genaakbare
implicatie zal de inferentie relatie dan niet-monotoon zijn: uit "a -~ b en a" is
"b" afleidbaar, maar uít "a ~ b, a en niet-b" is "b" niet afleidbaar. Zo
bekeken, hangt de niet-monotonie van deze inferentie relatie niet samen met
"niet-deductief redeneren" of inet "voorbarige conclusies". Het is een
consequentie van de betekenis van het voegteken "-~". De inferentie relatie
beschrijft een vorm van correct, deductief redeneren die niettemin niet-
monotoon is.
De aanpak van hoofdstuk 3, die genaakbare inferentieregels "invoert" via
geneste implicaties, heeft echter twee nadelen. Allereerst zou het formalis-
me duidelijker zijn, wanneer we genaakbare inferentie-regels konden
formuleren als gekwantificeerde uitspraken over proposities. (De aard van
het formalisme is van belang, omdat bovenstaande conclusies van hoofdstuk
3 het gevolg zouden kunnen zijn van onrealistische details in de
formalisering. Zo bleek in ~ 12, dat sommige varianten van het formalisme,
in het bijzonder On-validity, niet tot dezelfde conclusies leiden.)
In de tweede plaats is het gedrag van het systeem van hoofdstuk 3 niet altijd
in overeenstemming met wat we zouden verwachten (zie Example 11.11).
Formalismen die zich op dit punt beter gedragen kunnen echter niet op
hetzelfde principe gebaseerd zijn (d.w.z. een implicatie-operator en geneste
implicatie).
Gelukkig kan het topologische begrip "volle deelverzameling" ook gebruikt
worden om universele kwantificatie met mogelijke uitzonderingen te
definiëren. Dit wordt uitgewerkt in hoofdstuk 4, onder andere door een
aantal voorbeelden (~15), die laten zien dat dit onderwerp op zichzelf al van
belang is voor het bestuderen van practische argumentatie. Deze niet-
standaard interpretatie van universele kwantificatie gebruiken we vervolgens
in ~ 16, waar we genaakbare inferentie-regels op directe wijze formuleren als
gekwantificeerde uitspraken over het zinnen-repertoire van een redenerend
persoon. We passen het principe toe op de regels van klassieke propositie
logica, en laten zien dat het resultaat de conclusies van hoofdstuk 3
bevestigt: de regels van klassieke propositie logica kunnen niet gezien
worden als definitie of "karakterisering" van de gebruikelijke interpretatie
van inferentie en deduceerbaarheid, omdat de interpretatie van de regels het
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juiste begrip van deze noties vooronderstelt. We moeten al weten wat
implicatie-zonder-uitzonderingen betekent, voor we de regels op de
bedoelde wijze kunnen interpreteren.
De aanpak van ti 16 is bovendien bruikbaar om, naast klassieke propositie
logica, ook allerlei andere axioma-stelsels op gelijke wijze te behandelen.
Aan het onderzoeken van andere axioma-stelsels komen we echter in dit
proefschrift niet toe (waarmee meteen een mogelijke richtin~ voor verder
onderzoek ~egeven is).
Wie nader kennis wil nemen van de inhoud van het proefschrift, zonder het
boekje helemaal te lezen, wordt aan~eraden de eerste paragrafen van elk
hoofdstuk te bestuderen, te weten, ~ 1, ~ 5, ~9 (f ~ 10), ~ 14 en ~ 16.
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